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The first step in the estimate of an artist's 
philosophy is to ascertain what the artist himself con­
ceived as his mission, and whether he considered that 
he was impregnating his art with any philosophy of life 
worthy of acceptance. An admission hy an artist of a 
telic aim should give the inquirer a suggestion as to 
how to prosecute his investigation. But the converse is 
manifestly not true: that the denial of a telic aim
indicates the absence of a philosophy worth searching 
for. Both George Eliot and fhomas Hardy have left us 
in letters and notes, and buried in their imaginative 
writings, hints as to what each considered the aim of 
his work beyond the giving of pleasure to readers. Both 
felt that vital truths could be presented to a large 
audience more effectively through the imagination than 
directly through the faculty of reason. Yet eaoh dis­
claimed the responsibility of organizing his ideas into 
a complete system, neither artist, in fact, seems to 
have thought that the influence on society of any subtly 
ratiocinated system of philosophy could be very great.
So, like some greater moral artists, they have presented 
scattered truths for others to codify.
fhat George Eliot regarded art as a legitimate pulpit 
she stated in a review published in 18b6:
When Hornung paints a group of chimney-sweepers, 
more is done towards linking the higher classes with the 
lower, towards obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness,
2
than by hundreds of sermons and philosophical dissertations! 
Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of ampli­
fying experience and extending our contact with our fellow- 
men beyond the bounds of our personal lot#1
Of her own office as a literary artist she wrote in a
letter July 18, 1878:
My function is that of the aesthetic, not the 
doctrinal teacher--the rousing of the nobler emotions, 
which make mankind desire the social right, not the 
prescribing of special measures, concerning which the 
arjistic mind, however strongly moved by social sym­
pathy, is often not the best judge# It is one thing to 
feel keenly for one's fellow^beings; another to say,
"This step, and this alone, will be the best to take 
for the removal of particular calamities." 2
Yet in spite of this limiting of her "function”,
Greorge Eliot did, especially in her later novels and 
in The Spanish Grypsy and certain other poems, indulge 
in a great deal of abstract philosophizing— so much as 
to mar the artistry of, for example, Homola. This novel 
is, in fact, so didactic that it seems to depart from 
the inductive method that Greorge Eliot set for herself, 
and to follow the deductive plan, with characters and 
incidents cut to fit a previously determined moral# This 
program indicates a vast change in practice from her ideal 
of twenty years earlier, as expressed in a letter to her 
friend Sara Hennell:
I feel every day a great disinclination for theories 
and arguments about the origin of things in the presence 
of all this mystery and beauty and pain and ugliness that 
floods one with conflicting emotions#3
1. "Uatural History of German life," Essays. 161.
2. To Mrs. Peter Taylor. Gross III, 330.
3. To Miss Sara Hennell, June 8, 1837. Gross I, 461.
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This letter may have expressed a mood of weariness 
rather than a habitual attitude, for in her journal she 
wrote on January 28, 1859:
I owe him [Spencer] a debt of gratitude The
stimulus of his intellect, especially during our long 
walks, roused my energy once more and revived my dor­
mant love of science. His intense theorising tendency 
was contagious, and it was only the stimulus of a 
theory which could then have induced me to work.4
Some have seen in this growing tendency to philosophize 
a result of her growing interest in the scientific writ­
ings of her husband, Greorge H. Lewes. But the most 
probable explanation seems to be that George Eliot was 
oppressed with the necessity of bringing some sort of 
cosmic order out of the chaos of sufferings, wonderings* 
doubts, despairs. She had the instinct to manage, to 
arrange, to clarify, so insistently present that she be­
came a less accurate reporter in becoming a propagandist 
editor. In this she is quite different— one might say much 
less convincing— than Thomas Hardy. To the end of showing 
a satisfactory philosophy of life she bent every effort 
and consecrated every talent. Yet, unlike Thomas Hardy, 
she never brought her philosophy to even the semblance 
of a system. In a letter to Frederic Harrison she wrote:
But the fact is, I shrink from decided "deliverances” 
on momentous subjects from the dread of coming to swear 
by my own "deliverances”, and sinking into an insistent 
echo of myself. That is a horrible destiny— and one can­
not help seeing that many of the most powerful men fall 
int o it. °
4. Gross II, 76.
5. "To Frederic Harrison," January 15, 1870. Gross III, 1C
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The fact that Greorge Eliot's philosophy is never brought to 
a well rounded close does not indicate a lack of mental 
acumen or of moral courage. Bather it shows the agnos­
ticism inherent in any Positivist philosophy until the 
"unknowable" shall have been greatly reduced. For in 
spite of the deductive tendency mentioned in Bomola,
George Eliot remained a positivist as regards the great 
concepts of God, immortality, destiny, and the like.*
She could have been voicing her own increasing inability 
to reach conclusions satisfying to her judgment when 
she wrote in connection with the doubts assailing 
Savonarola:
To the common run of mankind it has always seemed 
a proof of mental vigor to find moral questions easy, 
and judge conduct according to concise alternatives.
And nothing was likely to seem plainer than that a man 
who at one time declared that God would not leave him 
without the guarantee of a miracle, and yet drew back 
when it was proposed to test his declaration, had said 
what he did not believe. 6
She seemed oppressed by the multitudinous aspects of 
truth demanding to be learned. Throughout her life she 
was an indefatigable student of science and of phil­
osophy, but always she saw ahead new fields to be in­
vestigated before she could reach satisfaction. She 
readily fell in with the investigative spirit of nine­
teenth Century thought, which she pictured in Daniel
* Positivism: A system of philosophy elaborated by
the Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798-1857), on the basis of 
the doctrine that man's knowledge is confined exclusively 
to phenomena, and that even this knowledge is relative and 
not absolute. It, therefore, rejects all attempts at 
metaphysics or speculative philosophy, whether as to 
natural causes or First Cause, and as to substances, 
physical or mental, human or divine. Dew Standard Dictionar
6. Bomola *‘■1, 150.
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Deronda:
While Mordecai was waiting on the bridge for the 
fulfilment of his visions, another man was convinced that 
he had the mathematical key of the universe which would 
supercede Hewton, and regarded all known physicists as 
conspiring to stifle his discovery and keep the universe 
locked; another, that he had the metaphysical key, with 
just that hairs-bredth of difference from the old wards 
which would make it fit exactly# 7
Throughout her works George Eliot dropped so many hits
of advice and uttered so many oracles that Mr# James
was right in stating George Eliot's
••••general attitude with regard to the novel, 
which, for her, was not primarily a picture of life, 
capable of deriving a high value from its form, hut 
a moralized fable, the last word of a philosophy en­
deavoring to teach by example* ®
jjike George Eliot, Thomas Hardy denied that he
had any consistent philosophy of life# Yet whereas
Eliot disclaimed in rather uncertain terms that hers was
a complete system of wisdom, Hardy asserted that what
was called his philosophy was
••• only a confused heap of impressions, like those 
of a bewildered child at a conjuring show. 9
It is this "confused heap of impressions" that will be
searched for its ideas of worth. That Hardy considered
the individual ideas in this "heap" as of value is
certain, and also that he considered his imaginative
mode of presentation best. In his journal he wrote on
October 17, 1896, while smarting from criticism of
7 Daniel Deronda II, 116.
8 James, Henry: Partial Portraits, 50
9 Letter written to someone about December, 1920, 




Poetry* Perhaps I can express more fully in verse 
ideas and emotions which run counter to the inert 
crystalized opinions— .hard as a rock— which the vast 
body of men have vested interests in supporting.
To cry out in a passionate poem that (for instance) 
the Supreme Mover or Movers, the Prime Force or Forces, 
must he either limited in power, unknowing, or cruel—  
which is obvious enough, and has been for centuries—  
will cause them merely a shake of the head; but to put 
it in argumentative prose will make them sneer, or 
foam, and «et all the literary contortionists jumping 
upon me, a harmless agnostic, as if I were a clamorous 
atheist, which in their crass illiteracy they seem to 
think is the same thing*•••If Galileo had said in 
verse that the world moved, the Inquisition might have 
let him alone. 10
Elsewhere in his journal he recorded:
April 19 (1885). The business of the poet and 
novelist is to show the sorriness underlying the 
grandest things, and the grandeur underlying the 
sorriest things. H
In October, 1917, he wrote:
I hold that the mission of poetry is to record 
impressions, not convictions. Wordsworth in his later 
writings fell into the error of recording the latter.
So also did Tennyson, and so do many other poets when 
they grow old. Absit omenJ ^
Some readers fresh from The Dynasts would not hold that 
Hardy has refrained from recording convictions. A few 
years later, in 1922, when Hardy was preparing to issue 
bate Ly rics and Earlier t he wrote an Apology which 
defends himself as a "thinker,11 and sets forth in some 
detail his later theory of his mission as artist. Yet 
here he pretended to no finished system:
10 Later Years,o7.
11 Barly Life. 223
12 Abater years , 178
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While I am quite aware that a thinker is not 
expected, and, indeed is scarcely allowed, now more, 
than heretofore, to state all that crosses his mind 
concerning existence in this universe, in his attempt 
to explain or excuse the presence of evil and the incon­
gruity of penalizing the irresponsible— it must be 
obvious to open intelligence that, without denying the 
beauty and faithful service of certain venerable cults, 
such disallowance of "obstinate questionings" and 
"bland misgiving" tends to a paralysed intellectual 
stalemate. Heine observed nearly a hundred years ago 
that the soul has eternal rights; that she will not be 
darkened by statutes, nor lullabied by the music of bells* 
An what is today, in allusion to the present author's 
pages, alleged to be "pessimism" is, in truth, only such 
"questionings" in the exploration of reality, and is the 
first step towards the soul’s betterment, and the body’s 
also. 13
The responsibility of the prose novelist in the shaping 
of the thoughts of the public was heavy on Thomas Hardy 
in the period of less and Jude. He was suffering under 
the sting of sharp criticism that his philosophy 
was useless if not positively dangerous. Yet he re­
fused to suppress or gloss his testimony. Instead he 
suggested that the fault might lie with the readers 
rather than with the philosophy;
It is unfortunately quite possible to read the 
most elevating works of imagination in our own ow any 
language, and, by fixing the regard on the wrong side of 
the subject, to gather not a grain of wisdom from them, 
nay, sometimes positive harm. What author has not had 
his experience of such readers?— the mentally and morally 
warped ones of both sexes, who will where practicable, 
so twist plain and obvious meanings as to see in an 
honest picture of human nature an attack on religion, 
morals, or institutions. Truly has it been observed that 
’the eye sees that which it brings with it the means of 
seeing." 14
13 Collected Poems, 526
14 "Profitable heading of Fiction1.!' Forum, wiarch, 1688.
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An entry in his journal for the same year implies 
genuineness of purpose:
October 7. The besetting sin of modern literature 
is its insincerity. Half its utterances are qualified, 
even contradicted, by an aside, and this particularly 
in morals and religion. When dogma has to be balanced 
on its feet by such lair-splitting as the late Mr. M* 
Arnold's it must be in a very bad way.
Two years later he published a more specific defence
of his loaded writing:
... The crash of broken commandments is as necessary 
an accompaniment of a tragedy as the noise of drum 
and cymbals to a triumphal march.
He defended his treatment of sex--a treatment that many 
Victorians and others have considered indelicate— by 
insisting that
... Nothing in such literature should for a moment 
exhibit lax views of that purity of life upon which the 
well-being of society depends; but the position of man 
and woman in nature, and the position of beliefs in the 
minds of man and woman--things which everybody is 
thinking but nobody is saying— might be taken up and 
treated frankly.
Though Hardy's defense of his right to publish his 
philosophy through imaginative writings grew more vigor­
ous, the philosophy itself did not change greatly, but 
was throughout deliberate, well-thought, and consistent.
It was suggested in the "Grass Casualty" of "Hap." written 
in 1866, and appeared without essential change in content, 
though with somewhat expanded reaches throughout his
lo Early Life. 281
16 nCandour in English Fiction,'! lew Heview. Jan. 1890.17 Ibid.
9
stories and poems to The Dynasts, completed in 1907, 
and the later poems* Throughout his long career he was 
a constant searcher for truth, and the hits of wisdom, 
colored by mood and circumstance, together form a 
more coherent whole than he foresaw when he wrote:
Unadjusted impressions have their value, and the 
road to a true philosophy of life seems to lie in 
humbly recording diverse readings of its phenomena as 
are forced upon us by chance and change*




POSITIVISTIC BASIS POR THE PHILOSOPHIES OP 
GEORGS ELIOT ADD THQmAS HARDY
Both George Bliot and Thomas Hardy were reared in
orthodox Christian surroundings. As a child and young
woman George Bliot was unusually devout. When she was
eighteen years old she wrote:
... Oh that we could live only for eternity! that 
we could realize its nearness.
... It would not cost me any regrets if the only 
music heard in our land were that of strict worship.-^-
At about the same time (1839) she wrote a devotional
poein, later published in the Christian Observer. The
refrain of the poem, Parewell. reflects the mood of its
inspiration, "Knowing that shortly I must put off this
2my tabernacle.” II Peter i.14.
Hardy was at one time destined for the church. When he 
was sixteen and an apprentice in an architect’s office, 
he became greatly exercised over the question of baptism. 
He feared that his own baptism in infancy acoording to 
English Church custom was not efficacious. Both Eliot 
and Hardy saw life with a high idealism. Both were by 
nature studious, investigative, eritical--characteristics 
not- inharmonious with religious devotion. And both were 
endowed with more than usual perceptiveness and insight* 
But the processes by which they arrived at their philo­
sophies, very similar in many major points, differed
1 jjetters to udiss Lewis (her teacher) Aug* 18 and Uov. 6, 1838. Cross I, 4,44.
2 Cross I, 57
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widely.
The method by which Greorge Eliot attained her 
philosophy of Positivism is well known. Here it is my 
purpose merely to mention some of the significant points 
as a basis for a further development of her theories of 
God, religion, fate, immortality. In 1841, two years after 
writing the letters mentioned above, George Eliot moved 
with her father to Coventry. Phe extensive reading that 
she had previously done in philosophy--Sant, Locke, be­
sides the ancients--formed a ground for friendship with the 
Pray circle. Phis consisted of Charles Bray and his wife, 
and the latter's brother and sister, Charles and Sara 
Hennell. Charles Bray had previously published his 
Philosophy of necessityt the essential feature of which 
is an identification of God and necessity. In this he holds 
that the supreme will or consciousness which has at some 
previous time created the universe has now regularised 
itself into automatically funcioning natural law. God, 
and therefore his objectification in the visible universe, 
are mind, either conscious or unconscious. In this he 
agrees with Hardy, except that he does not show the total 
mind in process of emerging into awareness. Phe necessity 
of explaining evil (pain), which prompts Hardy's thesis 
of the Emergent Will, also stimulate Bray. He answers 
the immemorial question of 7/hence comes evil? by an appeal 
to the supernatural creator. Since God, or necessity,
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has created all things, He must be the author of pain.
But He has not created it through any pleasure of evil,
"but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued." 
Evil is the "invariable accompaniment of that error which 
is consequent upon the necessary limitation of the powersg
of knowing." It is always present where there is ability 
to enjoy. Bray devotes chapters to a justification of 
the existence of evil. It is necessary, he says, as a 
protection for the system upon which happiness depends 
and as a stimulus to action. Greorge Eliot accepted Brayfs 
necessitarian Cod as superior to her old concept, but the 
limiting of Grod absolutely to law--even the law of His 
own regularity— did not suit her. It inhibited too much 
the present power of the Grreat Initiator to initiate new 
action or to alter existing forces. Some years later, 
after she had become acquainted with Spencer and had already 
been joined with lewes for three years, she wrote to Charles 
Bray this criticism of his book:
... In the fundamental doctrine of your book (The 
Philosophy of necessity) --that mind presents itself under 
the same conditions of invariableness of antecedent and 
consequent as all other phenomena (the only difference 
being that the true antecedent and consequent are propor­
tionately difficult to discover as the phenomena are more 
complex)— I think you know that I agree. And every one 
who mows what science means, must also agree with you 
that there can be no social science without the admission 
of thcit doctrine. I dislike extremely a passage in which 
you appear to consider the disregard of individuals as 
a lofty condition of the mind, liy own experience and 
development deepen every day my conviction that our moral 
progress may be measured by the degree in which we 
sympathize with individual suffering and individual joy.
... I could more readily turn Christian, and worship Jesus
3 Bray, Charles: The Philosophy of necessity, vol I.
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again, than embrace a Theism which professes to explain 
the proceedings of God. 3ut I don't feel at all wise in 
these matters. I have a few strong impressions which serve 
me for my owr. support and guidance, but do not in the least 
qualify me to speak as a theorist. 4
Charles Hennell had also published three years previously 
An Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity. This 
book shows the falsity of the objective basis of the 
Christian Faith. It rejects the supernatural, the mirac­
ulous, elements in the Christian Religion, and treats it 
as a natural, or^nic outgrowth of Judaism in contact with 
Western philosophy. The various events of the Gospels it 
subjects to a rational criticism. The man Jesus it pre­
sents in much the same light as does George Moore's 
3rook Kerith* But it does seek to retain the moral and 
aesthetic values commonly seen in Christianity. Uor does 
it reject theism. The central thesis is that since 
Christianity has become an integral part of European 
civilization, incorporated in its mores. it must be real:
And how canst be otherwise than real to us, this 
belief that has nourished the souls of us all, and seems to 
have moulded actually anew their internal constitution, a. 3  
Til as stored them up with its infinite variety of eternal interests and associations? 5
To Hardy, Hennellfs doctrine would have seemed a scholastic 
compromise. He would have pointed out th t "real to usTt, 
while sufficient as the basis of a system of morals, is 
not satisfactory as the basis for a theism. He would have 
called the Inquiry an effort to endow a system postulated
4 letter to Charles 3ray, ITov. 15, 1857. Cross I, 472.
5 Hennell, Charles: Aa inquiry Concerning the Origin of
Christianity. '
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on reason with the properties inherent in an established 
religion. 3ut George Bliot1s devout nature demanded some 
support in her doubts, and this system served her. She 
read the Inquiry in 1841, evidently with great interest, 
for she often mentioned it in her letters, and in 1852 she 
wrote an analysis of it for the Analytical Catalogue of 
Mr. Chapman's publications. It seems to have marked an 
epoch in her life— the definite break with orthodoxy. In 
commenting on Hennellfs book she wrote to Miss lewis:
... 3ut my only desire is to know the truth, my only 
fear to cling to error. ^
Her enthusiastic acceptance of Hennellfs views may have 
been more ready because, as she says in another letter:
I think the ''Inquiry" furnishes the utmost that can be 
done toward obtaining a real view of the life and character 
of Jesus, by rejecting as little as possible from the Gospel
A year later Charles Hennell induced her to translate
Strauss' leben Jesu. S8ra Hennell, the third member of
the circle, was also a free-thinking writer, who afterwards
published Thoughts in Aid to laith.
These three thinkers believed in a Christianity as
an ethical and spiritual system, based largely on the
teachings of Je3us. All three held the losdtivistic idea
that man can have no real knowledge whatever except that
furnished him through his senses. Yet all three developed
theories not strictly Positivistic. George Eliot spent
much time with them, and their influence on the young
searcher can hardly be exaggerated. They aided in the
6 Letter to iiss Lewis, Uov. 13, 1841. Cross I, 103.
7. Letter to Miss Sara Hennell,Sect. 16, 1847. Cross I, 163
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usually very painful operation of removing the ingrafted 
supports of traditional religion. At the same time they 
helped her to an endurable conception of life# Her devotion 
to truth was sincere, hut her reasoning can hardly have 
been so purely inductive as it would have been if her loss 
of faith had not been so promptly compensated with a new 
absorbing purpose— her new religion#
What would have been the effect on George Eliot if 
she had not come under the influence of these friends is, 
of course, impossible to say# Eor her happiness and 
sanity it was well to replace rejected theses at once with 
others relatively more tenable. Yet her devotion to 
objective truth cannot fail to have been hurt by this 
early subjection to a new system demanding defense. It 
was natural for her, as it is for every one similarly 
placed, to grasp eagerly for a supporting belief to bring 
order into the chaos of her shattered orthodoxy. In pro­
portion as she found a new belief she saddled herself with 
a vested interest. If her theory was correct, she accom­
plished more constructively than if she had remained more 
disinterested— weighing all phenomena with impartiality.
If wrong, she became the less accurate scientific observer. 
Hardy did not come to any organized theory comparable to 
Eliot*s until he reached that of the Emergent Will, when 
he was in his fifties. lie undoubtedly remained a better
16
observer than ho would have heen if ha had undertaken to de­
fend a doctrine— however in accord with Positivistic de­
monstration. That his books would have been different, 
probably happier, is certain. That he would have done 
more good for the world depends on what philosophy he 
might have embraced and what its degree of truth. In 
1842 Eliot wrote:
... Por my part I wish to be among the ranks of that 
glorious crusade that is seeking to set Truth1s Holy 
Sepulchre free from usurped domination^ ... Meanwhile, 
although I cannot rank among my principles of action a 
fear of vengeance eternal, gratitude for predestined 
salvation, or a revelation of future glories as a reward,
I fully participate in the belief that the only heaven 
here, or hereafter, is to be found in conformity with the 
will of the Supreme; a continual aiming at the attainment 
of the perfect ideal, the true logos that dwells in the 
bosom of one Pather. 8
This devotion to truth caused eventually a break with her 
father, which was only partially mended by Eliot's agree­
ment to outward conformity, including attendance at church. 
This compromise for the sake of her father is consistent 
with her practice of toleration through life and the kindly 
attitude of her writings toward all earnest religion.
While she felt herself a crusader to Tfset Truth's Holy 
Sepulchre free and while she believed herself emanci­
pated from supernaturalism, she yet had naJve faith that 
somehow truth must triumph over error. This is a super - 
naturalism that is usually pardonea because of its pleas-
8 Letter to Jirs. Pears, Priday Evening, Pebruary, 1842. 
dross X, 106.
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ing optimism and 'because of its laissez faire. It is in 
line with her desire to hold spiritually to all that 
seemed best in tradition* A letter of this period states 
her position:
... I can rejoice in all the joys of humanity,— in 
all that serves to elevate and purify feeling and action; 
nor will I quarrel with the million who, I am persuaded, 
are with me in intention, though our dialects differ.
Of course I must desire the ultimate downfall of error, 
for no error is innocuous; but this assuredly will occur 
without my proselytising aid, and the best proof of a real 
love of the truth— that freshest stamp of divinity— is 
a calm confidence in its intrinsic power to secure its 
own high destiny,--that of universal impire. ^
During her life at Coventry Greorge Eliot read 
exhaustively from Gomte, hiills, Darwin, Locke, Spencer, 
and others. G. E. Gooke points out that through this 
reading she effected the reconciliation between Kant and 
Locke which she had so much desired in younger years* ^  
Another writer of importance in framing George Eliotfs 
philosophy is Feuerbach, whose Essence of Ghristianity 
she translated after leaving Coventry for London in 1851. 
She had, however, through her reading of Hennell and Gomte, 
already reached much the same conclusion as Feuerbach —  
that the objective basis of Ghristianity is false, that 
religion exists in the consciousness independent of any 
basis in objective reality.
Ihe last, and probably the greatest, influence on her 
thinking was that of the great Positivist, George Henry
9 Letter to ilrs. Pears. Gross I, 105.
10 Cooke, G. E., George Eliot, 219
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Lewes, her husband from 1854 till his death in 1878•
Lewes* monumental work, A Biographical History of Phil­
osophy t published in 1845, is built, as he says, by an 
impartial sceptic who holds that all systems of phil­
osophy are equally futile, that they never have had any 
certainty nor ever will have. Yet he treats them respect­
fully as, altogether, the parent of positive science*
For philosophy, he holds, was essential to give stimulus 
to the investigator* He draws parallels to astrology 
and alchemy, which respectively furnished incentive for 
astronomy and chemistry. Lewes follows Gomte in holding 
to the three stages of thought through which all knowledge 
successively passes. First is the supernatural or ficti­
tious, in which the mind asks for causes; it is marked 
by animism and by gods that need to be propitiated; it 
reaches its highest stage in monotheism. Second is the 
metaphysical or abstract, a transitional modification 
of the first stage; here the mind is concerned with 
abstract forces; it finds its highest development in the 
recognition of a general force termed Uature. Third is 
the positive or scientific, in which
... mind, convinced of the futility of all inquiry 
into causes and essences, applies itself to the observa­
tion and classification of laws which regulate effects; 
that is to say, the invariable relations of succession and 
similitude which ull things bear to each other. The 
highest condition of this stage would be, to be able to 
represent all phenomena as the various particulars of one 
general view. H *
11 Lewes, 3. H.: Biographical History of Philosophy, 656.
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Lewes holds with Comte that the third stage of thought, 
the only stage in which knowledge is capable of progress­
ive development, is now possible, and indeed imperative,
The human mind is now ready to give its attention solely 
to the phenomena themselves, without interposing super­
natural or metaphysical considerations.
... The search after essences and causes was renounced. 
The pretention to absolute knowledge was set aside. The 
discoyery of laws became the great object Ojf mankind, 12
Man, then, can know only the relative, not the absolute.
Man must trust the results of his own experience because 
it is impossible for him to transcend them. It is vain 
for him to strive toward creative reason except on the 
basis of verified experience— laws. But Lewes does not 
hold, any more than does Comte, that the discovery of in­
violable laws is an end in itself. These discovered laws 
are to be used as bases for further deductive hypotheses.
The difference, then,.according to Lewes, between philosophy 
and positive science is basically one of method. "Philo­
sophy is deductive a priori." That is, it builds upon 
hypotheses whose truth may not be established. It pro­
ceeds from a priori axioms— axioms taken up without having 
undergone the "laborious but indespensible process of 
previous verification." Thus there may be a fallacy in 
either premise. Mathematics he holds as the ideal 
example of philosophy a priori, for it is readily
12 Ibid, 648
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demonstrable. Of course Lewes wrote "before the time of 
Einstein. "Positive science is deductive a posteriori."
It begins by first ascertaining whether the axiom from 
which it is to deduce conclusions is indisputable; it 
experimentalizes; it puts nature to the test of "inter­
rogation." After much observation it attains, by induct­
ive process, to the certainty of law, and from this law
certain deductions are drawn. It proceeds, then, not from
13an assumption but from a fact.
A further doctrine of lewes the scientist is that 
manfs ideas are the necessary concomitants of his organ­
ism and of his environment, Man has no inherent ideas, 
but the interpretation of the data furnished him through 
the senses is conditioned by his heredity— a part of the 
history of the race:
Modern philosophy staked its pretentions on the one 
question: Have we any ideas independent of experience?...
The answer always ends in a negative. 14
Lewes carries his biological theory further in considering 
man as not simply an assemblage of organs, but also as an 
organ in a collective organism--the race. Prom his in­
dividual organs man derives his sensations, judgments, and 
primary impulses. Prom the collective organism he derives 
his more complex concepts. This would give basis, if 
further basis were needed, for Eliot's treatment of here­
dity and tradition in her stories and poems. However,
13 Lewes, Gr. I I . : Jiographical History, Introduction.
14 Ibid, 664.
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before meeting Lewes, Greorge Eliot had read Darwin and 
knew Spencer as a friend. She already believed in the 
survival of every fit and positive form of life in the 
better forms that succeed it. She already saw a future in 
which the moral and spiritual offspring would rise higher 
than its progenitors— a melioristic theory reached at a 
much younger age than Hardy could have formed any synthesis.
Such then are the men and books that had the greatest 
influence on the developing mind of Greorge Eliot. Scott 
says that religion was to Spencer, Strauss, Gomte, Hennell, 
Feuerbach, ^ewes--her studies and companions—
but a plaything of th9 race--the sentimental out­
cropping of race infancy— built up of fears, ancestral 
and sun worship.
This assertion may be somewhat justified if one restricts 
religion to its frequent connotation as a system built on 
objective phenomena. Yet it is difficult to group Strauss, 
Gomte, Hennell, and Peuerbach in any generalization on 
religion. All these men, together with Bray, ^ocke, and 
others, conditioned George Eliot’s emergent religion.
They supplied the Positivistic base which she expressed 
in heredity, evolution, and tradition. This base, plus 
feeling, is her religion.
The process by which Thomas Hardy arrived at his 
Positivism was considerably different from that of George 
Eliot, and his philosophy was much slower in emerging.
The several reasons for this difference in development 
must be noted if one is to understand the different form 
his philosophy was to take. Only one or two of these,
15 boott, William T.: Chesterton and Other Essays, 273.
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however, need more than passing comment•
First, for several reasons, though chiefly because 
he was a hoy and not a girl, his serious reading during 
his late teens was principally Latin and Creek— Virgil, 
Hew Testament , Homer, Sophocles. He thus had relatively 
less Christian philosophy, and a relatively greater 
basis of Classic thought on which to build.
Second, at sixteen he was articled to an architect. 
For the next several years his reading could be pursued 
only early in the morning or at night. His work kept 
his mind from synthesizing the material he was gathering, 
but it did not keep him from gathering data, especially 
from the life around him. During the same period of life 
Ceorge Eliot was reading extensively in modern philosophy 
and theology. The most purposive reading that he did 
before he was twenty was probably his search of the Creek 
Hew lestament and whatever treatises he could lay hands 
on to find arguments for infant baptism. That he found 
very slender basis for this practice of the Church en- 
couraged him to question other accepted dogmas.
Third, at the usual time of settling life thought, 
Hardy was not thrown among friends who had already con­
sidered religion and life inductively, and who could 
aid him in building major premises. Instead, as his 
orthodox theories crashed around him he was left without
16 Early Life. 37ff
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protection from the hard facts that life presented on 
all sides, That he had no such friends as the 3rays and 
Hennells caused him to look more keeply into actuality, 
to observe life more keenly in the effort to find the 
key to phenomena. His study of the classics, while of 
some aid, did not give the support that doctrines en­
forced by a friendly presence could afford. Advice from 
the clergy he soon found of no service.
Fourth, Hardy’s mind, while precocious, had an 
elasticity that kept it unusually open to new opinions.
This was a concomitant of that immaturity which, at 
twenty
... was greater than is common for his years, and it 
may be mentioned here that a clue to much of his character 
and action through-out his life, is afforded by his late­
ness of development in virility, while mentally precocious. 
He himself said humorously in later times that he was a 
child till he was sixteen, a youth till he was five-and- 
twenty, and a young man till he was nearly fifty. Whether 
this was intrinsic, or owed anything to his having lived 
in a remote spot in early life, is an open question. 17
Hardy remained relatively agnostic all his life, and at
no time seemed settled in any belief except that suffering
demands pity and relief. This did not, of course, prevent
his tentative proposal of a philosophy of merliorism.
Fifth, and inevitable, was the hereditary organization 
of his mind. Whereas Eliot belonged to a family of intense 
religious convictions,— several of them, especially Dinah 
Morris, were Evangelical preachers and exhorters,— Hardy’s 
family seems to have taken little active interest in
17 Early -bife, 42
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religion "beyond regular attendance and worship and the 
furnishing of music. They were an intelligent family, who 
had for centuries furnished many leaders in local activi­
ties.
Sixth, and conditioned by the fifth, was his affection
by the fatalism of the ^est Country. This environment of
fatalism early accustomed his mind to see and note the
1 8sinister in life.
Seventh, a corollary of the fifth and sixth, is very 
important to an understanding of Hardy’s philosophy. Yet 
it seems to have been overlooked by his biographers as a 
major influence in the formation of his general philosophy. 
It is a bent of his mind that made him unusually tender 
towards suffering— that of birds and beasts no less than 
that of men.
Ceorge Eliot, while admitting man’s place in the 
evolutionary process, seems to consider man as an entity 
in the affairs of the universe so far removed from his 
brute connections as to live under a different dispen­
sation. Possibly Eliot’s infrequent mention of suffering 
in beasts is due to the influence of dray’s doctrine of 
Evil (pain) mentioned earlier in this chapter. Certainly 
the fact that she treats human suffering as frequently 
telic is reminiscent of dray's doctrine. Hardy's view
18 Early -uife
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of creation is more inclusive* Evolution is a more vital 
fact, Thus the number of data on which he must build his 
premises was greatly increased. He did not report this 
hypersensitiveness in letters or notes until in late yearsf 
long after it had worked its effect on his life and art*
In fact, Hardy was little given to reporting his intro­
spections. This tenderness, sometimes verging on animism, 
sees all creation, even inanimate, the helpless sport of 
an unkind fate— a very real force, almost anthropomorphic, 
to the Wessex dweller. Here will be treated only pity 
towards dumb life, from which Hardy drew parallels of pity 
towards the almost equally dumb (inarticulate) peasant.
It is this instinctive pity rather than any concept of pain 
in general that gave Hardy pause.
Hardy has denied that Jude the Obscure is intended to 
be autobiographical. Yet the idea persists that at least 
the boy Jude somewhat presents a picture of HardyTs feel­
ings. The first bit of advice Jude received was
Be a good boy, remember; and be kind to animals aid 
birds, and read all you can. 19
His first job, scaring the rooks from the farmer*s corn, 
he lost because through pity he let the birds eat. When 
punishment came, the child Jude perceived
... the flaw in the terrestrial scheme, by which whet 




We may believe that the average boy would recognize the 
folly of letting conduct be governed by pity, that he would 
see that philosophizing on the unfairness of nature brought 
only pain to himself. But
... Though Parmer Troutham had just hurt him, he was 
a boy who could not himself bear to hurt anything. He 
had never brought home a nest of young birds without lying 
awake in misery half the night after, and often reinstat­
ing them and the nest in the original place the next morning. 
He could scarcely bear to* see trees cut down or lopped, 
from a fancy that it hurt them; and late pruning, when 
the sap was up and the tree bled profusely, had been a 
positive grief to him in his ihfancy. This weakness of 
character, as it may be called, suggested thst he was the 
sort of man who was born to ache a good deal before the
fall of the curtain upon his unnecessary life should signify
that all was well with him again. He carefully picked 
his way on tiptoe among the earthworms without killing 
a single one. 2 1
As Jude pondered the ordering of the world, he concluded that
Browing up brought responsibilities. ... Events did 
not rhyme quite as he had thought, nature's logic was too 
horrid for him to care for. That mercy towards one set 
of creatures was cruelty towards another sickened his sense 
of harmony. 2 2
The man Jude did not get over the humane "weakness" in his
character. Whether Jude is in any sense Hardy or not, the
horrible details of ihe pig-killing could only have been
told by one who had witnessed such a scene with eyes of
23pity, and with a mind not at ease as to its justice.
At the same time that he weighed the undeserved 
sufferings of dumb life, Hardy attacked inhumanity in 





inhumanly wounded pheasants, Tess recalled that she had
been told when a girl that hunters, rough and brutal as
they seemed when pointing their guns with
... a bloodthirsty light in their eyes ... were, in 
fact, quite civil persons, save during certain weeks of 
autumn and winter, when, like the inhabitants of the 
Malay Peninsula, they ran amuck, and made it their purpose 
to destroy life, ... conduct at once so unmannerly and so 
unchivalrous towards their weaker fellows in nature’s 
teeming family.
As she put the yet living birds out of their torture
by breaking their necks with her trembling hands,
... She was ashamed of herself for her gloom of the 
night, based on nothing more tangible than a sense of 
condemnation under an arbitrary law of society which had 
no foundation in nature.
Hardy has not left us any notable records of the cruelty
of animals to each other, probably because such oases are
too common, and because nothing can be done about it.
Man is the offender. The wagtail let the bull, the
stallion, and the mongrel pass without fear, but
A perfect gentleman then neared;
The wagtail, in a winking,
With terror rose and disappeared;
The baby fell a-thinking.
One of the most poignant of the humanitarian poems is of
the song bird
Blinded ere yet a-wing 
By the red-hot needle.
• • •
He sent ing not such wrong,
Thy grievous pain forgot,.Sternal dark thy lot,
Groping thy whole life long,
AfJ-er that stab of fire;
Sn$8 iled in pitiless wire;
Hesenting not such wrong! 27
24 Tess, 318
25 Tess, 318
26”Wagtail and baby1’, (lollacted Poems, 278 
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Other examples might be sighted to show the unship
lardy felt with the dumb creation. One of his last poemsf
"Compassion", is an ode in celebration of the Gentennary
of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
28Animals. It is dated January 22, 1924.
In his letters and notebooks Hardy left several 
testimonies of his sensitiveness to the sufferings of 
animals. These latter references are mostly from rather 
late in life. One of these, a letter to the Rev. 3*
Whit tel Key, is reminiscent of " A Modest Proposal:1'
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the many 
varieties of sport to pronounce which is, quantitatively, 
the most cruel. I can only say generally that the pre­
valence of those sports which consist in the pleasure of watching a fellow-creature, weaker or less favored than 
ourselves, in its struggles, by Nature's poor resources 
only, to escape the death-agony we mean to inflict by the treacherous contrivances of science, seems one of the 
many convincing proofs that we have not yet emerged from 
barbarism.
In the present state of affairs there would appear to be no logical reason why the smaller children, say, 
of overcrowded families, should not be used for sporting 
purposes. Darwin has revealed that there would be no 
difference in principle; moreover, these children would 
often escape lives intrinsically jftss happy than those 
of wild birds and other animals. 2 9
The most significant pronouncements are contained in two 
letters written in 1909 and 1910. Doth show that the pity 
of his early life had now become rationalized:
The discovery of the law of evolution, which re­
vealed that all organic creatures are of one family, 
shifted the center of altruism from humanity to the whole 
conscious world collectively. Therefore the practice 
of vivisection, which might haye been defended while the 
belief ruled that men and animals are essentially different,
£8 "Compassion,:? Collected Poems, 791
29 Later years, ±06.
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has been left by that discovery without any logical 
argument in its favor* And if the practice, to the extent 
merely of inflicting slight discomfort now and then, be 
defended (as I sometimes hold it may) on grounds of it 
being good policy for animals as well as men, it is never­
theless in strictness a wrong, and stands precisely in the 
same category as would stand its practice on men them­
selves. 30
To the Secretary of the Humanitarian League —
Pew people seem to perceive fully as yet that the 
most far-reaching consequence of the establishment of 
the common origin of all species, is ethical; that it 
logically involves a readjustment of altruistic morals 
by enlarging as a necessity of rightness the application 
of what has been called "The Golden Rule" beyond the 
area of mere mankind to that of the whole animal kingdom. 
Possibly Darwin himself did not wholly perceive it, 
though he alluded to it. While man was deemed to be a 
creation apart from all other creatures, a secondary or 
tertiary morality was considered good enough towards 
the "inferior" races; but no person who reasons nowadays 
can escape the trying conclusion that this is not main­
tainable. And though I myself do not at present see how 
the principle of equal justice all around is to be carried 
out in its entirety, I recognize that the League is 
grappling with the question. 31
Pinally, in his will Hardy left money to two societies 
whose object was to lessen the sufferings of animals on 
the way from the farms to the slaughter centers.
A man that had so abiding a feeling of kinship to 
the "inferior races" could never frame a philosophy not 
based in considerable part on data respecting their 
position in the world. It was in part the necessity for 
ratiocinating this material that made Hardy slower than 
was Eliot in reaching a major premise. This lengthened 
time gave opportunity for more extended observation of
30 Later Years, 138
31 Later Years, 141
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phenomena to he used in making his induction. That the 
phenomena recorded are mostly of the pessimistic sort 
may oe due to the peculiar selectivity of HardyTs per­
ception. Or it may be due to the fact that phenomena are 
not pleasant when viewed impartially and without an 
artificial distortion to make them more pleasing. Hardy 
himself seemed to change his mind somewhat on this matter 
during his life.
Of the writings and thinkers that influenced Hardy's 
early authorship, we know much less than in the case of 
George Eliot. Before writing Ear Erom the Madding Crowd, 
his fourth novel, he read Comte's Positive Philosophy.
That he was influenced by it is certain from the following 
comment by Mrs. Hardy:
The Spectator ... hazarded a guess that it might 
be from the pen of George Eliot ... However, he con­
jectured, as a possible reason for the flattering guess, 
that he had latterly been reading Comte's Positive Phil­
osophy . and writings of that school, some of whose 
expressions had thus passed into his vocabulary, ex­
pressions which were also common to George Eliot. 32
Some years later the death of George Eliot again set him
thinking about Positivism. At this time he writes:
If Comte had introduced Christ among the worthies 
of his calendar it would have made Positivism tolerable 
to thousands who, from position, family connection, or 
early education, now decry what in their heart of hearts 
they hold to contain the germs of a true system, it 
would have enabled them to modulate gently into the new 
religion by deceiving themselves with the sophistry that 
they still continued one-quarter Christians, or one- 
eighth, or one-twentieth, as the case might be: This is
32 Early Life, 129
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a matter of policy, without which no religion succeeds in 
making way. ^3
An entry made in his journal on July 19* 1883, 
gives Hardy's justification for his particular kind 
of outspoken Positivism;
In future I am not going to praise things because the 
accumulated remarks of ages say they are great and good, 
if those accumulated remarks are not based on observation. 
And I am not going to condemn things because a pile of 
accepted views ranked together from tradition, and acquired 
by instillation, say antecedently that they were bad.34
This is the principle upon which Hardy had long been 
writing, and this entry does not, of course, mark an 
epoch in his thought. It simply shows that his Positivism 
was to be outspoken, whereas Eliot's was softened by a 
kindly tolerance and outward conformity. In spite of 
her basic Positivism Eliot seemed to believe that some­
how truth would triumph without her feeble aid. Her 
devotion to truth became conditioned by feelings of duty 
and expediency and religion. Hardy remained untrammeled 
for a longer period, and never got far from the agnosti­
cism requisite for the keen observer. This agnosticism 
is reflected in a latter written when he was sixty;
My own interest lies largely in non-rationalistic 
subjects, since non-rationality seems, so far as one can 
peroeive, to be the principle of the Universe. By which 
I do not mean foolishness, but rather a principle for 
which there is no exact name, lying at the indifference 
point between rationality and irrationality.
34 Early Life, 210
35 Later years, 90
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Excellent testimony that he had not yet ceased to gather 
data and that he had not yet begun to bend the data 
furnished by hie senses to the support of any intellectual 
vested interest. In spite of charges of its cruelty,
Hardy*s method of representing life is the kindlier is 
spirit, for it is the method of complete, fearless diagnosis. 
Heal kindness demands that the man of vision tell the whole 
truth as he sees it. That he finds life to be without 
value, or worse, can not excuse the artist for deceiving 
its victims. Hardy’s method is also much more in accord 
with whatever dignity and worth man may have, for it treats 
man as able to hear the truth and to form his own con­
clusions-*^ prerogative granted by few literary artists 
and by no religious propagandist s.
He'sume; Seorge Eliot’s Positivism was reached at 
a relatively early age. She was assisted in the formation 
of her major premises by learned friends and by wide 
reading in philosophy. The objectivity of her readings 
and recordings of phenomena may very conceivably have been 
distorted by her early adoption of a satisfying philosophy 
and by her outward acquiescence in what to her was error. 
Thomas Hardy was rather late in coming to any philosophy 
of life. The principal reason for this retardation was 
his humanitarian feeling, which greatly multiplied the 
data for him to weigh before reaching any satisfactory
33
solution to the incongruities of the world. This very 
lateness made his testimony more trustworthy than it 
otherwise would have heen. His Positivism was outspoken, 
unhampared by any mistaken kindness that would soften, 
oonoeal, or gloss his testimony. Both Eliot and Hardy 
held that a priori philosophies are limited by the 
faculties of the human mind; that only through Positive 




In an early scene of Goethe's ffaust the learned man
sits in his study, attempting to render into German the
Greek logos of John l.i. After successively discarding
1
Wort, Sinn, and Eraft, he fixes on That as best translating 
the idea implied in logos. In the English Bible logos is 
translated word. To the layman not concerned with the 
theological second person of the Trinity, it means the 
prime cause, the first reason, the unconditioned. This 
idea Thomas Hardy attempts to translate from his con­
sciousness into defining terms in many of his stories and 
poems. The most commonly chosen name is Immanent Will, 
borrowed from Arthur Schopenhauer4  Hardy also employs 
many other names, especially in the Dynasts, to define 
more narrowly the concept. He further attempts to make 
his idea understandable through describing the consciousness 
and activities of the Will,
Definition: A survey of the various terms applied
to the Immanent Will in the Dynasts gives a fairly accurate 
understanding of.Hardy's conception of the present status of 
^he Will. This description by nomenclature contains no 
fewer than forty-four suggestive names. Among these are 
the Immanent Will, used often: Voiceless Turner of the
Wheel; Prime Mover; the Mode (Being as its attribute); the
1 The primary English meanings of these words are word, 
sense, strength, and deed.
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Causa; the Prime; High Influence; All-inhering Power; the 
Unconscious Cause; Creat Unshaken; Creat ilecessitator;
World Soul; Sternal Urger; Unweeting x*iind; late; lorce; 
Purposive, Unmotived, Dominant Think; Rapt Determinator; 
the 3ack of Things; the Immanent Unrecking; the Unknowable; 
the Creat Poresighfcless; the Loveless, II teless; the 
Absolute; It; the Along; the Immanent Shaper* Some of 
these names are also employed in various poems and stories.
The many terms employed to identify the Will are not 
in themselves a satisfactory definition, however suggestive 
of attributes they may be to the imagination. They are 
partially successful in establishing the connotations of 
the term Will* They are the only definition Hardy attempted. 
That Will is not in itself a perfect term, although pos­
sibly the best to be found, Hardy admits in a letter to 
Ar. Sdwar d Wr ight:
I quite agree with you in holding that the word 
'Will' does not perfectly fit the idea to be conveyed—  
a vague thrusting or urging internal force in no pre­
determined direction. 3ut it has become accepted in 
philosophy for want of a bettor, and is hardly likely 
to be supplanted by another, unless a highly appropriate 
one could be found, which I doubt. The word that you 
suggest— Impulse— seems to me to imply a driving power 
behind it; also a spasmodic movement unlike that of, 
say, the tendency of an ape to become a man and other 
such processes. 2
In another letter he admits that the term is not alto­
gether satisfactory, but adds that
in the lack of another word to express precicely 
what is meant, a secondary sense has gradually arisen.
2 Later Years, 124.
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that of effort exercised in a reflex or unconscious 
manner. Another word would have "been better if one 
could have had it, though 'power* would not do, as 
power can be suspended or withheld, and the forces of 
Mature cannot. 3
bailing to give us a satisfactory definition of the 
Will, Hardy has furnished us with abundant data of 
the character and activities of the Immanent Will.
Character of the Immanent Will: In developing a
concept from the narrative and descriptive paraphrases 
that Hardy has left, the reader must remember that the 
poet has used imaginative terms not accurately trans­
latable into prose ideas. He must also remember that 
this material covers a long period of years and in­
evitably a wide range of moods in the author as well as 
some changes of belief. Since Hardy is an artist as well 
as a philosopher, one may expect him in the enthusiasm of 
creation to hazard some opinions that at other times he 
would repudiate. Yet a careful convassing shows not only 
his fanciful imaginings but also quite plainly his more 
sober judgment.
To the artist the Will does not always appear as 
of the same grade of consciousness, or one might say 
that in some passages the Will is described in more 
anthropomorphic terms than in others. Three such degrees 
of consciousness are fairly distinguishable, besides a
3 lo Hr. Sdward Clodd, inarch 22, 1904. Later Years, 105
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fourth, which is postulated as a future "meloir” possi­
bility.
1 . Sometimes the Will is merely a "sublime fermenting
vat." This is the evolutionary Will, ever becoming, in
a state of endless flux. This is the Nature that drives
her victims, not purposively, but because It must ever
work. It is the Grass Casualty of "Hap/! although in this
short poem the evolutionary character is not evident. In
any case Will so conceived is noneentient of good or evil,
and therefore is not to be blamed, for "guilt does not
4lie in willing, but in willing with knowledge •'! This 
amorphous conception of the Will is hinted as the Will 
to Bnjoy in an entry in Hardy's notebook dated July 16, 
1888:
Thought of the determination to enjoy. We see it 
in all nature, from the leaf on the tree to the titled 
lady at the ball. ... It is achieved, of a sort, under 
superhaman difficulties. Like pent-up water it will 
find a chink of possibility somewhere. Even the most 
oppressed of men and animals find it , so that out of a 
thousand there is hardly one who has not a sun of some 
sort for his soul. ^
Again he calls if the
... "appetite for joy”, which stimulates all 
creation; that tremendous force which sways humanity to 
its purpose, as the tide sways the helpless weed. °
Occasionally, not often, the seeming malevolence of a
certain spot, as Egdon Heath, seems thus amorphous.
4 Schopenhauer, Arthur: The World as Will and Idea, 204 
a. Early Life, 279 
6  Tess, 216.
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Usually tha spirit of a place is more personal.
2. jftost often the T.7ill is a stupid, blind urger, who
works unconsciously, as heretofore,
Sternal artistries in Circumstance,
Whose patterns, wrought by rapt aesthetic rote,
IjQ&m in themselves Its single listless aim,
And not their circumstance. ^
This ,fImmanent Doer that doth not know" is sometimes 
conceived as having grown tired of his partly finished 
toy, and as having dozed in his reasoning and perceptive 
faculties while yet willing in a mechanistic fashing. 
Usually It has not yet completely emerged into conscious­
ness, but works in a state of calm nescience, giving no 
warnings and answering no questions. It has no sense 
of good or ill, of pain or pleasure. It is supremely 
indifferent to Its creatures, mutely musing over their 
fates. It is without any sustained aim. Yet It is 
ceaselessly striving toward It knows not what. That 
countless midges are tortured cr desti:;yed is immaterial 
to a non-sentient being. The fact that their feelings 
and desires are intense cannot concern It* It can not 
pay heed to manfs motives any more than to Its own*
The evils that man commits because driven by this Will 
are not morally chargeable to It, for it is nescient and 
irresponsible. That the sins so committed are not wholly 
chargeable to man is another matter, one on which Hardy
7 dynasts, 1.
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differs considerably from George Eliot, as will appear 
later. An unexplained reference in Hardy’s journal 
gives very doubtful help on this point, because of the 
confused use of the verb t£ sin* Elsewhere Hardy uses 
sin to mean conscious evil doing. Here the term seems 
to mean t_o err. Hardy’s doctrine of Free Will, as ex­
plained later in this chapter, would not allow the usual 
meaning of sin to be used here, The Italics are mine.
December 10 (1888) . . .He, she, had blundered; 
but not as the Prime Cause had blundered. He, she, had 
sinned; but not as the Prime Cause had sinned. He, she, 
was ashamed and sorry; but not as the Prime Cause would 
be ashamed and sorry if Ft knew. ®
When the Spirit of the Years shows to the Spirit of the
Pities the mad massacre at Waterloo, the Pities asks
why the Will prompts ,Tso senseless-shaped a doing . ” The
Years exonerates the unreckinp- misdoer with
I have told thee that It works unwittingly,
As one possessed, not judging. 9
Again through the Spirit of the Years we learn that
{times,
... the 7/ill heaves through Space, and moulds the 
With mortals for Its finder si We shall see 
Again men's passions, virtues, visions, crimes,
Obey resistlessly 
The purposive, unmotived, dominant Thing 
which sways in brooding dark their wayfaring!
Such a doctrine of an irresponsible manipulator is ex­
ceedingly repugnant to the mind that wishes to bring order 
out of chaos—  to extablish responsibility. Yet




Hardy shows it as the usual concomitant of disillusion­
ment •
The concept of the development of the Will from the 
first to the second degree of consciousness, from "sublime 
fermenting~vat" toTThlind urger ," is shown in a paragraph 
from Jude the Obscure:
Vague and quaint imaginings had haunted Sue, in 
the days when her intellect scintillated like a star, 
that the world resembled a stanza or melody composed 
in a dream; it was wonderfully excellent to the half 
aroused intelligence, but hopelessly absurd at the full 
waking; that the First Cause worked automatically lixe 
a somnambulist, and not reflectively like a sage; that 
at the framing of the terrestrial conditions there 
seemed never to have been contemplated such a develop­
ment of emotional perceptiveness among the creatures 
subject to those conditions as that reached by thinking 
and educated humanity. But affliction makes opposing 
forces loom anthropomorphous; and those ideas were now 
exchanged for a sense of Jude and herself fleeing 
from a persecutor.
But whither to flee?
Sometimes the Will, while yet mainly nescient, 
seems to approach the third grade, that of sentience.
In the following passage the Will is a great Denier, 
possibly sentient:
Then another silence, till she was seized with 
another uncontrollable fit of grief. "There is some­
thing external to us which says, 'You shan't! 1 First 
it said, 'You sha'n't learn!' Then it said, 'You 
sha'n't labor!' How it says, 'You sha'n't love!'"
He tried to soothe her by saying, "That's bitter 
of you, darling."
"But it's true!" ^
1 1 . Jude, 407-. 
12 Ibid, 401,
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This theory of a Will either wholly or partially
nescient is utterly iconoclastio— as far as the poles
from the comfortable dualism of the Victorian Age, and
of our own* For such a Will is neither good nor evil, but
powerful, arbitrary, unpredictable* Critics, especially
those theologically inclined, have bitterly condemned
this view as robbing man of all dignity and making him
13a mere puppet in the hands of a blind power* In answer 
I would make two observations. First, the inherent 
dignity of man as conceived by anyone who pretends to 
more than the most material philosophy is not conditioned 
by the treatment he is acoorded from without. In other 
words, a man driven by fate id not less worthy than he 
would be if fate were not present. Second, it has never 
been satisfactorily proved that truth is in any way de­
pendent upon advantage to man, or that the universe is 
constituted for man’s benefit, This will be treated 
further in the section of Religion.
3. Often, especially in the later poems, Hardy 
postulates a Will sufficiently sentient to be at least 
partially capable of pleasure, pain, malice, but not 
quite omnipotent. To the degree in which the Will is 
both sentient and potent, It may be held morally 
responsible. A very high degree of sentience is indi­
cated in a fragment in Hardy’s notebook, dated 21lay 29, 
1922. Ho poem or story pictures the Will so far emerged
13 Whitfield, T. H.: Thomas Hardy.
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from the unconscious:
Poem -- I —  .First Gauss, omniscient, not omni­
potent —  limitations, difficulties, etc., from being 
only able to work by law (His only failing is lack 
of foresight)« x
Hardy's intent was obviously to write a poem from the 
point of view of I, the Will, which would somewhat 
exonerate the Will from moral guilt for Its evident 
blunders in ordering the universe. But is not this 
merely placing the responsibility one step further 
back? Hardy does not postulate what may be the nature 
of this government behind the Will. Possibly the con­
ditioning is meant to be inherent in the nature of the 
Will itself, although that does not quite tally with 
the earlier conception of the Will as conditioned not 
by any external, but only by Its own nescience and aim­
lessness. A conditioning outside the Will would not 
agree with Hardy's doctrine of Monism, on which he bases 
his theory of Free Will. A somewhat similar idea is 
recorded by William Archer in reporting a conversation 
with Mr. Hardy:
Mr. Hardy: ... Bo you know Hartmann's philosophy of 
the Unconscious? It suggested to me what seems almost 
like a workable theory of the great problem of the origin 
of evil —  though this* of course, is not Hartmann's own 
theory —  namely, that there may be a consciousness, 
infinitely far off, at the other end of the chain of 
phenomena, always striving to express itself, and 
always baffled and blundering, just as the spirits seem 
to be. IB
14 hater Years, 226
15 Archer, Wm.: Heal Conversations, 45.
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But these- two references seem to present fanciful
hypotheses rather than typical indictments of a sentient
Will* They ascribe to the Will a more anthropomorphic
mind than appears in Hardyfs most convincing writing*
There, in so far as the Great Gauser has at all emerged
into awareness, It is somewhat imbeoilic* It is different
from the Immanent Unrecking, but for practical purposes
it is not much better. To the intellect this view of
an imbecilic Cause is certainly less satisfying than
that of the nescient Urger or that of the omniscient,
limited Gause. In his apostrophe to the portrait of the
woman about to be hanged, it is certainly not a sane Cause
that Hardy refrains from chiding:
Would that your Causer, ere knoll your knell 
For this riot of passion, might deign to tell 
Why, since It made you '
Sound in the germ,
It sent a worm 
To madden Its handiwork, when It might well 
Hot have assayed you,
Hot have implanted, to your deep rue,
The Clytaemnestra spirit in you,
And with purblind vision 
Sowed a tare 
In a fi31d so fair,
An a thing of symmetry, seemly to view,
3rought to derision.1 1 6
Hare the spirit is not one of rebuke to the mad Cause, 
but rather of compassion toward the soul made to suffer 
for the arbitrary sport of a Setebos. Instead of ordering 
Its universe as a sane governor would, the Cause pro­
ceeds with its




Like a potter raptly panningI 
Chorus
And then, Love and Light its aim —
Grood Its glory, Bad Its blame?
Hay; to alter evermore
Things from what they were before.
Many of Hardyfs poems and stories are reoitals 
of the inane pranks of this partly sentient Will, 
occasionally for poetic purposes objectified as plural, 
as the ,TPurblind Doomsters" of "Hap. The only merit 
of this Will is a sense of irony. The classis example 
of their hideous sport is found in the ending of Tess:
"Justice11 was done, and the President of the 
Immortals (in Aeschylean phrase) had ended his sport 
with Tess. And the D'Urberville knights and dames 
slept on in their tombs unknowing. 18
Gases of monstrous irony may be found in almost any
story in A Group of Hoble Lames and LifeTs Little Ironies.
Small wonder that the moon says of life
0, I think of it, often think of it 
As a show
God ought surely to shut up soon, lq 
As I go. ^
But the show does not shut.
More intolerable to Hardy than that man should be 
made sport of is the idea that his affliction serves 
no end, not even the amusement of moronic Immortals*




19 ri#o the Moon," Collected Poems, 411.
4 5
Well, my for©thoughtless modes to you 
May seem a shameless thing,
But —  I'd no meaning, that I knew 
In crowning Death as ILingJ
Instead of smiling "at this collapse of Austria's
men-at-arms, so drolly done", the Great Unshaken remains
21"impassible as glacial snow.f'
Again the poet complains:
If hut some vengeful god would call to me
From up the sky, and laugh: "Thou suffering thing,
Snow that thy sorrow is my ecstacy,
That thy love's loss is my hate's profiting:
Then could I hear it, clench myself, and die,
Steeled by the sense of ire unmerited;
Half-eased in that a Powerfuller than I 
Had willed and meted me the tears I shed.
22
But not so.
Since, then, man's ills are the result of the 
purposelessness, or at best listlessness, of the Prime 
Mover, what, if any, is the remedy? Hardy's favorite one 
is that the Unconscious shall at last wake into com­
plete sentience. This idea, the basis of his distinctive 
doctrine of Meliorism Hardy claimed as his own. On 
February 2, 1908, He adds this postscript to a letter to 
Dr. Glodd:
The idea of the Unconscious Will becoming conscious 
with flux of time, is also new, I think, whatever it 
may be worth. At any rate I have never m jt with it 
anywhere. T. H* *3
Seven years later he repeated the claim in a letter to
20 "An Inquiry ," Collected Poems, 725.
21 Dynasts, 76.
22 "Hap:rr Collected Poems, 7.
2 3  Pater +ears, 276. Dee also letter to Mr. Sdw. 7/right, 
later in this chapter*
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Dr. Sale eby;
The assumption of unconsciousness in the driving
foroe is, of course, not new. But I think the view
of the unconscious force as gradually becoming conscious: 
i.e., that consciousness is creeping further and further 
back towards the origin of force, had never (so far 
as I know) been advanced before The Dynasts appeared.
3ut being only a mere impressionist I must not pretend
to be a philosopher in a letter and ask you to believe m e . 24
Among Poems of the Past and Present, published in 1911, 
two definitely postulate this future coming into conscious­
ness of the Prime Causer. "The Sleep-Workerrf is a query 
as to the result of such an awakening:
When wilt thou wake, 0 mother, wake and see -~
As one who, held in trance, has laboured long 
By vacant rote and prepossession strong —
The coils that thou hast wrought unwittingly;
• • •
Wilt thou destroy, in one wild shock of shame,
Thy whole high heaving firmamental frame,
Or patiently adjust, amend, and heal?
"Cod-Forgotten" in the same collection is an ironic
fantasy, imagining a truly moral god who says,
Thou shouldst have learnt that got to Mend 
For Me could mean but Not to Know. 26
That man’s condition may be ameliorated by the coming
awakening into awareness of the Will is suggested in the
Dynast s:
Chorus of the Pities 
Yet It may wake and understand 
3 re earth unshape, know all things, and 
With knowledge use a painless hand,A painless handJ 27
24 Later Years, 70.
25 "The sieep-Worker", Collected Poems, 110.
26 "Grod-Forgotten" , Collected Poems ~ ~1T3.
27 Dynasts, 322.
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One of Hardy*s late poems, "Xenophanes, the Monist of
Colophon,’,? suggests that this Or eat Dumb, vainly queried
by Xenophanes twenty-five hundred years ago, still snores
in Its sleep;
Some day I may tell,
When I *ve broken My spell.
But that will be long henoe,
••• when you’re forgotten,
And old cults are rotten,
And bulky codes shotten.
Hardy suggests that through an inadvertence man 
has preoeded the Will into consciousness. That is, 
a part of the Cosmos has attained consciousness end 
is become sentient man. Just why this particular part 
of the Cosmos is become conscious, is not answered.
Uor is reason given for believing that no other part 
of the Cosmos is emerged from unconsciousness. This 
does not at all deny Hardy’s general doctrine of Monism. 
The Cosmos is becoming conscious —  emerging from 
nescience —  with undeserved pain to the part already 
sentient. Man, .s the part of the Cosmos already emerged 
into sentience, is imagined as leading the Will to 
clearer consciousness, and therefore to a finer sense of 
morality. Cod, when rebuked by man for flagrant cruelty, 
answers;
28 "Xenophanes, f Collected Poems, 692
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The thought (of cruelty) is new to me. 
Forsooth, though I men's master he,
Theirs is the teaching mindI 29
We see man's intelligence as
. hut an unreckoned incident
Of the all-urging Will, raptly magnipotent.
This "tinreckoned incident" is fancifully described as
the coming of a germ of Consciousness
• • • on an aerolite 
Aions ago
From some far globe, where no distress 
Had means to mar supreme delight.
The conclusion suggested in this poem, however, is
not that greater awareness of the Will shall relieve
distress, hut that
... Maybe now „
Hormal unawareness awaits rebirth.
Whichever form Meliorism may take is not important in 
this connection. A more essential thesis is that the Will, 
whidh now knows neither good nor evil, but whose mani­
festations work mischief for mankind because they are 
unordered, will become good if once consciousness is 
established. Ho other thesis could be consistent with 
Hardy's belief in the essential goodness of man as a 
phenomenon of the Cosmos, enlightened by sentience. In 
preceding the Will into consciousness, man has also 
attained a higher morality than that of the semi-conscious 
Will. Then man may hope that if the rest of the Cosmos —  
the Will that now thwarts man —  becomes aware, it also
29 "Cod’s Education," Collected Foems, 261.
30 Dynasts, 137.
31 "The Aerolite /' Collected Poems, 736.
32 Ibid
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will “become good* We should he 
..•thankful yet
Time's finger should have stretched to show 
Ho aimful author's was the hlow 
That swept us prone,
But the Immanent Boer's That doth not know,
Which in some age unguessed of us 
May lift Its blinding incubus,
And see, and own:
"It grieves me 1 did thus and thus!"
One of Hardy's very late poems, "A Philosophical Fantasy," 
published in the Fortnightly Review, January, 1927, con­
tains this stanza of hope of meliorism:
Aye, to human tribes nor kindlessness 
Hor love I've given, but mindlessness,
Which state, though far from ending,
May nevertheless be mending*
There yet remains the problem of reconciling the 
Immanent Will with the individual free will that is 
essential to morality as conceived by Mr* Hardy.
Hardy has been accused of pronouncing false "the 
inner world revealed by consciousness —  the world of 
feeling, value, and purpose;" and delusive "our dis­
tinctive traits, such as conscience or remorse, implying
35as they do responsibility on our part." If this 
is the message that Hardy gives the world, we can surely 
not rejoice in it as one likely to elevate mankind.
And we can somewhat understand why protagonists of
33 "The Blow," Collected Poems, 449.
34 Later Years, 2^3.
36 Shafer, Robert: Christianity and Haturalism, 265, 248*
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various sorts of orthodoxy should attacke Hardy as 
a subvartar of youth. Yat it is not tha part of scholar­
ship to denounce a doctrine on tha ground of its being 
opposed to one's preconceived notion of teleology. The 
progress of tha world has bean too much retarded by the 
well meant suppression of disturbing doctrines —  a 
suppression that does not appear to have made happier the 
mankind for whose benefit it w%s practiced. Rather the 
seeker after truth should demonstrate the falsity of 
the doctrine before denouncing it. And he should make 
certain that the artist has promulgated the objection­
able doctrine before censuring him#
In his own mind Hardy was clear as to the recon­
ciliation of the driving, external Will and individual 
free will# He believed that man has a modicum of in­
herent will by virtue of his being a minute part of the 
total dreat Will, which is for the most part unconscious. 
Aian, as a relatively emerged bit of the Cosmos, can 
distinguish between good and evil. And, as a partly 
free agent, he can often choose the good. In proportion 
as he can both see the right and do his wish, he is 
morally responsible —  not to anything outside himself, 
but to hie own enlightened soul. 3ut to the degree in
which he is unenlightened or is bound or manipulated
3 6as one of Earth's jackaclocks, he is to be pitied*
36 Dynasts. 6#
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He is sometimes made to perform evils that he hates 
even while he does them. In such a case the sin —  if 
sin there he —  cannot he charged to him, for he is 
only the hand of an unweeting compulsion. This gloomy 
futility of the man either unenlightened or impotent 
or both is the most novel feature of Hardy's art, and 
so has been allowed to obscure the element of free will 
that is just as evident. There is, then, a seeming 
dualism in the soul. Man can make free choices between 
good and evil up to a certain point. Beyond this point 
he can sometimes see the good and desire it, but cannot 
execute his wish. That is, he is conditioned by a 
mightier than he in the form of destiny, fate, en­
vironment, heredity, or some element external to his 
individual will. Almost any novel v5 11 serv-j to 
illustrate this seeming dualism in a theoretic monism. 
For instance, Jude has an unusual degree of enlighten­
ment. He can see ideal goods and he is able to make 
many ideal choices. That is, his enlightened will is 
largely free. But the point that Hardy impresses on 
the reader is that Jude is not free in all things, that 
his choice is sometimes forced by the ouiar Till—  
here his passion for women and for liquor. This does 
not mean that he is otherwise free. His body and his 
activities —  the objective Jude —  are often the sport 
of an external compulsion. But his volition is mainly
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free, and good, except for these two passions. Another 
writer might have pictured a Jude whose every impulse 
was governed by arbitrary destiny. The fate of Jude 
might then have been deplorable or beatific; it could not 
have been tragic, oome writers —  for example, Jeorge 
Eliot -- might have shown us a Jude with a much greater 
degree of autonomy. Instances of wills not entirely 
free are to be found in all the greater novels#
Another type of reconciliation to be made is 
this: The individual will, ordinarily capable of
making right choices, is forced to choose between two 
apparent goods, Hut accurate choice is difficult to 
make because the enlightenment is not perfect. This 
problem is common enough in real life. Hardy gives it
it  na sympathetic treatment in tTA Tragedy of Two Ambitions."
A reprobate father has fallen into a weir and is calling 
for help. His two clerical sons stand at a. little 
distance. Two goods appear: to rescue the father, or
to insure their sister's happiness and their own success 
by allowing his worthless life to expire. The question 
of what they should do is too difficult, too subtle to 
be at once decided. And the time allowed b^ fate for 
the choice is very short. As we re^d the story at 
leisure we assure ourselves that we should have rescued 
the father. The two sons recognise later their error 
in allowing the father to perish. 3ut what Hsrdy would
37 life's Little Ironies, 44.
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tell us here is that man is not always sufficiently out 
of the dark to see what choice he should make, even 
when he wishis to choose the hest. In this case our 
condemnation must give way before pity. Such a 
situation is even more intolerable than the one in which 
moral choice is denied through inborn passions or limit­
ing environment. The spirit of tragedy, which must in­
volve freedom of will, is for the moment displaced by 
one of paralysis, which in turn becomes the bitterest 
irony when the good, chosen only passively, turns to 
dust and ashes.
Hardy has been accused of writing stories in which 
the individual frae will is entirely displaced by the 
outside Will. This accusation may mean either of two 
things. First, that the individual, though able to 
form choices, is impotent to execute his wishes, that 
he is the unwilling sport of Circumstance. Second, that 
the Immanent Will so dominates the individual free will 
that it can make no conscious choices, that it is utterly 
passive and without desire except as that desire is 
dictated from without. Hardy undoubtedly does present 
some catastrophes of the first sort in the shorter poems. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, such outside com­
pulsion is wrongly taken by some as a denial of human 
worth* It is rightly only a denial of man’s ability
o4
to objectify hia worth. Of the second sort, the utter 
dominance of the individual will from without , I can 
find no examples in Hardy. Such a dominance is what 
zealots seek in religious ecstacy -- a subordination to the 
will of some deity. T&st Hardy has created any character 
whose will is completely under outside control, either good 
or evil, seams an exaggeration. The nearest approach is 
probably in the case of young Hare in A Laodicean. Hardy’s 
own testimony in a letter to Hr. Saleeby is apropos:
The nature of determination embraced in the 
theory is that of a collective will; so that there is 
a proportion of the total will in each part of the 
whole, and each part fcas therefore, in strictness, 
some freedom, which would, in fact, be operative as 
such whenever the remaining great mass of will in 
the universe should happen to be in equilibrium.
However, as the work is intended to be a poetic 
drama and not a philosophic treatise I did not feel 
bound to develop this. 38
His reconciliation of the Unconscious Will with the 
free will is also contained in a letter to air. Edward 
Wright, partly quoted previously:
In a dramatic epic —  which I may perhaps assume 
The Uynasts to be —  some philosophy of life was 
necessary, and I went on using that wlich I had de­
noted in my previous volumes of verse (and to some 
extent prose) as being a generalized form of what the 
thinking world had gradually come to adopt, myself in­
cluded. That the Unconscious Will of the Universe is 
growing aware of Itself I believe I may claim as my 
own idea solely —  at which I arrived by reflecting 
that what has already taken place in a fraction of the 
whole (i.e. so much of the world as has become conscious) 
is likely to take place in the mass; and there being no 
Will outside the mass —  that is, the Universe —  
the whole Will becomes conscious thereby: and ultimately,
38 Hater Years, 269
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it is to be hoped, sympathetic,
I believe, too, that the Prime Cause, this Will, 
has never before been called 'It1 in any poetical 
literature, English or foreign.
This theory, too, seems to me to settle the 
question of Free-will v. necessity. The will of a 
man is, according to it, neither wholly free nor wholly 
unfree. When swayed by the Universal Will (which he 
mostly must be as a subservient part of it ) he is not 
individually free; but whenever it happens that all the 
rest of the ureat Will is in equilibrium the minute 
portion called one person’s will is free, just as a 
performer’s fingers are free to go on playing the 
pianoforte of themselves when he talks or thinks of 
something else and the head does not rule them. 39
Resume: The Will as conceived by Hardy is
immanent, autonomous, indestructible. So far he 
agrees with Schopenhauer. Typically the Will is 
unconscious and aimless. In so far as the Will is 
or majj become conscious, it ceases to be aimless. In 
this Hardy differs from Schopenhauer, whose Will is 
always unconscious and aimless. It is on this latter 
proposition that Hardy bases one of his two theories 
of Meliorism —  the one principally held in his later 
years and evidently the dearer to him. It is that re­
lief will come when and if the unconscious part of the 
Cosmos follows man into consciousness. Hardy’s Will is 
not, as in Schopenhauer, malignant, but is supremely in­
different to man. In essence It is rather good than evil. 
Thus, as the Will may become enlightened there need be 
no conversion of Its nature. So far as the present 
result to man is concerned, there is little difference
39 Ibid, 124c
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whether the Will is malignant or indifferent. Man, 
as well as the rest of creation, is crushed by tho 
operation of a potent Will without governance. So, 
as in Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, as well as in 
the pessimistic philosophies of the Orient, pain is the 
normal, positive state; pleasure is the negation of 
pain -- an interlude in the prevailing order. The 
doctrine is one of a monism at present flawed through 
the inadvertent enlightening of a part. The unen­
lightened mass works through "Mindless minions" that
In mechanized enchantment sway and show 
A Will that wills above the will of each,
Yet hut the will of all conjuctively;
A fabric of excitement, web of rage,
Tiiat permeates as one stuff the weltering whole. 40
Till the Melior shall come man had best
3e mute, and let spin on 






Fate - Character in Eliot
"Character is destiny/’ said IJovalis. This rather 
cryptic pronouncement Eliot quotes in the Mill on the 
Floss and uses as a thesis for many of her developments. 
She modifies its sense, however, in two directions.
First, she uses is in a causative sense, meaning that 
character determines, conditions, becomes destiny. She 
would hardly reverse the phrase and say, "Destiny is 
character," as Hardy sometimes does. Second, in common 
with Hardy, although not to the same extent, she treats 
character as only the partitive condition of destiny.
Like Hardy she shows a converse; that destiny beyond 
the individual’s control partitively determines the 
character. The extent and direction of the interaction 
of character and destiny give a clue to the comparative 
hopefulness of the philosophies of Eliot and Hardy. It 
is as we might suspect. 3oth show that our destinies 
are, unfortunately, only partly subject to our volitions—  
Hardy less than Eliot. Both show that our characters are 
in part shaped, directly or indirectly, by forces wholly 
beyond our control —  Hardy much more than Eliot.
In a short moral essay on Maggie Tulliver's fate, 
George Eliot indicates how circumstance may occasion 
action that will in turn affect character:
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For the tragedy of our lives is not created entirely 
from within* "Character*, says Uovalis, in one of the 
questionable aphorisms —  "character is destiny." But 
not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, 
was speculative and irresolute, and we have a great 
tragedy in consequence. But if his father had lived to 
a good old age, and his uncle had died an early death, 
we can conceive Hamletfs having married Ophelia, and got 
through life with a reputation of sanity, notwithstanding 
many soliloquies, and some moody sarcasms towards the fair 
daughter of Polonius, to say nothing of the frankest in­
civility to his father-in-law, 1
This circumstance outside the self, which forces 
man’s acts, Eliot never shows, as Hardy occasionally does, 
as deceiving the individual will, For instance, in a few 
cases Hardy indicates that the Immanent Will not only 
forces man against his inner promptings to do acts which 
would constitute sins if prompted by the individual free 
will, but also deceives the free will itself so that it 
wills to do what it ordinarily would not. It is as if 
the free will were non-existent. (Soe chapter on Immanent 
Will*) George Eliot do^s not go to this length. Always 
there is a modicum of free will that may make choice, even 
though sometimes feeble. Again, in Hardy Destiny is 
sometimes blamed for giving man a will not quite free 
or not enlightened enough to make right choices. Eliot 
is not quite so clear as is Hardy in her theory of the 
influence of this external Will on the individual free 
will, but she seems to hold, as does the Church, that 
every man is endowed with a free will strong enough to
1 Mill on the Floss, 427
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make right choices in any situation. Yet she is much 
influenced by Bray's Necessitarianism -- that the end 
product of the life is the absolute result of the 
heredity as affected by the environment. She must have 
seen that this doctrine if carried to its ultimate con­
clusion would destroy all moral responsibility. As 
specific a statement as she makes of this placing of 
responsibility on one's nature, for which one can hardly 
be to blame, is the Bev. Mr. Irwin's defense of Arthur 
Donithorne.:
Ah, but the mood lies in his nature, my boy, just 
as much as his reflection did, and more. A man can never 
do anything at variance with his own nature. He carries 
within him the germ of his most exceptional action; and 
if we wise people make eminent fools of ourselves on any 
particular occasion, we must endure the legitimate con­
clusion that we carry a few grains of folly to our ounce 
of wisdom. ^
That Eliot does not develop this irrefutable doctrine 
further, as does Hardy in his poems and stories of futil­
ity, may mean that Eliot does not consider this thesis of 
benefit to mankind. As appears elsewhere, she does temper 
her scientific doctrine to the "shorn lamb." She does 
not deny her faith; neither does she always exploit it.
In a modified form this admission is found in her de­
scription of the character of Tito Malema. Yet in this 
case there seems not to be the purpose to extenuate the 
wrong doing. Tito is the cne fully developed character
2 Adam Bede, 177.
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ghat George Eliot appears to have created with in­
sufficient moral viability. True, she did give him 
many advantages of instruction and of companionship, 
and she laid on him an obligation of gratitude that 
would have restrained most men, even seaklings. If she 
created him deductively, if she endowed him with in­
sufficient safeguards to meet his crises, if she made 
him a man of straw to be burned for the edification of 
her readers, she did him a wrong, and she was not true 
to her inductive art. In an early passage we read that
... His mind was destitute of that dread which 
has been erroneously decried as if it were nothing 
higher than a man's animal care for his own skin: that
awe of the Divine Nemesis which was felt by religious 
pagans, and, though it took a more positive form under 
Christianity, is still felt by the mass of mankind 
simply as a vague fear of anything which is called wrong­
doing. Such terror of the unseen is so far above mere 
sensual cowardice that it will annihilate that cowardice; 
it is the initial recognition of a moral law restrain­
ing desire, and checks the hard bold scrutiny of im­
perfect thought into obligations which can never be 
proved to have any sanctity in the absence of feeling.
"It is good", sing the old Eumenides, in AEschylus,
"that fear should sit as the guardian of the soul, 
forcing it into wisdom —  good that men should carry a 
threatening shadow in their hearts under the full sun­
shine; else, how should they learn to revere the right?" 
That guardianship may become needless; but only when all 
outward law has become needless —  only when duty and 
love have united in one stream and made a common force® *
In the case of Arthur Donnithorne, salvation was to come
through his "nature" as modified by circumstance. In the
case of Tito, as appears later in this chapter, destruction
was to come from the same sources.
3 Homola I, 125
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Again, without being very clear as to the responsi­
bility for our deeds, Eliot states that these deeds, which 
become a part of our immediate environment as soon as they 
are objectified into action, in turn affect their source. 
Thus Arthur Bonnithorne's ingenuous character is made de­
ceitful through the fancied necessity for concealment:
Arthur was in the wretched position of an open, 
generous man, who had committed an error which makes 
deception seem a necessity. The native impulse to give 
truth in return for truth, to meet truth with frank con­
fession, must be suppressed, and duty was become a questioa 
of tactics. His deed was reacting upon him —  was already 
governing him tyrannously, and forcing him into a course 
that jarred with his habitual feelings. 4
Eliot gives further moralizing comment on the effect on
Arthur's soul of his deception:
Our deeds determine us, as much as we determine our 
deeds; and until we know what has been or will be the 
particular combination of outward with inward facts, 
which constitutes a man's critical actions, it will be 
better not to think ourselves wise about his character. 
There is a terrible coercion in our deeds which may 
first turn the honest man into a deceiver, and then 
reconcile him to the change; for this reason —  that 
the second wrong presents itself to him in the guise 
of the only practicable right. The action which before 
commission has been seen with that blended common-sense 
and fresh untarnished feeling which is the healthy eye 
of the soul, is looked at afterwards with the lens of 
apologetic ingenuity, through which all things that men 
call beautiful and ugly are seen to be made up of 
textures very much alike. Europe adjusts itself to a 
fait accompli. and so does an individual character, —  
until the placid adjustment is disturbed by a conclusive 
retribution. 5
The rnoral that deorge Eliot would point in this essay 
is plain enough. Ho one would dispute that it is sal- 
utory to mankind. But she does not make clear the
4 Adam Bede, 317.
5 Ibid, 5£4.
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original responsibility for those deeds that determine 
us.
The literary artist who takes pains to show character—  
not merely the objective outcome of life —  as affected 
by externals usually allows his creature to be corrupted 
or at least reduced to conformity, very seldom to be 
exalted. In great art the reader is not ordinarily made 
aware that there is a force outside the character that 
is moulding more than his "fortune" unless that force is 
sinister* This is practically always true in Hardy. In 
Sliot there is usually, not always, a conflict between 
inherent nobility and perverting circumstance. Sometimes, 
as in Daniel Peronda, Silas garner, and Spanish Gypsy,
Fate intervenes as a constructive force. Daniel is made 
more sensitive, more kindly, by his suspicion of the 
bar sinister:
fha sense of an entailed disadvantage -- the de­
formed foot doubtfully hidden by the shoe, makes a rest­
lessly active spiritual yeast, and easily turns a self- 
centered, unloving nature into an Ishmaelite. But in 
the rarer sort, who presently see their own frustrated 
claim as one among the myriad, the inexorable sorrow 
takes the form of fellowship and makes the imagination 
tender. 6
Such cases are probably quite as common in life as are 
the more sinister# But in life, as in literature, there 
must be the "rarer sort" upon wnich circumstance may work.
In the case of Silas Marner we are led to believe that 
his salvation could never have been effected except through
6 Daniel Deronda, 180.
63
the intervention of chance in the person of Eppie. Eliot 
does not subtilize as to whether his sin would have been 
on his own head if that chance had not come, A more strik­
ing example of the interaction of inborn tendency and of 
circumstance to form character, which in turn becomes 
fate, is in the case of Eedelma. At a time when Destiny 
seems to have been kind to the Zincala maiden in having 
raised her to become the bride of Don Silva, Destiny, in 
the person of her father, comes to call her to salvation. 
The call from luxury, love, the consolation of religion, 
to a life of hardship and disappointment, far from her 
lover and outside lod's sight, is partly contained in 
these two speeches of Zarca's:
ho, not a slave; but you were born to reign.
1 Tis a compulsion of a higher sort,
Whose fetters are the net invisible 
That holds all life together. Royal deeds 
liLay make long destinies for multitudes,
And you are called to do them. You belong 
hot to the petty round of circumstance 
That makes a woman's lot, but to your tribe,
Who trust in me and in my blood with trust 
That men call blind; but it is only blind 
As unyeaned reason is, that growing stirs 
Within the womb of superstition#
* • •
Well, then, unmake yourself from a Zincele., —
Unmake yourself from being child of mine!
Take holy water, cross your dark skin white;
Round your proud eyes to foolish kitten looks;
Walk mincingly, and smirk, and twitch your robe; 
Unmake yourself,-- doff ell the eagle plumes 
And be a parrot, chained to a ring that slips 7 
Upon a Spaniard's thumb.
7 Spanish U y p f 132
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Tha inborn nobility, which but for this one call
would probably have atrophied, answers:
Pather, I choose! I will not take a heaven 
Haunted by shrieks of far-off misery.
This deed and I have ripened with the hours:
It is a part of me,—  a wakened thought 
That, rising like a giant, masters me.
And grows into a doom, 8
At a later time the father indicates the degree of 
Fedelma's salvation by showing the emptiness and un­
worthiness of the life she escaped:
... The worst of misery
Is when a nature framed for noblest things 
Condemns itself in youth to petty joys,
And, sore athirst for air, breathes scanty life 
Grasping from out the shallows. You are saved 
Prom such poor doubleness. The life we choose 
Breathes high, and sees a full-arched firmament. 
Our deeds shall speak like rock-hewn messages. 
Teaching great purpose to the distant time, 9
In all this 31iot shows Fedelma's free will making the
right choice. 3ut how much of Fedelma's salvation can
be accounted to her? The destiny that redeemed Fedelma
was the undoing of the weaker Hon Silva. A strength of
character sufficient for an ordinary don's life could
hot withstand the unusual strain imposed upon it. The
responsibility for his contemplated breach of faith he
rather unheroically shifts from his own shoulders:
... I will sin,
If sin I must, to win my life again.
The fault lie with those powers who have embroiled 
The world in hopeless conflict, where all truth 
Fights manacled with falsehood, and all good 




That he ultimately regains some degree of esteem in our
eyes is less attributable to himself than to the constancy 
of Eedelma. In Theophrastus Such Eliot suggests that among 
men not of the "rarer sort’1 outside circumstance in the 
form of heredity, tradition, environment, must be de­
pended upon to produce whatever changes are effected in 
the character. Such sluggish souls rarely experience 
self-prompted impulses toward any high ideal:
The truth is that, the primitive wants of nature 
once tolerably satisfied, the majority of mankind, even 
in a civilized life full of solicitations, are with 
difficulty aroused to the distinct conception of an 
object toward which they will direct their actions with 
careful adaptation; and it is yet rarer to find one who 
can persist in the systematic pursuit of such an end.
Few lives are shaped, few characters formed, by the con­
templation of definite consequences seen froro o distance, 
and made the goal of continuous effort or the beacon of a 
constantly avoided danger* Such control by foresight, 
such vivid picturing and practical logic, are the dis­
tinction of exceptionally strong natures; but society 
is chiefly made up of human beings whose daily acts are 
all performed either in unreflecting obedience to custom 
and routine, or from immediate promptings of thought 
or feeling to execute an immediate purpose. ^
In a headnote to a chapter of Daniel Deronda, Oeorge
Eliot again shows the creation of character in part
independently of volition;
We please our fancies with ideal webs 
Of innovation, but our life meanwhile 
Is in the loom, where busy passion plies 
The shuttle to and fro, and gives our deeds 
The accustomed pattern. ^
The other side of the shield appears in the assurance 
that Deronda gives Gwendolyn that our salvation is in our
11 ,fA Too Deferential .Jan", Theophrastus Such, Essays, 306.
12 Daniel Deronda I, 243.
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own hands:
Ho evil dooms us hopelessly except; the evil we love, 
and desire to continue in, and make no effort to escape 
from. You have made efforts -- you will go on making 
them#
This is comforting, perhaps, but it does not solve the 
problem of responsibility for the desire. The converse 
of this same thought is expressed by Hardy;
But much as he wished to be an exemplar in these 
things, he could not get on. It was quite impossible, 
he found, to ask to be delivered from temptation when 
your heart's desire was to be tempted unto seventy times 
seven. 14
The divergent tones of these two passages are illustrative 
of Eliot's and Hardy's contrasting approaches to the 
problem of responsibility for character. Hardy does not 
predicate so assuredly an unhampered volition. One can 
less suspect the reliability of his reportings of phen­
omena when one notes how free they are from any attempt 
to inculcate "right thinking.’1
Uemesis in Eliot
A specialized application of "Character is Destiny" 
is found in Oeorge Eliot’s doctrine of Hemesis.
,MTis Law as steadfast as the throne of heus --
15
Our days are heritors of days gone by."
Her idealism shows itself in the emphasis which she 
constantly lays on the Eumenides as spiritual forces 
effecting their punishmont not alone in objectives, but
13 Ibid, II, 314.
14 Jude, 112.
15 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, falix Holt, 471.
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more especially in character degeneration. Inevitably 
sin brings its reward. Hever in Eliot is there the 
suggestion, rather common in Hardy, that evil either may 
or may not entail a physical punishment, and that a 
spiritual punishment is not inevitable, but is conditioned 
on the soul*s innate sensitivity. In Eliot the soul is 
always sensitive until it has become numb through wrong 
doing. The process by which the soul dies to virtue is 
subtle, end the temptation is often insidious. But Eliot 
always puts the initiative to error in the individual*
The form that Hemesis usually takes in Eliot is a 
benumbing of tha faculty for distinguishing good and 
evil, which gradually develops into a paralysis of the 
conscience. Eliot then shows the victim of his own evil 
acts sinking deeper and deeper into sin, with a pro­
gressively less acute conscience to sting him to a saving 
effort. «7ith Eliot it is not an objective punishment for 
sin, although that comes too, that is most to be feared.
It is the subtle anaesthetization, hardly noticed at 
first, that in time either destroys the fine sense of 
values or inhibits any impulse to choose the better*
Eliot shows both. If the mind is not wise enough to 
struggle against this deadening result of initial wrong 
doing, or if some powerful outside influence does not 
save it, the end is destruction. The most striking, 
though possibly not most convincing,illustration of
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the process by which deeds so affect the soul that 
they lead to its complete degeneration is Tito Malema*
The beginning of the downfall of this unfortunate man 
came in his willing to believe that his benefactor was 
beyond his aid* I believe he is dead expressed his 
wish rather than his conviction. On the basis of that 
wish he determined to put his money to interest rather 
than risk it on a probably vain search for his father:
When, the next morning, Tito put this determination 
into act he had chosen his color in the game, and had 
given an inevitable bent to his wishes. He had made it 
impossible that he should not from henceforth desire it to 
be the truth that his father was dead; impossible that he 
should not be tempted to baieness rather than that tha pre­
cise facts of his conduct should not remain forever con­
cealed.
Under every guilty secret there is hidden a brood 
of guilty wishes, whose unwholesome infecting life is 
cherished by the darkness. The contaminating effect of 
deeds often lies less in the commission than in the con­
sequent adjustment of our desires —  the enlistment of our 
self-interest on the side of falsity; as, on the other 
hand, the purifying influence of public confession springs 
from the fact, that by it the hope in lies is forever swept 
away, and the soul recovers the noble attitude of sim­
plicity.
Besides, in this first distinct colloquy with him­
self the ideas which had previously been scattered and 
interrupted had now concentrated themselves; the little 
rills of selfishness had united and made a channel, so 
that they could never again meet with the same resistance• 6
It is true that Tito did not have the protection of
"that awe of the Divine Nemesis", an unreasoned fear of
the results of evil doing. Yet Sliot does not excuse
Tito for his sin, as Hardy might have done on the ground
that Tito did not have this moral defense. She chooses
16 Homola I, 108.
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rather to let him assume full moral responsibility for
the progressive denials of his father:
He had sold himself to evil* but at present life 
seemed so nearly the same to him that he was not conscious 
of the bond* 17
Bach successive downward step made the next more in­
evitable# Each evil volition when objectified into an 
act became an entity in the host of evils that beset 
him# Or, to change the figure, each deed became a 
child to be sponsored, supported, defended:
But our deeds are like children that are born to us; 
they live and act apart from our own will# Hay, children 
may be strangled, but deeds never: they have an in­
destructible life both in and out of our consciousness; and 
that dreadful vitality of deeds was pressing hard on Tito 
for the first time#
The climax in the downfall of Tito is the point at which
his perception of evil became dimmed:
It was that change that comes from the final depart­
ure of moral youthfulness —  from the distinct self-con­
scious adoption of a part in life. The lines of the face 
were as soft as ever, the eyes as pellucid.; but something 
was gone —  something as indefinable as the changes in 
the morning twilight. 19
Uemesis was now laying hold of the soul of Tito ^alema*
When his father, a prisoner and in rags, confronted him
on the street, he denied him before he had time to collect
his thoughts:
He hardly knw how the words had come to his lips: 
there are moments when our passions speak and decide for 
us, and we seem to stand by and wonder# They carry in 
them an inspiration of crime, that in one instant does the 






When fear had brought him to his senses he experienced
... that inexorable law of human souls, that we 
prepare ourselves for sudden deeds by the reiterated 
choice of good or evil which gradually determines character.
2 1.The possibility of a return to rectitude was not 
yet past. But nothing short of a miracle could now change 
the direction of Tito’s volitions. Greorge Eliot does not 
show any moral struggle such as we commonly find as a 
prelude to the final renunciation of the good. Instead, 
there is only a selfish dread of disgrace:
There was still one resource open to Tito. He might 
have turned back, sought 3aldassarre again, confessed 
everything to him —  to Homola —  to all the world. But 
he never thought of that. The repentance which cuts off 
all moorings to evil, demands something more than selfish 
fear* 22
Yet one so endowed and circumstanced as Tito could not 
return. The web that he had begun to spin about himself
... had gone on spinning itself in spite of him, 
like a growth over which he had no power.
The final Hemesis leaves us not much grieved. We 
feel that Tito’s soul is dead, that there is now no 
longer any salvation for him that the incident of physical 
death alone is required to give a sense of completeness.
It may oe doubted whether Greorge Sliot is quite fair to 
Tito in subjecting him to such tests without endowing 
him with greater moral stamina. If the odds were too 





to destiny in the form of heredity and circumstance, then 
the ITemesis becomes, in the last analysis, an almost in- 
evitable working out of destiny, and Tito is only the 
maltreated victim, given merely the show of self-determination* 
In this case the responsibility must be borne by Destiny.
This is an altogether possible reading of the matter pre­
sented by Eliot, and the case is not untrue to life*
Hardy's Dare in A Laodicean is a man with a very slight 
chance, if any, of living a good life. That George Eliot 
does not intend Tito to be a moral puppet is evidenced 
by the care with whidh she prepares his moral downfallo 
An evil foil for Bornola and Savonarola could have been 
created much more easily. The final judgment must rest 
with each reader.
While George Sliot creates no other character in whom 
UTemesis wreaks so complete an immolation, she does pre­
sent data from other lives in which the moral struggle is 
more evident, and the tragic value correspondingly enhanced.
The Hemesis that overtakes Savonarola is particularly 
tragic, for it is not the result of singleness of evil 
purpose. Savonarola's became, rather,
... a consciousness in which irrevocable errors 
and lapse3  from veracity were so entwined with noble 
purposes and sincere beliefs, in which self-justifying 
expediency was so inwoven with the tissue of a great 
work which the whole being seemed as unable to abandon 
as the body was unable to abandon glowing and trembling 
before the objects of hope and fear, that it was perhaps
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impossible, whatever course might be adopted, for the 
conscience to find perfect repose. ^4
Eliot holds that whatever the final outcome of life may 
be, no struggle against evil ever fails utterly, for just 
as each sin poisons the soul, so each struggle against sin 
develops an inward resistence. It was only through years 
of resistence to evil ideas that Maggie developed suffi­
cient strength to save her from the final consummation
S'/'fe pjvtf'yvof sin. As she woke on the river with g&il'xp" she reviewed
the events of the previous day «  events that might well
have become the objective ancestry of a progressively more
calloused sensitivity:
She had said she would rather die than fall into 
that temptation. She felt it now —  now that the conquest 
of such a fall had come before the outward act was com­
pleted. There was at least this fruit from all her years 
of striving after the highest and best —  that her soul, 
though betrayed, beguiled, ensnared, could never de­
liberately consent to a choice of the lower. An a choice 
of what? Oh, Ood —  not a choice of joy, but of conscious 
cruelty and hardness; for could she ever cease to see 
before her Lucy and Philip, with their murdered trusts 
and hopes? 25
The anguish at the thought of leaving Philip was bitter;
That at the thought of the pain she must give him was
even more poignant;
... hut surmounting everything was the horror^of 
her own possible failure, the dread lest her conscience 
should be benumbed again, and not rise to energy till it 
was too late. 26
24 Pomola II, 148.
25 Mill on the Eloss, 504. *
26 IgfcT ;~UC75~
* Eote: In the case of less the long struggles against
wrong did not bring strength for victory.
... to snatch ripe pleasure before the iron teeth of 
pain could have time to shut upon her; that was what love 
counselled; and in almost a terror of ecstacy less con­
fusedly divined that, despite her mahy months of lonely 
self-chastisement, wrestlings, communings, schemes to lead 
a future of austere isolation, love’s counsel would prevail, 
less of th® . D ’Urbervilles, 201.
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For a soul so delicately constituted as Lfiaggie's 
or Savonarola1s , effective Uemesis, or threat of ITemesis, 
lies in the loss of
. #. the capacity for ruth, compunction, or any un­
selfish regret -- which we may come to long for as one in 
slow death longs to feel lacerations, rather than he 
conscious of a widening margin where consciousness once 
was# 27
But for more gross natures some pointing hand seems 
requisite to make the soul fully conscious of the Hemesis 
that is upon it# This may he accomplished in various 
ways, probably most effectively through the opinion of 
others. This is true in the case of Arthur Bonnithorne:
He (Adam) stood like an immovable obstacle against 
which no pressure could avail; an embodiment of what 
Arthur most shrank from believing in -- the irrevocable- 
ness of his own wrong-doing. The words of scorn, the 
refusal to shake hands, the mastery asserted over him 
in their last conversation in the Hermitage —  above all, 
the sense of having been imocked down, to which a man 
does not very well reconcile himself, even under the 
most heroic circumstances —  pressed on him with a galling 
pain which was stronger than compunction. Arhtur would 
so gladly have persuaded himself that he had done no 
harmJ And if no one had told him the contrary, he could 
have persuaded himself so much better. ITemesis can seldom 
forge a sword for herself out of our consciences —  out 
of the suffering we feel in the suffering we may have 
caused: there is rarely metal enough there to make an
effective weapon. Our moral sense learns the manners 
of good society, and smiles when others smile; but when 
some rude person gives rough names to our actions, she 
is apt to take part against us. 28.
27 Daniel Beronda II, 357.
28 Adam 3ede, 322.
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Pate —  Character in Hardy
29‘'Character is Hate," said Novalis. Hardy, as does 
Eliot, uses this aphorism as the thesis of many of his 
stories and poems* And, like Eliot, he modifies consider­
ably the sense of the verb is. In Hardy character con­
ditions fate to a somewhat less degree than in Eliot.
Hate exists as a more independent entity which executes 
a blind will on the individual without being so much 
affected by the character as expressed in volitions. Con­
versely, the character is even more affected by fate in 
Hardy than in Eliot. This may be because of Eliot's de­
ductive purpose to show the independence of the soul to 
circumstance. Or it may be the result of a greater 
accuracy of reporting, because of He ss puroosive synthesis, 
in Hardy. When stripped of editorial comment the phenomena 
presented by Eliot and Hardy are in many phases parallel. 
That is, they show a mutual interaction of character and 
fate. 3ut the synthesis that the reader makes of Hardy's 
data is quite different from that which Eliot helps him 
to construct. In Eliot there is always a modicum of free 
will left to the individual. At least he believes himself 
free to make his own choices. He realizes, it is true, 
that he is conditioned by tradition, heredity, circum­
stance. Hut these seem to affect the end-product of his 
will -- not his will itself. He retains the precious
29 iflayor oi Casterbridge, 137.
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illusion of autonomy. Ueither do^s Hardy deny all autonomy 
to the soul, but in his greatest works ha often shows this 
autonomy as partial «  conditioned not alone in the exe­
cution but to a great extent in the volition itself#
Usually the mind does not feel itself to be hampered in 
its wishings, ouS: sometimes it plainly perceives that the 
ego is being manipulated from without. It is then as if 
the victim were given the eyes of the author and saw for 
himself that his freedom was restricted, or perhaps only 
a figment, This idoa of consciously being played does 
not appear in 31iot.
Among the characters that have this sense of a 
constricted freedom is 7/ildeve, who said:
However, the curse of inflammability is upon me, 
and I must live under it, and take any snub from a 
woman. It has brought me down from engineering to 
inkeepine: TThat lower stage it has in store for me
I have yet to learn. 30
Jude saw and measured the bars that held him. He 
recognized that his struggle was not alone with out­
side circumstance, but more especially with an indwell­
ing fate, a sort of personification of his passions.
The feeling he had was what must have inspired ancient 
writers to their conception of possession by demons.
He felt himself urged by an objective force, a not ego, 
for whose compulsions he ought not in strictness be held 
responsible, although he could not expect a third
30 Return of the Uative, 73.
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parson to make such distinction he tween his self and a 
force that expressed its will through that self. His 
life was a constant internal warfare between the noble 
self and its ignoble genie. In proportion as Jude 
recognized in himself such foreign dictation, his own 
power of resistence was weakened. Yet most modern 
writers, including George Sliot, would not have seen Jude's 
struggle as so very different from that which might go 
on in any soul. The point to be noted is Hardy's 
atavistic endowment of the passions with personality, 
and Jude's recognition of that personality.
A more clearly developed example, but not so great 
art, is thot of Jocelyn Pierston. The mind of this 
artist was subject to rebirths within it, or rather to 
successive emergences into activity, of an Idea of the 
Unattainable ^all-beloved. Pierston recognized that this 
Idea was really wholly in his own mind, although it 
objectified itself in successive women, especially the 
three Aviees, grandmother, mother, and daughter. So 
imperious was this dictator of hig oo&sciousness that 
it drove him quite against his judgment and even against 
anything t h a t  could be calleu desire. At forty he was 
being impelled toward the second Avic,?:
behind the mere pretty island girl (to the worl) 
is, in ray eye, the Idea, in Platonic phraseology —  
the essence and epitome of all t h a t  is desirable in 
this existence .... I am under a doom, Homers. Yes, I
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am under a doom. To have been always following a 
phantom whom I saw in woman after woman while she was 
at a distance, but vanishing always on close approach, 
was bad enough; but now the terrible thing is that the 
phantom does not vanish, but stays to tantalize me 
even when I am near enough to see what it i sI Tnat 
girl holds me, though my„eyes are open, and though I 
see that I am afoolJ 1
Twenty years later it was the same, except that by 
then he saw himself more objectively and recognized 
more clearly the nature of his malady:
... He now felt that his old trouble, his doom —  
his curse, indeed, he had sometimes called it —  was come 
back again. His divinity was not yet propitiated for 
that original sin against her image in the person of 
Avice the First; and now, at the age of one -and -sixty, 
he was urged on and on like the Jew Ahasuerus or, 
in the phrase of the islanders themselves, like a blindram.32
The curse is finally exorcised by a fever which also 
destroys his artistic sense. So long as the possession 
persisted, Pierston was helpless against its decrees.
The Dynasts shows various characters, notably 
Napoleon, driven by some force within. Hut in the 
Dynasts Hardy shows even less of individual responsi­
bility than in the novels. Jude, Pierston, Wildeve 
assumed a major liability for the deeds prompted by
31 Well-Beloved, 171.
32 Ibid, 240
33 Note: The idea to which Hardy gave artistic ex­
pression by animating it in the fashion of Wessex was 
later developed by Proust: Peu de personnee comprennent
le caractere purement subjectif du phenomene qu’est
1 *amour, et la sorte de creation que c'ost d ’une personne 
supplamentaire, distincte de eelle qui porte le msme 
nom dans le monde, et dont la plupart des elements sont 
tires de nous-memas. Ombre, i. 40.
Le desire s'eleve, se satisfait, disparait et 
c feot tout. Ainsi, la jeunf- fill^ qu'on epouse n ’est 
pas celle dont on est tombe amour rax. Ombre, ii. luQ,139.
Later Years, 248.
78
Their passions objectified. Napoleon much more than 
they disclaimed personal responsibility and laid any 
blame upon the indwelling genie. He recognized him­
self as a tool of an Immanent Will:
Napoleon (gravely, to Josephine)
•.. Enow you, my Pair 
That I —  ay, I in this deserve your pity.-- 
Some force within me, baffling mine intent, 
Harries me onward, whether I will or no.
My star, my star is what’s to blame —  not I.
It is unswervableJ 
• 0 •
Spirit of the Years
He spoke thus at the Bridge of Lodi. Strange, 
He's of the few in Europe who discern 
The working of the Will.
Spirit of the Pities
If that be so,
Better for Europe lacked he such discerning•
And again, after the retreat from Moscow:
Napoleon 
• • 0
I had no wish to fight, nor Alexander,
But circumstance impaled us each on each;
The Genius who out shapes my destinies
Lid all the rest.’ 35
In no novel of Eliot’s is there a hint of this person­
ification of the forces within. Nor do these examples 
mean thc~t Hardy in any sense believes in demon-possession# 
He is recording the feelings of distracted souls that in 




anthropomorphic control within themselves. It is 
significant that to the degree in which the soul feels it­
self manipulated and acquiesces in the manipulation, it 
ceases to he affected in character except by the volition 
to acquiesce. In other words, the spiritual constitution 
of the tool is not affected by what it is made to do; it 
is affected only as it ceases to struggle against fate. 
Hapoleon is not shown to us as a developing charactert 
but as a driven one. Napoleon recognized that:
... Yet, *tis true, I have ever known
That such a Will I passively obeyed] 36
This submission he did not find inconsistent with his 
early vaunting ambition:
To shoulder Christ from out the topmost niche
In human fame. 37
JPor even that ambition was inspired. Could Napoleon 
have meant to deny this control in his final epigram?
Creat men are meteors that consume themselves gg
To light the earth. This is my burnt-out hour.
A closer parallel to Eliot*s philosophy of the 
mutual interaction of character and fate is found in 
those characters that are warped by circumstance with­
out realizing that they are changed in moral fiber.
In case of change in character coincident with great 
external stress, Eliot usually makes plain the major 
part played by the soul itself. Her mind revolts at
36 Ibid, 519.
37 Ibid 9 520.
38 Ibid, 520.
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the thought that man may have but an infinitesimal part 
in his own salvation or damnation. The case of Father 
Time would be hardly less repellent to her than that of 
a conscious possession by a genie.
The boyrs faoe expressed the whole tale of their 
situation. On that little shape had converged all the 
inauspiciousness and shadow which had darkened the first 
union of Jude, and all the acoidents, mistakes, fears, 
errors of the last. He was their nodal point, their 
focus, their expression in a single term. For the rash­
ness of those parents he had groaned, for their ill- 
assortment he had quaked, and for the misfortunes of 
these he had died. 39
The most zealous apologist for a divine plan could 
hardly hold that the child had a fighting chance. As 
his father said in trying to explain to Sue:
It was his nature to do it. The doctor says thare 
are such boys springing up amongst us -« boys of a sort 
unknown in the last generation —  the outcome of new 
views of life. They seem to see all its terrors before 
they are old enough to have staying power to resist them. 
He says it is the beginning of the coming universal wish 
not to live*
This is the most extreme example that Hardy presents of 
the terrible unfairness of life. Because of its very 
monstrousness it loses in tragic effectiveness. Never­
theless it must be considered among the data he offers.
The most common, and at the same time the most con­
vincing instances of fate projected into character are 
those in which Nature in her more sinister aspects mis­
shapes the developing personality. Eustacia Vye under
39 Jude the Obscure, 400.
40 Ibid« 400.
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less adverse circumstances would never have become the 
rebel against life. She
... was the raw material of a divinity. On Olympus 
she would have done well with a little preparation. She 
hap the passions and instincts which make a model goddess, 
that is, those which make not quite a model woman. 41
Pate had not endowed her with an adaptable character#
Yet if it had placed her in almost any surroundings but 
Egdon Heath, she would have cast herself into some part 
that she could play acceptably. On the Heath she strug­
gled against her destiny, unable to see herself objectively 
as the sport of circumstance, unable to resign herself to 
the ordained. So hers is not a melodrama of a soul de­
ceived into making evil choice or of a soul forced to 
misdoing against its will. It is a tragedy of a soul 
so acted upon by fate that its very fiber is corrupted 
until it brings about its own destruction. This is not 
so veryxfar from Eliotfs thesis, although Eliot would 
have preserved more the figment of free will, and she 
would have shown more plainly a culpability in Eustacia. 
Hardy does not moralize. He does not place on Eustacia 
the sin for an imperfectly constituted character further 
warped by an uncommonly perverse environment. His method 
is induction. The reader may deduct moral responsibility 
if he dare. Such also is the case in the T.7oodlanders, 
and A Pair of blue Eyes, and somewhat in Jude the Obscure.
41. Return of the Native, 77.
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Heme sis in Hardy
The ideal example in Hardy of "Character is Fate" 
is to he found in The Mayor of Casterbridge, which also 
typifies Hardy's concept of Heme sis. Michael Henchard 
was born with the seeds of his final immolation already 
in his soul seeds that required no particular set of 
circumstances for their development. His own stubborn 
pride and ungovernable temper were a force that could 
prove victorious over his many admirable qualities in 
almost any environment. His long and valiant struggle 
against the evil within him -- a struggle th: t began the 
morning after he sold his wife -- did not develop, as in 
the case of Maggie Tulliver, a moral resilence. Rather 
the evil itself seemed to gain in its resilence by being 
long suppressed. After nearly twenty years of upright, 
respected living, he was crossed by difficulties with 
Farfae. Then his
... tones showed that, though under a long reign 
of self-control he had become Mayor and churchwarden and 
what not, there was still the same unruly volcanic stuff 
beneath the rind of MichaelgHenchard as when he had sold 
his wife at Weydon Fair.
The Furies pursued him without respite, making sport of 
any feeble effort his will might make to save him. 
Finally, discredited and broken he went forth as a 
laborer:
And thus Henchard found himself again on the 
precise standing which he had occupied five-an-twenty
42 Mayor of Casterbridge, 134.
years before. Sxternally there was nothing to hinder his 
making another start on the upward slope, and by his 
new lights achieving higher things than his sould in 
its half-formed state had been able to accomplish. But 
the ingenious machinery contrived by the Gods for re­
ducing human possibilities of amelioration to a minimum —  
which arranges that wisdom to do shall come pari passu 
with the departure of zest for doing —  stood in the way 
of all that. He had no wish to make an arena a second 
time of a world that had become a mere painted scene to 
him, ^
The tragic close of the story is not heart-breaking so 
much for the suffering, p/.ysical and mental, that was 
inflicted on Henchard , as for the feeling that all this 
suffering was uselessor worse; that he was most bitter in 
death. It is as if the soul of Henchard had been saddled 
with a genius which did not drive him to destruction as 
the demons drove the swine into the sea, but, which is 
more tragic, warped and dulled the soul till it became 
its own Nemesis. That Michael Henchard’s destiny would 
probably have evolved in much the same fashion in other 
surroundings, does not affect it as an illustration of 
the interaction of character and fate to produce a final 
Nemesis. Henchard's character is so much affected by 
fate that Hardy does not pronounce condemnatioh.
Hardy often shows Nemesis as dependent on what 
seems a minor decision. The whole course of the 
Woodlanders was changed by the petulant refusal of Mrs# 
Charmond generously to grant an extention on Giles 
Winterborne*s leasehold. Nemesis was brought upon 
her and suffering upon many others. It is not quite 
accurate to say in this case that character is fate.
43 Ibid, 388.
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tfor the fate resulting was out of all proportion to its 
inception in character* It is rather that an incidental 
mood in character conspired with Pate to bring catastrophe. 
The part that character as such played was only sufficient 
to give a bitter irony to the outcome. George Eliot lets 
Hemesis depend on Arthur Lonnithorne's blameworthy failure 
to tell of his relation with Hetty. But Eliot is careful 
to give both Arthur and Hetty opportunities to tell at 
least enough to establish moral culpability. The tragedy 
does not, then, seem the ironical consequence of an error 
but the rigorous retribution for a sin. In Tito Malema, 
Bulstrode, Grandoourt, the moral guilt is even more fully 
established. Hardy is less careful to constitute guilt. 
Life1s Little Ironies is a series of condensed stories, 
each of which illustrates a Hemesis occasioned by Pate set 
in motion b,y an incommensurate error. Since HardyTs pur­
pose is not to edify, he is free to present the most dis­
illusioning data. An interesting comment on this dis­
parity between cause and effect he left in his notebook:
History is rather a stream than a tree. There is 
nothing organic in its shape, nothing systematic in its 
development. It flows on like a thunderstorm-rill by a 
road side; now a straw turns it this way, now a tiny 
barrier of sand that. The offhand decision of some 
commonplace mind high in office at a critical moment 
influences the course of events for a hundred years. 
Consider the evenings at Lord Carnarvon's, and the in­
tensely average conversation on politics held there by 
average men who two or three weeks later were members of 
the Cabinet. A row of shopkeepers in Oxford Btreet 
taken just as they came would conduct the affairs of 
the nation as ably as these.
Thus, judging by bulk of effect, it oecomes impossible 
to estimate the intrinsic value of ideas, acts, material
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things: we are forced to appraise them by the curves
of their career. Chore were more beautiful women in 
Grreece than Helen; but what of them? 44
After reading Hardy one has no comforting sense of
fairness in the government of the world: that one is
responsible for one's own character, that destiny is
what one makes it, and that Hemasis is a just and law-
abiding paymaster. 3ut one does feel that there has been
no purposive amelioration of unpleasant phenomena.
86
CHAPTER V 
PAIU PITY PESSIMISM MELIORISM
Pain - Pity
In the chapter on the Positivism of Thomas Hardy, 
his sensitivity to suffering, especially that of animals, 
is suggested as a factor in delaying the formation of his 
philosophy. More important still, his sensitivity to all 
suffering is a major factor in the development of that 
attitude toward life which has caused him to he called a 
pessimist. The problem of pain is one of the first to 
which Hardy gives his attention. His approach is radically 
different from that of an apologist for any divine scheme. 
Through observation of phenomena he has come to see pain 
not as a beneficent provision for man's welfare, but as 
the result of imperfection in the ordering of the universe. 
Hone of the commonly accepted theories by which man has 
through the ages sought to make inescapable pain less 
intolerable is acceptable to Hardy’s intellectual honesty. 
Hardy does not find that suffering has resulted in man's 
ennoblement. He does not find consolation in pain the 
punishment for sins that in the future may be avoided*
Uor does he think that pain will be abundantly com­
pensated for in a future life. He sometimes advises a 
sort of stoicism, not as an organized philosophy, but as 
a mute submission to the inevitable bad. He satirises 
the doubtful integrity of those who simply deny the
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existence of pain or who employ a priest to deny it for 
them:
".Setter!11 said the parson, in the strenuously sanguine 
tones of a man who got his living hy discovering a "bright 
side in things where it was not vary perceptible to other people. 1
None of these more or less deductive theories of the 
amelioration of suffering accord with Hardy's agnostic 
spirit. He approaches the matter from the scientific 
viewpoint, and sees that pain is a real phenomenon and 
inescapable except through the numbing of the senses.
Hardy, like Schopenhauer, observes that the more 
highly developed forms of life suffer more acutely than 
those less developed, and that the person of greatest 
endowments endures the most exquisite pain. As the in­
dividual consciousness approaches distinctness of per­
ception, as it emerges further from the Unconscious, its 
susceptibility to pain is proportionsely increased. The 
soul whose awareness approaches genius suffers most of 
all. buch is the case with Jude, Clym Yeobright, and 
less. An entry in Hardy's notebook gives such an ob­
servation:
April 7 (1888). A woeful fact -- that the human 
race is too extremely developed for its corporeal con­
ditions, the nerves being evolved to an activity abnormal 
in such an environment. Even the higher animals are in 
excess in this respect. It may be questioned if nature, 
or what we call Uaturg, so far back as when she crossed the 
line from invertebrates to vertebrates, did not exceed 
her mission. This planet does not supply the materials 
for happiness to higher existences. Other planets may, 
though one can hardly see how. *
1 Two on a Tower , 22.
2 Early Life, 28b.
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The same idea is incorporated in Hardy’s comment on the 
excruciating agony suffered by Bathsheba when she un­
screwed the lid of the unfortunate Penny's coffin and 
discovered her husband’s perfidy:
Capacity for intense feeling is proportionate to the general intensity of the nature, and perhaps in all 
Fanny’s sufferings, much greater relatively to her strength, 
there never was a time when she suffered in an absolute 
sense what Bathsheba suffered now, 25
A highly organized person, like Fiarty South or Orace
Melbury,
... who combined modern nerves with primitive 
emotions ... was doomed by such coexistence to be 
numbered among the distressed, and to take her scourg- 
ings to their exquisite extremity. 4
Hardy believes that duller sorts suffer only propor­
tionately to their less acute sensibilities. Since, 
then, pain is conditioned in intensity by the degree 
of consciousness of the sufferer, no objective standards 
can b* set r;o for its measurement.
... It is not the thing, but the sensitiveness to 
the thing, which is the true measure of its pain. Per­
haps whst seems so bad to you falls lightly on her mind. ^
Fifteen years later he wrote in his journal:
February 26 (1889). In time one might get to 
regard every object, and every action, as composed, not 
of this or that material, this or that movement, but 
of the qualities pleasure and pain in varying pro­
portions. 6
The most complete statement Hardy makes on the subject 
of pain is a letter published in The Academy and Literature ,
3 Far From the Madding Jrowd, 351.
4 7/oodlanders, 294.
o Hand of Ethelberta, 380.
6 Early Life, 285.
89
May 17, 1902. This is an answer to a review of 
Maeterlinck's apology for Nature (The 3uried Temple),
Sir, In your review of M. Maeterlinck's hook you 
quote with seeming approval his vindication of Nature's 
ways, which is (as I under&Jand it ) to the effect that, 
though she does not appear to be just from our point of 
view, she may practice a scheme of morality unknown to 
us, in which she is just. Now, admit hut the hare possi­
bility of such a hidden morality, and she would go out of 
court without the slightest stain on her character, so 
certain should we feel that indifference to morality was 
beneath her greatness.
Nar he it from my wish to distrust any comforting 
fantasy, if it can he barely tenable. But alas, no pro­
found reflection can he needed to detect the sophistry in 
M. Maeterlinck's argument, and to see that the original 
difficulty recognized by thinkers like Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann, Haeckel, etc., and by most of the persons 
called pessimists, remains unsurmounted*
Pain has been, and pain is: no new sort of morals
in Nature cun remove pain from the past and make it p 
pleasure for those who are its infallible estimators, 
the bearers thereof. And no injustice, however ample, 
so long as we consider Nature to he, or to stand for, 
unlimited power. The exoneration of an omnipotent Mother 
by her retrospective justice becomes an absurdity when 
we afek, what ude the foregone injustice necessary to 
her Omnipotence?
So you cannot, I fear, save her good name except 
by assuming one of two things: That she is blind and
not a judge of her actions, or that she is an automaton, 
and unable to control them: in either of which assump­
tions, though you have the chivalrous satisfaction of 
screening one of her sex r you only throw responsibility 
a stage further back.
3ut the story is not new. It is true, nevertheless, 
that, as Mr. Maeterlinck contends, to dwell too long 
amid such reflections does no good, and thac to model 
our conduct on Nature’s apparent conduct, as Nietzsche 
would have taught, can only bring disaster to humanity.7
Is,then, pain of no value? Gannot this plentiful 
and inescapable suffering be turned to some account?
Yes, a little. But in no sense commensurate to its 
cost. IP or the sufferer Hardy sees very little virtue in
7 Later Years, 97.
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pain. This is evidenced by the futile sort of suffering 
conceived as of refining or exalting potency, the artist 
would have shown triumph over suffering rather than dumb 
submission or useless revolt. On? looks in vain for the 
ecstatic suffering of the martyr, so common in George Eliot. 
The repeated chastisements of fortune may reduce the 
victim to a conformity where conformity seems the remedy 
for the torture. Or, more often, it may induce a dumb 
resignation where the suffering seems to be inflicted with­
out apparent reason. The sufferer himself seams no more 
noble or magnanimous. His only gain is in the ability to 
endure more pain. This Hardy holds to be not of intrinsic 
worth, as does Eliot, but rather only an. accomplishment 
rendered necessary by the mismanagement of the universe. 
Hardy would consider a case of smallpox too high a price 
to pay for future immunity —  especially if the immunity 
did not protect.
There is another and much more worthy gain to be 
got from suffering. Unfortun.°tely, however, it does 
not accrue to the sufferer but to the observer. Early 
in 1890 Hardy wrote in his 'journal:
Altruism, or the Golden Rule, or whatever THove 
your Neighbor as Yourself* may be called, will ulti­
mately be brought about a think by the pain we see in 
others reacting on ourselves, as ii we and they were a 
part of one body. Mankind, in fact, may be and possibly 
will be viewed as members of one corporeal Irame. ®
It is notable that Hardy never writes of the refining,
exalting effect of pity on the pitier. To him the only
8 Early nife, 294.
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good of pity is utilitarian,--that is, it may serve to 
lessen the total hulk of pain to he endured, (liven a 
raee with no pain and so no need for pity, Hardy would 
never wish pain to enter in order that pity might enohle 
the heart of the beholder. Unawareness rather than 
sensitivity is the ideal he expresses. In a passage 
from the Dynasts he suggests that a better scheme than the 
present one of sufferers pitied would be a universe of 
rhohots:
Spirit of the Pities
But out of tune the Mode and meritless
That quickens sense in shapes whom, thou hast said,
Necessitation swaysJ A life there was
Among these self-same frail ones -- Sophooles--
Who visioned it too clearly, even the while
He dubbed the Will "the gods". Truly said he,
"Such gross injustice to their own creation 
Burdens the time with mournfulness for us,
And for themselves with shame."—  Things mechanized 
By coils and pivots set to foreframed codes 
Would, in a thorough-sphered melodic rule,
And governance of sweet consistency,
Be cessed no pain, whose burnings would abide 
With That Which ho.de responsibility,
Or inexist. $
Yet one doubts whether HardyT & reticence on the su b je ct
of pity a? an asset is to be taken as meaning that he 
does nos at all value it for its own sake —  that is, 
for its value to the one exercising pity. Sympathy was 
a major factor in his own life, and the principal emotion 
he arouses in his readers# Yet he has given no direct 
testimony on this subject. Pity as a means of alleviating
9 Dynasts, 99.
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suffering roust, of course, be considered as a very poor 
substitute for the absence of pain itself* So, if com­
passion does not benefit the one feeling it, it is at 
best only a fractional compensation for the suffering 
occasioning it•
While pity itself may not be a distinct gain to 
the one experiencing it, the failure to feel pity in the
presence of distress is an evil* In 1887 he wrote in
his journal:
May 29. Instance of a wrong (i.e. selfish) 
philosophy in poetry:
Thrice happy he who on the sunless side
Of a romantic mountain . . . .
bits coolly calm; while all the world without,
Unsatisfied and sick, tosses at noon. 10
Without straining meanings one can see that Hardy 
is revolted at the blind inductive optimism that seems 
to find even more than compensating good in pain —  a 
divine plan for enriching the life of the sufferer or 
of his associates. Three significant doctrines are im­
plicit in Hardy’s reportings of spiritual and physical 
suffering: first, the more man has read divine purpose
into pain, the less concerned he has been in its alleviation; 
second, the total pain in the world would have been lessened 
had men not looked to a future life to right the outrages 
of this; third, the likliest way to bring relief is to 
expose pain, not as conceived by theological apologists
l-: Thomson, James: "Surameaj" The Seasons, hine 458-464.
Barly Life, 262.
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but as it presents itself in all its grimness.
. if way to the Better there be, it ezacts a full 
look at the Worst. H
Pessimism
The almost universal indictment against Hardy is 
that he is a pessimist, most often the critio making the 
charge would appear to mean that Hardy's philosophy is 
unpleasant, that it does not harmonize with the critic's 
own notions of the government of the universe, that 
whether true or false such findings as Hardy presents 
are not salutary, and that it is expedient to discredit 
the bringer of offensive news rather than to hear and 
weigh his message. A critic voicing such views should 
not be taken seriously, for he is not sincere in his 
position, and is probably ill informed. A second critic 
is sincere in his charge. He holds that Hardy, whether 
unconsciously through a distortion of his mental optics, 
or purposely in order to defend preconceived theses, 
selects phenomena of a sinister sort rather than re­
porting life disinterestedly as it presents itself to 
him, -- in other words, that he is not inductive in his 
art, but deductive. This charge cannot be absolutely 
refuted, of course, for the most unbiased observer will 
see most clearly what corresponds to his own ideas. Yet 
that Hardy's readings of life are more reliable than most,
11 "In Tenebris". Collected Poems, 154.
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that they are not purposely distorted, the data in the 
chapter on Hardy’s Positivism will show. A third critic 
does not deny the author's sincerity or his accuracy in 
the reporting of phenomena. On the basis of theso find­
ings he reads pessimism into the author’s philosophy. It 
is to show that Hardy is not a consistent pessimist that 
the following data are presented, together with Hardy’s 
own comments on the charge.
Pessimism in its accurate metaphysical sense is a
... doctrine that everything in nature is ordered 
for, or tends to, the worst, or that the world is 
essentially evil. ^2
The term is loosely applied to any philosophy that does
not express the glowing optimism of
Jod's in his heaven —
All's right with the world!
One must note, too, that pessimism is much more a matter 
of mood than is, for example, the belief in personal 
immortality. It is so very subjective that without 
shifting his opinions on many phases of life, an author 
may change from pessimist to optimist and back again.
And in his zeal for objective truth he may record im­
pressions that brand him a pessimist -- that are indeed 
pessimistic —  even though in the large his outlook is 
hopeful. Such is the case with Thomas Hardy, whose 
pessimism is due, not to any personal ill fortune but 
to a heightened sensitivity to the sufferings of others
12 abater's Hew International Dictionary.
13 Browning, Hobart: Hippo Passes.
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(including animals) and an enthusiasm for the good and 
the "beautiful* So endowed, he cannot help being oppressed 
by the disparity between the almost limitless capacity for 
enjoyment and the much restricted means for satisfying the 
legitimate demands on life. lo a letter written to a 
friend who had reviewed Jude the Obscure t Hardy adds this 
postscript:
P.S. One thing I did not answer, fhe 'grimy1 
features of the story go to show the contrast between 
the ideal life a man wished to lead, and the squalid 
real life he was fated to lead. ... It is, in fact, to 
be discovered in ev^rybody1s life, though it lies less 
on the surface perhaps than it does in my poor puppet's. ^
Aight one say that Hardy is optimistic as to humanity's
capacity for aspiring and enduring, but pessimistic as
to the objective results of his efforts?
Injustice, especially the gratuitous insult of being 
born, lies at the base of much of Hardy's pessimism. Unlike 
Wordsworth, he does not find nature's plan holy, but an 
irrational travesty on justice, sending children into 
lives of inescapable misery, such as await the Lurbey- 
field household;
All these young souls were passengers in the Lurbey- 
field ship -- entirely dependent on the judgement of the 
two Lurbeyfield adults for their pleasures, their necessities, 
their health, even their existence* If the heads of the 
Lurbeyfield household chose to sail into difficulty, disaster, 
starvation, disease, degradation, death, thither were these 
half-dozen little captives under hatches compelled to sail 
with them —  six helpless creatures, who had never been 
asked if they wished for life on any terms, much less if 
they wished for it on such hard conditions as were involved
14 Later Years, 41.
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in “being of the shiftless house of Durbeyfield. Some 
people would like to know whenoe the ooet whose philosophy 
is in these days deemed as profound and trustworthy as 
his song is sweet and pure, gets his authority for speak­
ing of "Nature1 s holy plan". 15
The tragedy in less* life was in great measure due to 
her vain effort to correct the injury inflicted “by an 
unkind fate;
.. to he their Providence; for to Tess, as to some 
few millions of others, there was ghastly satire in the 
poet's lines:
Not in utter nakedness 
But trailing clouds of glory do we come.
To her and her like, hirth itself was an ordeal of de­
grading personal compulsion, whose gratuitousness 
nothing in the result seemed to justify, and at best 
could only palliate. 16
In some respects parallel to the plight of the Durb ay*.
field children is that of the young Chickerels, who were
... bright little minds ready for a training, 
which without money and influence she could never 
give them. 1?
But it is not alone the children whom Pate has placed 
among the lowly that Hardy pities. All life holds enough 
of disappointment and hardship so that Hardy feels com- 
passion for the child to be born. °
Hardy sees the element of chance as unfriendly to 
man, not because it is inherently malignant, but because 
it moves powerfully and in unoreuictable directions. The 
failure of Clym to admit his mother and her consequent 
pitiful death are attributed to chance. A more patent
IB Tess of the <fr*Urbervillas, 21.
16 Ibid, 410.
17 Hand of Ethelbarta. 207.
18 ’’The masked Pace," "The Unborn", etc., Collected Poems, 
490,268.
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instance of the unhappy inteference of chance in the 
affairs of men is the failure of Angel Claire to get lass' 
letter, Hiuch has heen said and written to prove Eustacia 
3ye's undoing was the result of errors within her con- 
tol -- errors for which she might reasonably be held 
responsible. Critics have felt that to prove Eustacia's 
ego, as ideally distinct from her heredity, and en­
vironment, culpable, would somehow exonerate the world 
order of blame and prove Hardy at least not a pessimist. 
Hardyfs position here, as elsewhere, is that the bene­
volence or malevolence of the non-ego -- environment, 
heredity, distiny —  must be determined for the individual 
by his own outlook. Subtilizings do not help the soul 
that feels itself overwhelmed by an unkind providence. 
Hardy undoubtedly expresses a pessimistic outlook on life 
when he lets Eustacia lament her lot:
f... How I have tried and tried to be a splendid 
woman, and how destiny has bean against me! ... I do 
not deserve my lot!' she cried in a frenzy of bitter 
revolt. 'O, the cruelty of putting me into this ill- 
conceived world! I was capable of much; out I have been 
injured and blighted and crushed by things beyond my 
control! 0, how hard it is of heaven to devise such 
tortures for me, who have done no harm to heaven at 
all 2* 19
Ho matter how righteous theoretically the governance of 
the universe may be proved to be, it is bad in so far as 
it allows such despair. Hardy himself in his earlier 
years does not philosophize much about metaphysical
19 Hefeurn of the Native, 442.
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causes, remedies, and such He is plainly pessimistic 
regarding the tyranny of the non-ego. The man who tries 
to discover a workable way of life is no more successful 
shan Oabriel OakesT sheep dog:
leorge’s son had done his work so thoroughly that 
he was considered too good a workman to live, and was, 
in fact, taken and tragically shot at twelve o’clock 
that same day —  another instance of the untoward fate 
which so often attends dogs and other philosophers who 
follow out a train of reasoning to its logical con­
clusion, and attempt perfectly consistent conduct in a 
world made up so largely of compromise*
In the fall of 1882 he writes in his journal:
Since I discovered, several years ago, that I was 
living in a world where nothing bears or4* in practice 
what it promises incipiently, I have troubled myself 
very little about theories. ... There development accord­
ing to perfect reason is limited to the narrow region of 
pure mathematics, I am content with tentativeness from 
day to day. 2-*-
And three years later:
December 21 (1885). The Hypocrisy of things, 
nature is.an arch-dissembler. A child is deceived com­
pletely; the older members of society more or less 
according to their penetration; though even they seldom 
get to realize that nothing is as it appears. 22
Hot all the pessimism evident in Hardy’s earlier 
years is a reflection of an unkind destiny, except as 
that destiny manifests itself in the frailty of man 
himself. Thile Hardy has a high appreciation of the 
inherent capacity of many men to aspire and to endure, 
he has not the Victorian faith in human perfectibility.
He so63 man as not much improved after years or gener­
ations of experience and indoctrination. The strivings
20 gar from The dding Crowd, 42.
21 Barly ixfe, 201.
22 Ibid, 251.
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and. sufferings of man, the labors of his prophots and 
seers have largely been in vain# The fires of tri­
bulation have blistered his soul, but not refined it#
A tragic instance of the vanity of endeavor is that 
of aiichael Henchard, who after twenty years of effort 
gave up the struggle against drink:
'3ecause in twelve days I shall be released from 
my oath."
'Tnat oath?'
'The oath t'- drink no spirituous liquid. In 
twelve days it will be twenty years since I swore it, 
and then I mean to enjoy myself, please Sod:1 23
The pathos lies not so much in Henchard’s poverty and
its attendant suffering as in his lack of self-mastery.
That his twenty years of resistance have failed to
refine him, that his stubborn heredity lias proved too
much for his will so that at last he must go down in
defeat, are thoughts that lie close to pessimism.
Hardy early loses faith in the potency ‘f creeds to
elevate man, but since ho sees all creeds as man-made,
the fault lies, of course, with man. Jude's efforts
toward the better life were nullified by the emptiness
of the doctrines offered him as well as by his own .
limitations. In the midst of his troubles, Jude said:
.#. I am in a chaos of principles — . groping in the 
dark -- acting by instinct and not after example# Sight 
or nine years ago, when I dame here first, I had a neat 
stock cf fixed opinions, but they dropped away one by one; 
and the further I get the less sure I am. I doubt if I 
ha/o anything more for my present rule of life then 
following inclinations which do me and nobody else any 
harm, and actually give pleasure to those I love best*
23 Aayor of Casterbridge , 276.
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... I perceive there is something wrong somewhere in 
our social formulas: what it is can only he discovered
by men or women with greater insight than mine —  if, 
indeed, they ever discover it —  at least, in our time. 
fffor who knoweth what is good for man in this life? -~ 
and who can tell a man what shall be after him under 
the sun?1 24
While the crowds in the street shouted Hurrahs, Jude
died bewildered, embittered, whispering slowly, his
lips scarcely moving:
"Let the day perish wherin I was born, and the night 
in which it was said, ‘There is a man child conceived. T"
... "Let that day be darkness; let not Cod..." "Why died 
I not from the womb? ... I should have slept: then had
I been at rest I" ... "... Wherefore is light given to 
him that is in misery, and life unto the bitter in eoul?"gg
In the stupidity with which man clings to the outworn
supernaturalism of Christianity, with its anthropomorphic -
god, Hardy reads the ii.capacity of mankind for advancement.
In "A Plaint to Man," Hardy admits a possible need in the
infancy of the race for
... a mercy seat 
Somewhere above th*> bloomy aisles 
Of this wilful world.
3ut man should no longer outrage his intelligence by
clinging to this god that must
... dwindle day by day 
beneath the deicide eyes of seers 
In a light that will not let me stay.27
In rejecting the supernatural Hardy does not, however,
discount man’s need for something to take its place.
The following is from a letter of June 10, 1901:
24 Jude the Obscure, 388.
25 Ibid, 482.26 "APlaint bo i^an," Collected Poems, 306.
27 Later Years, 90.
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I do not think that there will by any permanent re­
vival of the old transcendental ideals; but I think there 
may ̂ gradually be developed an Idealism of fancy; that is, 
an idealism in which fancy is no longer tricked out and 
made to masquerade as belief, but is frankly and honestly 
accepted as an imaginative solace in the leek of any 
substantial solace to be found in life.
Sometimes Hardy’s pessimism takes the form of a
querulous pointing of man’s follies and inconsistencies*
He is the cynic in this reverie in church:
... When the congregation rises there is a rustling 
of silks like that of the Devils’ wings in Paradise Lost. 
Hvery woman then, even if she had forgotten it before, 
has a single thought to the folds of her clothes, They 
pray in the litany as if under enchantment. Their real 
life is spinning on beneath this apparent one of calm, 
like the District Hailway-trains underground just by —  
throbbing, rushing, hot, concerned with next week, last weak. ... CJould these true scenes in which this congre­
gation is living be brought into church bodily with the 
personages, there would be a churchful of jostling 
phantasmagorias crowded like a heap of soap bubbles, g
infinitely intersecting, but each seeing only his own.
diore cynical is the speech he puts into the mouth of
Hapoleon:
AyJ Hot content to stand on their own strength,
They try to hire the enginry of Heaven.
I am no theologian, but I laugh 
That men can be so grossly logicless,
When war, defensive or aggressive either,
Is in its essence Pagan, and opposed 
To the whole gist of Christianity I ^
The foregoing examples have all been taken from 
the earlier part of Hardy's life. Until about 1890 he pre­
sented data that showed a far from hopeful outlook for 
man as an inherently good creature the sport of an irrational 
destiny. Yet he seldom wrote of pessimism as such. Then 
followed the period of the Dynast s, when he seemed on the 
whole more sanguine, as will appear later. Out when the
27 Later Years, 90
28 Harly nife, 27o.
29 The Dynasts, 342.
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Great War brought a general disillusionment, Hardy 
seemed to lose much of this faith in the amelioration 
of man’s condition — . a faith that he seems never fully 
to have recovered. Of course these divisions are only 
proximate, for, as stated above. Pessimism is largely 
a matter of immediate mood. Doubts intrude into the 
brightest periods, if such there are, and Hardy nevor 
wholly loses feith in man’s worth. In the truest sense, 
it is only in so far as Hardy doubts the nobility of 
human nature, its capacity for enlightenment, that he 
can be called a pessimist. So long as man is the victim 
of an irrational Will, or even of his own errors caused 
by his development, there is hope. Even though man is 
much persecuted from without, the integrity of his soul 
remains a matter of satisfaction. Irue despair must 
center on the incurable depravity of man himself. This 
sort of pessimism Hardy does not exhibit in his earlier 
writings, and only infrequently in his later.
2?he shock of the War completely shattered the hope 
which he had expressed in the ”Sick Battle Grod,” published 
in 1901:
In days when men found joy in war,
A God of Battles sped each mortal jar;
Ihe peoples pledged him heart and hand, 
i'rom Israel’s land to isles afar.
• * A3ut new light spread. That god’s gold nimb 
And blazon have waned dimmer and more dim;
Even his flushed form begins to fade, 
fill 'out a shade is left of him.
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^That modern meditation broke 
His spell, that penmen’s pleadings dealt a stroke,
Sa^ some; and soma that crimes too dire 
Did much to mire his crimson cloak.
Yes, seeds of crescent sympathy 
Were sown by those more excellent than he,
Long known, though long contemned till then —
The gods of men in amity.
* • •
He rarely gladdens champions now;
They do and dare, but tensely -- pale of brow;
And would they fain uplift the arm 
Of that weak form they know not how.
Yet wars arise, though zest grows cold;
Wherefore, at times, as if in ancient mould 
He looms, bepatched with paint and lath;
But never hath he seemed the oldJ
Let men rejoice, let men deplore,
The lurid Deity of heretofore 
Succumbs to one of saner nod;
The Battle-god is god no more.
But even before the outbreak of the war, Hardy must have
felt, as did very many leaders in Burope, that war was
imminent. The prophetic "Channel Firing," published in
April, 1914, four months before the outbreak of the War,
shows that he was even then apprehensive for the safety
of Europe. The pessimism of this poem is not so much
directed against an outward fate as against man's failure
to ameliorate his own condition. Cod tells the startled
ghosts that:
Just as before you went below;
The world is as it used to be. 30
In commenting on the effect of the war on her husband,
dr s. Hardy says that •
£9 "The Lick Battle-god," Collected Poems, 88. 
30 "Channel Tiring," Collected Poems, 287.
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... the war destroyed all Hardy’s belief in the 
gradual ennoblement of man, a belief he had held for many 
years, as is shown by poems like 'The Sick 3attle-lod," 
and others. He said he would probably not have ended 
Jhe Dynasts as he did end it if he could have foreseen what 
was going to happen within a few years.
I&oreover, the war gave the coup de grace to any con­
ception he may have nourished of a fundamental ultimate 
Wisdom at the back of things. With his views on necessita- 
tion, or at most a very limited free will, events seemed 
to show him that a fancy he had often held and expressed, 
that the never-ending push of the Universe was an unpur- 
posive and irresponsible groping in the direction of the 
least resistence, might possibly be the real truth. 31
In September, 1118, Hardy answered a letter painting
the monstrosities to be expected in any future war. Ha
said:
If it be all true that the letter prophesies, I do 
not think a world in which such fiendishness is possible 
to be worth the saving. Better let Western "civilization” 
perish, and the black and yellow races have a chance*
However, as a meliorist (not a pessimist as they say)
I think better of the world.
Distrust of the perfectability of man is evident in the 
preface to Date Lyrics and 3arlier, published in February, 
1922;
... when belief in witches of Sndor is displacing 
the Darwinian theory and ’’the truth that shall make you 
free,’1 men's minds appear, as above noted, to be moving 
backwards rather than on.
• * *
... But if it be true, as Comte argued, that advance 
is never in a straight line, but in a looped orbit, we 
may, in the aforesaid ominous moving backward, be doing 
it pour mieux sauter, drawing back for a spring. I re­
peat that I forlornly hope so, notwithstanding the super­
cilious regard of hope by Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and 
other philosophers down to Sinstein who have my respect. 33
It is only during the latter years of his life that
31 Pater Years, 155*
32 Later years» 190.
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Hardy says much of Pessimism as such —  years when he 
admits that:
... The Scheme of Things is, indeed, incompre­
hensible ; and there I suppose we must leave it —  perhaps 
for the best, Knowledge might be terrible, 34
One does not need to go deeply into his thought to see 
why Hardy always repudiats the charge of pessimism commonly 
directed against him. Yet it is rather the popular con­
notation of the term that he resents: a false, morbid,
misanthropic desire to see wrong triumph. Hardyfs own 
attitude has none of this ill will towards man. His is 
rather the pessimism of the prophet of truth in contem­
plation of inevitable woe. His philosophy he sees as the 
only impartial, unafraid estimote of man's unhappy state.
He sees the same injustice towards himself in the term 
pessimist (as popularly applied) as the surgeon might 
feel in announcing a malignant disease, oo in the ex­
cerpts following it will be seen that he sometimes denies 
and sometimes accepts the title of pessimist. He is con­
vinced that the only possible hope of saving the human 
race lies in a clearer recognition of the evils of 
existence and an acceptance by man himself of responsi­
bility for their correction. It is to shake man from 
his mental and spiritual lethargy, to show him that a 
considerable part of his ills lie with himself and can 
be cured only by himself, that Hardy mercifully exposes
34 Letter to Alfred Hoyas, December. 1920, Later Years, 213.
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the worst in life. His purpose is to enforce a feeling 
that much injustice is needless. An entry in his note­
book on January 16, 1018, gives the creed of a sensitive 
humanitatian, not of a gloomy cynic:
As to pessimism, ^y motto is, first correctly 
diagnose the complaint —  in this case human ills —  
and ascertain the cause: then set about finding a
remedy if one exists. The motto or practice of the 
optimist is: Blind the eyes to the real malady, ggd
use empirical panaceas to suppress the symptoms.
So, since he considers his position the one of in­
tellectual honesty, he resents what seems an unfair attack 
on his motives.
One of the first references he makes to pessimism, 
so-called, occurs in his journal of 1902:
Januaryl. A Pessimists apology. Pessimism (or 
rather what is call such) is, in brief, playing the 
sure game. You cannot lose at it; you may gain. It is 
the only view of life in which you can never be dis­
appointed, Having reckoned what to do in the worst 
possible circumstances, when better arise, as they may, 
life becomes child’s play. 36
In Heal Conversations William Archer reports a discussion 
with Thomas Hardy on the subject of pessimism. Mr. Archer 
vouches that he has faithfully reproduced the thought of 
Mr. Hardy, although possibly not the exact words. The 
conversation is undate a, but took place at max Cate about
W. A. And the pessimist holds, I take it, that the 
principle of evil is the stronger.
Mr. Hardy. Ho, I should not put it precisely in 
that way. For instancy, people call me a pessimist; and 
if it is pessimism to think, with Bophocles, that ’’not tc
3b Later Years, 183.
36 Later Years, 91.
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have been born is best,’* then I do not reject the desig­
nation. I never could understand why the word ’pessimism" 
should be such a red rag to many worthy people; and I 
believe, indeed, that a good deal of the robustious, 
swaggering optimism of recent literature is at bottom 
cowardly and insincere. I do not see that we are likely 
to improve the world by asseverating, however loudly, 
that black is white, or at least that black is but a 
necessary contrast and foil, without which white would 
be white no longer. That is mere juggling with a metaphor. 
But my pessimism, if pessimism it be, does not involve 
the assumption th^t the world is going to the dogs, and 
that Ahriman is winning all along the line. On the con­
trary, my practical philosophy is distinctly meliorist.
T̂liat are my books but one plea against "man's inhumanity 
to man" —  to woman —  and to the lower animals? (By the 
way, my opposition to "sports" is a point on which I am 
rather in conflict with my neighbors hereabouts.) What­
ever may be the inherent good or evil of life, it is 
certain that men make it much worse than it need be.
When we have got rid of a thousand remediable ills, it 
will be time enough to determine whether the ill that 
is irremediable outweighs the good. 37
An acknowledgement of a birthday letter from Mrs. Arthur 
Henniker shows a decided doubt as to the spiritual pro­
gress of the race:
Max Grate, 5 June, 1919.
Sincere thanks for your good wishes, my dear friend, 
which I echo back towards you. I should care more for 
my birthdays if at each succeeding one I could see any 
sign of real improvement in the world —  as at one time 
I fondly hoped there was; but I fear that what appears 
much more evident is that it is getting worse and worse.
All development is of a material and scientific ^ind —  
and scarcely any addition to our knowledge is applied to 
objects philanthropic and ameliorative. I almost think 
that people were less pitiless towards their follow­
er eatures -- human and animal —  under the homan Umpire 
than they are now; so why does not Christianity throw up 
the sponge and say, I am beaten, and let another religion 
take its place?
A year later among some "Birthday Uotos" -.ppoar two para­
graphs that show that his faith in man Pas not yet been 
restored. The pessimism is now more than a mood, if
37 Archer, Van.: Meal Conversations^ 46.
38 hater Years, 19.
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pure mood it ever was. It is thoroughly rationalized 
into a philosophy of life not malevolence hut almost 
hopeless ben9volence:
nature's indifference to the advance of her species 
along what we are accustomed to call civilized lines makes 
the late war of no importance to her, except as a sort of 
geological fault in her continuity.
Though my life, like the lives of my contemporaries, 
covers a period of more material advance in the world than 
any of the same length can have done in other centuries,
I do not find that real civilization has advanced equally. 
People are not more human, so far as I can see, than they 
were in the year of my hirth. Disinterested kindness is 
less. The spontaneous goodwill that used to characterize 
manual workers seems to have departed. One day of late 
a railway-porter said to a feehle old lady, a friend of 
ours, ’'See to your luggage yourself." Human nature had 
not sunk so low as that in 1840. 39
On December 29, 1926, he writes in a letter to iflr• and Mrs. 
Oranvilie-Barker that Hapoleon
... threw hack human altruism scores, perhaps hundreds 
of years. 40
The apologist for Hardy will look in vain through the 
writings of his last years for an assurance that the dark 
veil was removed and that Hardy died in the confidence
that all was finally on the way to perfection. Such is not
the case, for the veil did not lift. Or if one agree with 
Hardy that eventual salvation for the race is not assured, 
one will recognize that Hardy saw clearly to tho end. In 
August of his last year (1928) he wrote to the critic 
J. 3. Priestley, apropos of *or. Priestley's criticism of




... Meredith was, . I always felt, in the direct 
succession of Congreve and the artificial comedians of 
the Hast oration, and in getting his brilliancy we must 
put up with the fact that he would n o t , or could not —  
at any rate did not -- when aiming to represent the "Comic 
Spirit," let himself discover the tragedy that always 
underlies Comedy if you only scratch it deeply enough.
This echoes what he wrote in 1876.
"All is vanity," said the Preacher. But if all 
were only vanity, who would mind? Alas, it is too often 
worse than vanity; agony, darkness, death also.
A man would never laugh were he not to forget his 
situation, or were he not one who never has learnt it.
After risibility from comedy, how often doe3 the thought­
ful mind reproach itself for forgetting the truth?
Laughter always means blindness-—  either from defect, 
choice, or accident. 42
At the close of his life he had not greatly changed his
mind from his belief er expressed above and in his journal,
of October 15, 1888:
If you look beneath the surface of any farce you see 
a tragedy; and, on the contrary, if you blind yourself to 
the deeper issues of a tragedy you see a farce. 4^
Mrs. Hardy records that the last thing read to her husband
on the evening of his death was a quatrain from the
Rubaiyat:
Oh, Phou, who man of baser Barth didst make,
And ev ’n with Paradise devise the Snake:
Por all the Sin wherewith the Pace of Man 
Is blacken’d —  M a n ’s forgiveness give -- and take I
Meliorism
As antitode for the wretched condition into which 
man has been thrown by no fault of his own but by the
41 Ib i d , 257.
42 Barly Life , 148..
43 Ibid, 282.
44 i>at er Years, 266.
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compulsion of "birth, Hardy offers various solutions.
Nona are, however, so much in accord with conventional 
thought as are those of Eliot. These may he grouped as 
follows: first, voluntary cessation of existence; second,
resignation to the inevitable; third, evolution of the 
race into a more tolerable concord with the external uni­
verse; fourth, rebirth of "Unawareness” ; fifth, emergence 
of the 77111 into more complete consciousness. These are 
the ultimate solutions. lor immediate amelioration of 
m a n ’s lot, Hardy offers much the same suggestions as does 
Eliot -- greater compassion toward all creatures, accept­
ance of duty, development of a spirit of brotherhood.
Hardy is convinced that whatever irru be the ultimate fate 
of the human race its present condition is unnecessarily 
aggravated by abuses that lie within the power of man to 
correct. This is a commonplace to even the sketchy 
reader of his work.
The theory of von Hartmann’s that man can best find 
the w o u t  of his dilemma through suicide —  not active, 
personal suicide, but a passive ending of oneself through 
failure to procreate is one that Hardy develops in many 
poems and stories. The direction the idea takes in Hardy 
is what is termed race suicide, the refusal to be a party 
to the extent ion of race suffering. If, as Hard.* is con­
vinced, the ills of life outweigh its values, if existence
is a mockery uud a curse, it would be better not to h a v e  
been born* Obviously man cannot undo the error of his 
own birth. 3ut ha can refrain from inflicting a like in­
justice on another. Jude the Obscure is at bottom an ex­
position of this doctrine. It was this reluctance to 
force sufferers into the world will-nilly even more than 
the unusual sensitiveness of her nature that resulted in 
Sue's reluctance to marry and reproduce. As she and Jude 
cam9 into the church to be married, they found another 
couple already at the altar. The necessary delay before 
tlieir own ceremony coiud be performed gave them opportunity 
to weigh more carefully the responsibilities of wedlock.
Sue realised that she could not enter matrimony with her 
eyes opened to all its meaning to her and Jude and to those 
who might follow. She said to Jude:
... Everybody is getting to feel as we do. We are a 
little beforehand, that’s all. In fifty, aye, twenty 
years, the descendants of these two will act and feel 
worse than we. They will see weltering humanity still 
more vividly than we do now, as
’’chapes like our own selves hideously multiplied," 
and will be afraid to reproduce them. 45
In the atrocious slaying of Sue's babies by the pathetic
little "ITather Time," -- and his own suicide, Hardy has
shown us an objectification of the "coming universal wish
4. ^  -i • t i 46not to live.
A considerable p^rt of less of the J lTJrbervilles is 
an exposition of the tyranny of being born. Th9 case of
45 Jude the Obscur e , 339.
46 Ibid / 400.
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the Durbeyfielu children has already been cited. Probably 
the most striking instance, the one in which Hardy’s large 
humanitarianism is most apparent, is a conversation be­
tween Angaju Glaii e ana Dess daring their estrangement. In 
explaining the impossibility of their continued union,
Angel pictured to Pass a Hemesis in the form of children 
blighted by the knowledge of their mother’s early trans­
gression:
” ...Don’t think of me or of yourself, my feelings or 
your feelings. That’s not all the difficulty; it lies in 
another consideration — . one bearing upon the future of 
other people than ourselves. Think of years to come, 
and children born to us, and this past matter getting 
known —  for it must get known. ... Well, think of these 
wretches of our flesh and blood growing up under doubts 
which they will gradually get to feel the full force of 
with their expanding years. What an awakening for them! .. .”
... She had truly never thought so far as that, and 
his lucid picture of possible offspring who would scorn 
her was one that brought deadly conviction to an honest 
heart which was humanitarian to its center. Sheer exper­
ience had already taught her, that, in some circumstances, 
there was one tiling better than to lead a good life, and 
that was to be saved from leading any life whatever. Dike 
all who had been provisioned by suffering, she could, in 
the words of II. Sully-Prudhomme, hear a penal sentence 
in the fiat, ’’You shall be born.”
Yet such is the vulpine slyness of Dame Mature, that, 
till now, Tess had been hoodwinked by her love for Claire 
into forgetting it might result in vitalizations that 
would inflict upon others what she had bewailed as a mis­
fortune to herself. 47
In several of his poems Hardy has suggested the 
same salvation for the race through cessation of existence, 
klad Judy, whom Hardy thinks not so mad after all, illus­
trates this philosophy:
47 Tess of the D ’Urbervillea, k76.
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When the hamlet hailed a hirth 
Judy used to cry:
Ttfhen she heard our christening mirth 
She would kneel and sigh.
She was crazed, we knew, and we 
Humored her infirmity.
When the daughters and the sons 
Gathered them to wed,
And we like-intending ones 
Hanoed till dawn was red*
She would rock and mutter, '’More 
Comers to this tony shoreI”
TIhen old Headman Heath laid hands 
On a bahe or twain,
She would feast, and buy her brands 
Sing her songs again.
What she liked we let her d o ,
Judy was insane, we knew. 48
An epigram, that Hardy adapted from the Prench flippantly
states a thought which is really a serious one:
I ’m Smith of Stoke, aged sixty-odd,
I ’ve lived without a dame 
Prom youth-time on; and would to God 
hiy dad had done the same.
This doctrine of suicide is commonly associated with 
Pessimism. In Hardy it is the product of his extreme 
sensitiveness to suffering as influenced by the phil­
osophy of Pessimism propounded by von Hartmann and others* 
Yet suicide is itself a form of amelioration, for it im­
plies that the contemplated state of nothingness is better 
than the present one of being. Hardy’s humanitarianism 
would never countenance the infliction of suffering on 
one’s friends through taking one’s own life. Hut the
48 "iviad Judy,” Collected Poems, 138.
43 '’Epitaph on a Pessimist,” Collected Poems, 771.
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passive suicide of the race he seriously suggests as 
a conceivable ultimate escape, especially for those of 
the race furthest emerged into consciousness —  those most 
sensitive to the woes of life, lor
Better than waking is to sleep! ^
The second form of meliorism that Hardy suggested is 
resignation to the inevitable, renunciation of the hardly 
attainable. It is offered as a partial antidote against 
the
... intolerable antilogy 
Of making figments feel! 1
Ye- in Hardy this doctrine never reaches a lofty develop­
ment. There is never the selfless renunciation of desire 
which one finds in Bomola or Liiddlemarch. Tess* sacrefice 
of herself, no less heroic than that of Bomola or of 
Dorothea, was nevertheless not a voluntary seeking to 
give her life for those who had no claim, upon her. N o ­
where in Hardy does non-resistence approach the sublimity 
of
Thou hast not half that power to do me harm 
As X have to be hurt* ^2
There is rather the capitulation to the inevitable —  a
rebellious impotence. He does not subscribe, as does
Eliot, to the doctrine of loathe's quoted and developed
by Carlyle, that
50 Dynasts, 302.
51 Dynast s', 77.
52 oha^e spear e , 7/m.: Othello V.ii.
115
... It is only with 11 enunciation (Bntsagen j that 
Life, properly speaking, can he said to begin. ... There 
is in man a Higher than Love of Happiness: he can do 
without Happiness, and instead thereof find 31essednessJ
Unlike Sliot and Carlyle, Hardy is a sensitive hedonist.
To him resignation is not a renunciation of the right to
happiness. The right still remains even though the
effort toward attainment may he foregone. He would
repudiate the renunciation preached hy Carlyle:
Poolish soulJ What Act of Legislation w^s there that 
thou shouldst he Hap;oy? A little while ago thou hadst no 
right to he at all. What if thou wert horn and predestined 
not to he Happy, hut to he Unhappy I Art thou nothing other 
than a Vulture, then, thatflies through the Universe seek­
ing after somewhat to eat; and shrieking dolefully hecause 
carrion enough is not given thee? Close thy 3yron; open 
thy Groethe. 54
^an has that right, says Hardy, hy virtue of his being 
horn without his desire or consent, and of his being 
furnished with the aopetite for happiness. But since 
man is impotent to enforce his just claim on destiny, he 
will, on the whole, get on hatter if he accepts whatever 
is given him without contention. Protest is futile; 
resistance is worse.
An interesting hit of indirection, a seeming re­
signation of what is the prime aim of the hedonist, is 
found in Hardy's journal:
January 5, (1888). Be rather curious than anxious 
about your own career; for whatever result may accrue to 
its intellectual and social value, it will make little
53 Carlyle, Thomas: "The everlasting Yea." Sartor Hesart us.
54 Ihid.
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difference to your personal well-being. A naturalist's 
interests in the hatching of a queer egg or germ is the 
utmost introspective consideration you should allow 
yourself. 0 0
A similar sort of saving indifference to what life may
bring is shown in a conversation between Ethelberta Petharwin
and Christopher Julian. Here the thought is that happiness
is a by-product not to be sought for itself. What Hardy
really means is that happiness is so uncertain of attainment
that man had best not center too much attention on it, or
be too much disappointed in failing to secure it:
Ethelberta: Let me be. Life is a battle, they
say; but it is only so in the sense that a game of chess 
is a battle -- there is no seriousness in it ; it may be 
put an end to at any inconvenient moment by owning yourself 
beaten, with a careless "Ha-ha!'.1 and sweeping your pieces 
into the box. Experimentally, I care to succeed in society; 
but at the bottom of my heart, I don't care.
Julian: P’or that very reason you are likely to do it.
Liy idea is, make ambition your business and indifference 
your relaxation, and you will fail; but make indifference 
your business and ambition your relaxation, and ^gu will 
succeed. S j impish are the ways of the gods.
Years later Hardy writes in his journal a paragraph that
shows almost this same conception of the untrustworthiness
of life:
Lay 1, (1102) Life is what we make it as 7/hist is 
whet we make it; but not as Chess is what we make it; 
which ranks higher as a purely intellectual game than 
either 7/hist or Life. ^7
In the great tragedies the resignation is that of 
chained despair before an unrighteous but powerful fate.
It is a bending before blind necessity, an acquiescence
55 Early Life, 267.
56 Hand" oT^fhelberta, 140.
57 Later Years, 96.
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not willingly initiated ’out yet preferable to vain re­
sist ence. In the case of the peasant it be conies a dumb 
acceptance* In the Hot urn of the xfative Sustacia, who 
cannot learn to bend before fate, is broken, blyrn better 
adapts himself to the inevitable, not because he sees the 
prevailing order as right , but because disillusionment of 
spirit has convinced him that life at best offers little 
to her victims —  not enough to struggle for.
Yeobright placed his hand upon hor arm. TTlTow, don't 
you suppose, my inexperienced girl, that I cannot rebel, 
in high Promethean fashion, against the gods and fate as 
well as you. I have felt more steam and smoke of that 
sort than you have ever heard of. 3ut the more I see of 
life the more do I perceive that there is nothing par­
ticularly great in its greatest walks, and therefore noth­
ing particularly small in mine of furze-cutting. If I 
feel that the greatest blessings vouchsafed to us are not 
very valuable, how can I feel it to be any great hardship 
when they sre taken away?n 58
Such is the resignation that Hardy holds forth as a pos­
sible alleviation for m a n Ts lot. It is a far cry from 
She lofty, mystical renunciation of religious asceticism. 
It is equally removed from the idealism of Eliot, in 
which the renunciation although not undertaken for its 
own sake, becomes none the less a means of srace, puri­
fying and ennobling the character. In Hardy it is only 
a make-shift, a poor substitute for the better objective 
conditions that man is powerless to affect. It never 
ilevates the soul to a beatific state of merging with the 
godhead -  to a state beyond temptation from the life that
58 Heturn of the Hative, 31o.
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has bean renounced. There is too little of the voluntary in 
the renunciation for it to be accounted a virtue per se.
If it makes less intolerable the inflicted misery of life, 
it fulfills its utilitarian purpose.
The third means by which Hardy fancies that a melior­
ation may come is through an evolution of the human race 
into a more supportable relationship with its environment* 
Just wha« this evolution may be Hardy does not specify 
dlearly. In fact, he suggests several possible adjust­
ments that may be made. These are not all harmonious, and, 
except for the theory of progressive enlightenment, they 
are probably little more than fancies. Hardy finds man 
fettered by social restraints, superstitions* outworn re­
ligions, barbarous laws —  man-inflicted injustices which 
man will discard on emerging further into rationality*
One of these, the .English marriage laws, Hardy denounces 
as the
... gratuitous cause of at least half the misery of 
the community. ^9
It is partly against oppressive marriage and divorce
laws that Jude the Obscure is directed, m  it Sue looks
forward to a saner age.
... T.7hen people of a later age look back upon the 
barbarous customs and superstitions of the times that we 
have the unhappiness to live in, what will they say’ 60
Much more widely dispersed is Hardy's complaint against
59 ,fLaw 3 the dause of misery," Hear si ’ a magazine , dune, 1912.
60 Jude the Obscure, 254.
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man's shackling himself witn outgrown religious ritual 
and superstition. He sees a good omen of man's deliver­
ance in the general rejection by scientific thinkers of 
constraining, irrational feith in a man-made deity*
"Grod's Funeral" shows a mingled note of pity for the 
unhappy dazedne3S of those who see the god dead and of 
hope that a new, clearer light may dewn to take the place 
of the anthropomorphic concept. Jut disillusionment 
brings an immediate lessening of satisfaction in life*
Hardy quotes the mourners for the dead god:
How sweet it was in years far hied 
To start the wheels of day with trustful prayer,
To lie down liegely at the eventide 
And feel a blest assurance he woo there I
And who or what shall fill his place?
Whither will wanderers turn distracted eyas 
For some fixed star to stimulate their pace 
Towards the goal of their enterprise?*..
Then he applies his enlightened imagination to find a
compensation for the loss of the god:
Still, how to bear such loss I deemed 
The insistent question for each animate mind,
And gazing, on my growing sight there seemed 
A pale yet positive gleam low down behind,
Whereof, to lift the general night,
A certain few who stood aloof had said,
"Jee you upon the horizon that small light —  6-j
dwelling somewhat?" Bach mourner shook his head.
Only through disillusionment, a burying of the dead god,
can a new hope arise. Yet none but the seer can behold the
new hope* To the mourner of uhe shattered faith there is
61 "Ood’s Funeral/' Polle otod Poems, 308.
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no bright gleam. His lot it is to bury the dead, not 
to rejoice in the birth of the new god.
Highly idealistic is the thought in '’The Oraveyard 
of Dead breeds,” published in Human Shows three years 
before Hardy’s death. It and "There seemed a StrangenessrT 
from the same collection stand out in contrast to the 
pessimism of most of his late poems. They show a hope 
that out of the welter of tried and discarded faiths a 
purer spirituality may be born. The poet imagines him­
self sitting among the fungus-grown sepulchres of the dead 
creeds, readings the epitaphs of ’’deceased Oatholicons:”
When in a breath-while, lo, their spectres rose 
Like wakened winds that autumn summons up: —
,T0ut of us cometh and heir, that shall disclose 
Haw promises!” cried they. "And the caustic cup
We ignorantly upheld to men, be filled
With draughts more pure than those we ever distilled,
That shall make tolerable to sentient segrs
The melancholy marching of the years.” ^
’’There Seemed a Strangeness” also borrows an ’’otherworldly”
voice which announces that the Supreme, who has long
fogged men in ignorance, is about to uncloud their veiw.
A new dispensation awaits,
”And they shall see what is, ere long,
Dot through a glass, but face to face;
And night shall disestablish \ 'J ronpi:
The Dreat Adjustment is taking place.” 63
Hardy does not, however, believe that this improvement in
belief will take place through any inherent capacity of
62 ”The bravoyard of Dead breeds,” Oolleoted Poems, 639.
63 "There Seemed A Strangeness,” bollected P oems, 690.
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truth to prevail. In July, 192a, he wrote in his note­
book;
,fTruth, is what will work,’' said William James (harpers). 
A worse corruption of language was never perpetrated. 64
That man must he his own salvation -- if salvation there
is to he —  is always Hardy’s doctrine. In "T e racking
Sense’1 Hardy imagines Uature groping blindly, wounding
her children unwittingly, needing guidance from her creatures.
He counsels man to
Heal, then, her groping skill no scorn, no note of 
malediction;
Hot long on thee will press the hand that hurts the 
lives it loves;
And while she plods dead-reckoning on, in darkness 
of affliction,
Assist her where thy creaturely dependence can or may,
IT or thou ar; of her clay, 65
Hardy looked forward to a time when the church would
so modify its liturgy and creed as not to exclude the
millions of thinkers who c ,-uld not subscribe to its present
sanctities. He hoped to see the English Church liberalize
and rationalize its worship so as to admit men and women
who no longer believed in the supernatural. 3ut in his
late years the fulfillment of that hope seemed projected
far into the future, for he sow the clergy becoming more
narrow and dogmatical, and a belief in mysticism increasing*
Home notes from his journal of January, 1907, throw light on
his conception of the function of religion. They also
show that the various churches of England have fallen far
64 Hater Years, 242.
65 "The Lacking Sense," Collected looms, 107.
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short of that conception:
An ephemeral article which might be written: "The Lard
Gas9 of the Would-be-Religious. 3y Sinceritas.”
Synopsis. Liany millions of the most thoughtful 
people in England are prevented entering any chi *oh or 
chapel from year’s end to year’s end.
The days of creeds are as dead .̂nd done with as the 
days of Pterodactyls.
Required: services at which there are no affirmations 
and no supp1i cat i ons.
Rationalists err as far in one direction as Revelrtion- 
ists or mystics in the other; as far as in the direction 
of logicality as their opponents away from it.
Religious, r?ligion, is to be used in the article 
in its modern sense entirely, as being expressive of 
nobler feelings towards humanity and emotional goodness and 
greatness, the old meaning of the Yford -- ceremony, or 
ritual —  having perished, or nearly.
We enter church, and we have to say, r’Wo have erred 
and strayed from Thy ways like lost sheep,” when what we 
want to say is, ’Why are we made to err and stray like lost 
sheep?” Then we have to sing, ”wy soul doth magnify the 
nord,” when what we want to sing is, ”0 th.t my soul could 
find some Lord that it could magnify! Till it can, let us 
magnify good works, and develop all means of easing 
mortals' progress through a world not worthy of them.”
Still, being present, we ssy the established words 
full of the historic sentiment only, mentally adding, "How 
happy our ancestors were in repeating in all sincerity 
these articles of faith!” But we perceive that none of the 
congregation recognizes tfut we repeat the words from an 
antiquarian interest in them, and in a historic sense, 
solely in order to keep a church of some sort afoot —  a 
thing indispensable; so th-t we are pretending what is 
not true: that we axe believers,. This must not be; we
must leave. And if we do, we reluctantly go to the door, 
and creep out as it creaks complainingly behind us, 
Christianity nowadays as expounded by Christian 
apologists has an entirely different meaning from that 
which it bore when I was a boy. If I understand, it now 
limits itself to the religion of emotional morality and al­
truism that was taiit by Jesus Christ, or nearly so limits 
itself. But this teaching does not appertain especially 
jo Christiunity: other moral religions within whose
sphere the name of Christ has never been heard, teach 
the same thing! Perhaps this is a mere question of 
terminology, and does not much matter. That the dogmatic 
superstitions read every Lunday are merely a commemorative 
recitation of old articles of faith held by our grand­
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father a, may not much matter either, os long as this 
is well understood. Still, it would be more honest to 
make these points clearer, by recasting the liturgy, for 
their real meaning is often misapprehended. Hut there 
seems to be no sign of such a clearing up, and I fear that, 
since the "Apology" ( in Late Lyrics), in which I expressed 
as much some years ago, no advance whatever has been shown; 
rather, indeed, a childish back-current towards a belief 
in magic rites. ^6
Sometimes, though not often, Hardy states his assurance 
that people were happier when the race was younger. Yet 
he nowhere recommends a return to nature. He recognizes 
that the loss in creature happiness has been compensated 
for by increased intellectual satisfaction, ft ^east, 
having attained to the light of disillusionment, man does 
not wish the peaceful illusion of the blind. 30 his 
evolutionary adjustment does not include retrogression.
In 1888 he wrote of the peasants of essex:
... Indeed, it is among such communities as the se that 
happiness will find her last refuge on earth, since it is 
among them that a perfect insight into the conditions of 
existence will be longest postponed.
Ho far three ideas of meliorism have been treated, 
cessation of existence, resignation to the inevitable, 
and evolution of man into a more adaptation to his en­
vironment. In. all these the initiation lies 'with man; 
he is responsible for his own salvation. fwo further 
hypotheses r?main: that of the submerging of man into
unawareneBs, and that of an emergence of the 7/ill into 
consciousness -- both dependent primarily not on man
66 Later Years, 1?1.
67 "The Aerolite," Collected roems, 737.
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but on the Immanent Till. Of these two, the former is
only a phantasy. It ooours in rTIha Aero lit e/ in which
the ills of man are ascribed to a germ of consciousness
that escaped to this world through an error. Vhile the
seers pondered how to rid the world of this curse, or to
limit its registerings to good,
I left them pondering. This was how 
(Or so I dreamea) was waked on earth 
The mortal moan 
Jegot of sentience, .aaybe now 
formal unawareness waits rebirth. 68
Hardy1s distinctive theory of meliorism is that of
an emergence of the Immanent 7/ill from nescience or
semi-sentience into fuller awareness. Since this is
wholly an activity of the 'Till, it is treated inthe
chapter on the immanent Will.




3oth Greorge Eliot and Thomas Hardy make careful 
distinction between two types of immortality: that of
the individual consciousness in a personal life beyond 
the grave as taught by orthodox Christianity, and that 
of influence persisting only in 'ahe lives of others, fhe 
first both reject unqualifiedly. The latter they accept 
and frequently allude to as a hope that adds dignity and 
worth to human life.
The rejection of personal ii.mortality has brought 
Greorge Sliot into disfavor with a considerable number of 
readers, especially protagonists of Christianity, who have 
failed to see in this rejection of' a second life a 
heightened altruism, a greater devotion to the task of 
alleviating the ills of the present life. That her 
avowal of the finality of this life has not hurt her 
with more readers may be attributed to the fact that 
she boldly expresses her belief only in her essays and 
in her letters and conversations -- never in poems or 
fiction. The reason for this unfortunate inconsistency 
would seem to oe the same as that which prompted her to 
outward conformity, including ■attendance at church. In 
her private thinking she was a fearless searcher for the 
truch. Yet she hesitated to destroy the happiness which
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others might find in traditional faith in the supernatural. 
Writing to one who passionately clung to such a hope, 
she said:
I have no controversy with the faith that cries out
and clings from the depths of m a n ’s needs. I only long,
if it were possible to me, to help in satisfying the need
of those who want a reason for living in the absence of
what has been called consolatory belief. ^
Yet her inconsistency here is less easily understood than
in the case of church attendance and worship, for to the
mature Jeorge Eliot the conventional belief in immortality
is not merely unscientific and contrary to experience; it
is pernicious to mankind in that it dulls the feelings of
compassion, discourages a fearless search for truth, and
lowers the dignity and worth of this life. In a review
of ^ecky’s history of the hise and Influence of the Spirit
of Nationalism in Tarope, she writes:
Indeed, wherever the tremendous alternative of ever­
lasting torments is believed in, —  believed in so that it 
becomes a motive determining the life, -- not only per­
secution, but every other form of severity and gloom, 
is the legitimate consequence. ^
She finds that the belief in personal immortality not only 
encourages vicious practices, but fails in the one service 
that it is best calculated to render —  that of maintain­
ing morality. In a criticism of the poet Arthur Young she 
offers this opinion:
Eay, to us it is conceivable that in some minds the 
deep pathos lying in the thought of human mortality —  t3,ut
1 juettar quoted by 1. E. dooke: leorge Eliot , 22E.
Z "Ihe Influence of Hati onalism , ” Essays ,It»o>.
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we are here lor a little while and then vanish &ia^, that 
this earthly life is all that is given to our loved ones 
and to our many suffering fellow-men —  lies nearer the 
fountains of moral emotion than the conception ul extended 
existence. And surely it ought to he a welcome fact, if 
the thought of mortality . as well as of immortality, he 
favorable to virtue. Do writers of sermons and religious 
novels prefer that men should he vicious in order that 
there may he a more evident political and social necessity 
for printed sermons and clerical fictions? 3
later in the same review, while showing that a higher 
morality is independent of considerations of future re­
ward or punishment, or of other theological dicta, she 
says:
... To us it is a matter of unmixed rejoicing that 
this latter necessary of healthful life (morality) is 
independent of theological ink, and t h a t  its evolution 
is ensured in the interaction of human souls, as certainly 
as the evolution of science or of art, with which, indeed, 
it is hut a twin ray, malting into them with undefinahle 
limits. 4
Her indignation is aroused at the slander against the
unbeliever which she reads in these lines from Young’s
hight Though os :
As in the dying parent dies the child,
Virtue with Immortality expires.
Tho tells me he denies his soul immortal,
TZhate'er his ooast, has told me he's a knavo. 
his duty ' tis to love himself alone;
IJor Care though mankind perish, if he smiles.
In her reply to this unwarranted and unjust pronouncement,
Sliot gives her most complete statement of the failure
of the belief in immortality to make men more merciful or
more just;
3 "V/orldliness and Oth 3r —Oorldliness , ' dssuy ̂ , ol.
4 I  o i u  , o2 .
h x o u n g  , a u w a r d  : n i g n c  J n o u g h e »? , o l . I ,  x-sight 7 , p . 2 0 0 .
2ssayts , 43.
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T,Ve can imagine the man who ''denies his soul immortal," 
replying; "It is quite possible that you would be a knave, 
and love yourself alone, if it were not for your belief 
in immortality; but you are not to force upon me what would 
result from your own utter wart uf moral emotion• I am 
just and honest* not because I exnect to live in another 
world* but because, having felt the pain of injustice and 
dishonesty towards myself, I have a fellow-feeling with 
other men, who would suffer the same pain if I were un­
just or dishonest towards them. T.7hy should 1 give my 
neighbor short weight in this world, because there is 
not another world in which I should have nothing to 
weigh out to him? I am honest, because I don't like to 
inflict evil on others in this life* not because I'm 
afraid of evil to myself in another. The fact is, I do 
not love myself alone, whatever logical necessity there 
may be for that in your mind. ... It is a pang to me to 
witness the sufferings of a fellow-being, and I feel his 
usffaring the more acutely because he is mortal. —  be­
cause his life is so short, and I would have it* if 
possible, filled with happiness and not misery. through 
my union and fellowship with men and women 1 ~have seen,
I feel a like, though a fainter, sympathy with those I 
have not seen; and I am able so to live in imagination 
with the generations to come, that their good is not alien 
to me, and is a stimulus to me to labor for ends which 
may not benefit myself, but will benefit them, ...And I 
should say that, if you feel no motive to common morality, 
but your fear of a criminal bar in heaven, you are de­
cidedly a man for the police on earth to keep their eye 
upon, since it is matter o f world-old experience that 
fear of distant conseauences is a very insufficient barrier 
against the rush of immediate desire. I’ear of consequences 
is only one form of egoism, v/hich will hardly stand against 
half-a-dozen other forms of egoism bearing down upon it. °
The final indictment of the faith in immortality is 
most characteristic of Greorge TJliot's thought. It is 
an attack upon the commercialism of this system of de­
ferred rewards and penalties through which the bhurch 
has largely encouraged morality. 2he holds that morality 
practiced in order to gain reward or to avoid punishment 
is not morality at all but an investment. ’Vhile it may 
gain the approval of men, it really denies the highest 
attribute of man -- his ability to choose the good without
6 "7/orldliness and Jther-TTorldliness , " Is says, 41.
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reference to hie own selfish ends. In opposition to 
the theory that the "belief in immortality is a principal 
source of virtue, she maintains that:
... so far as moral action is dependent on that 
belief, so far the emotion wrJ.ch prompts it is not truly 
moral,-- is still in the stage of egoism, and has not 
yet attained the higher development of sympathy, xii 
proportion as a man would care less for the rights and 
welfare of his fellow if he did not believe in a future 
life, in that proportion is he wanting in the genuine 
feelings of justice and benevolence; as the musician who 
would care less to lay a sonata of Jeethoven finely in 
solitude than in public, where he was to be paid for it, 
is wanting in genuine enthusiasm for music. ^
She denounces bitterly:
... that impiety towards the present and the visible, 
which flies for its motives, its sanctities, and its 
religion, to the remote, the vague, and the unknown. ®
Greorge Sliot is not dispirited by her belief in the 
finality of earthly life. In it she sees a challenge 
to help humanity make the best of the few years alloted 
to it. Her only dissatisfaction is the one freauently 
expressed, especially in her later years, of the shortness 
of life. ,fI could be interested in everything, If I only 
had time." Duty, the keynote of her religion, becomes 
to her the more insistent as she realizes thwt there will 
be no second opportunity afforded for correcting the 
errors and omissions of this life. Ihe poet and essayist 
Frederic ’7. uiy^rs reports a conversation in which hliot 




I remember how, at dambridge, I walked with her onc-e
in the Fellows' harden of Trinity, on an evening of rainy
Flay; and she, stirred somewhat "beyond her wont, and taking 
as her text the three words whioh have "been used so often
as the inspiring trumpet-oalls of men, —  the words God,
Immortality, .Duty,—  pronounced, with terrible earnestness, 
how inconceivable was the first, how unbelievable the 
second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third, 
lievar, perhaps, have sterner accents affirmed the sov- 
reignty of impersonal and unrecompensing haw, I listened, 
and night fell; her grave, majestic countenance turned 
toward me like a sibyl’s in the gloom: it was as though 
she withdrew from my grasp, one by one, the two scrolls of 
promise, and left me the third scroll only, awful with 
inevitable fates, and when we stood at length and parted 
amid that columnar circuit of the forest-trees, beneath 
the last twilight of starless skies, I seemed to be 
gaving, like Titus at Jerusalem, on vacant seats and 
empty halls,-- on a sanctuary with nogBresence to hallow 
it, and heaven left lonely of a God.
In her imaginative writings George Eliot treats with 
respect the beliefs that her characters hold in a future 
life, but his tolerance is rather an indication of her 
delicacy toward the religious convictions of her readers 
than of m y  belief of her own in the supernatural. In 
her poems and stories she gives freouent hints of the 
pathos of finality, as:
Oh the anguish of that thought that we can never 
atone to our dead for the stinted affection we gave them, 
for the light answers we returned to their plaints or 
their pleadings, for the little reverence we showed to 
that sacred human soul that aived so close to us, and was 
the ui vine at thing God m d  given us to unowl 10
"Yet she nowhere says anything that could lead the reader
to thinx: since t h i s  life is shox*t, and since there is
none to follow, why improve it? she perhaps feels it
expedient not to emphasize a doctrine that has not ^ 0 0 been
9 y/er s, Frederic 7. H. : ’’George Sliot,” Century m g a z i n e , 
bov. 1881.
10 ”Amos Barton,” Beene s of dlerical hife, 77.
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proved beneficial to man, even though she herself feels
that it was both true and salutary. This dualism is
further treated in the section on religion.
3ut ieorge hliot does believe in an immortality
based on the teachings of Oharles 3ray —  that we live
hereafter only in the life of the race. 1 1 The most
beautiful expressions of this enlightened faith are
in the poem inspired by these words of Cicero's:
longum illud tempus, quum non ero, magis me movet, 
auam hoc exiguum. (That long time, when I shall not be, 
more moves me than this present short time.) 1 2
Oil may X .loin the choir invisible 
Ejf those immortal dead who live again 
In minds made better by their presence: live
In pulses stirred to generosity,
In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn 
lor miserable aims that and with self, 
an thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars, 
And with their mild persistence urge man's search 
To vaster issues.
So to live is heaven:
To make undying music in the world, 
breathing as beauteous order that controls 
7/ith growing sway the growing life of man.
* • •
That better self shall live till human Time 
3ha1 1 fold its eyelids, and the human sky 
be gathered like a scroll within the tomb 
■Jnread forever.
This is life to come. 13
This immortality of influence is predicated mi:
... he has no tomb. ^ 4
He a v,ells no o w i oh you dead, ouj j. iv 0 a a s 1 aw *
Sometimes she approaches the mystical in her poetic
treatment of this impersonal sort ol immor tali ty, as
i n :
11 bray, Charles: The Philosophy of ITec * salty.
12 dieero, ad Atticum, xii. 18.
13 "h Aay X Join the Choir in visible , ” Poems, 441.
14 "heath of Moses," Poems, 437.
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Spirits seem buried and their epitaph 
Is writ in Latin by severest pens,
Yet still they flit above the trodden grave
And find new bodies, animating them _^
In quaint ana ghostly way with antique souls.
Usually her expression of immortality is of the mild sort
as in "Janet's Repentance :?f
But there is another memorial of Bdg^r Iryan. which 
bears a fuller record: it is Janet Dempster, rescued
from self-despair, strengthened with divine hopes, and 
now looking back on years of parity and helpful labor. The 
man who has left such a memorial behind him must have 
been one whose heart beat with true compassion, and whose 
lips were moved by fervent faith.
It will be noted that none of these readings of the 
immortality of influence deny the personal life beyond 
the grave, and readers do not, of course, find the two 
ideas inharmonious. In no case does Eliot express that 
unhappy outlook frequently voiced by Hardy that our immor­
tality is conditioned by our being kept in mind as person­
alities,— ? that we cease to exist as influences as soon 
as our lives are no longer remembered as such. Ihis 
doctrine Hliot would call both egoistic and untrue, lor 
the soul after death, non-sentient because non-existent, 
could not be affected by being forgotten. And the influ­
ence of the soul, its true immortality, would not necessar­
ily cease when the person ceased to be remembered by name. 
Dor does Hliot suggest that other more hopeless second 
death, when even influence shall have fudea to naaghi.
This idea of Hardy's she would reject as contrary to
13 " 3 vanish Jypsy," Poems, 30.
16 "Janet's Repentance , "Beenes of Jlaricul ^if a . 307.
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the law of conservation.
Eliot recognizes the insistent demand that man 
makes for a future life, Hhe admits that;
Our impulses* our spiritual activities, no more 
adjust themselves to the idea of their future nullity, 
than the beating of our heart, or the irritability of 
our muscles.
Yet in spite of this almost organic demand, she refuses 
to postulate any eternity more supernatural than the 
poetic assertion that our souls, as objectified in our 
words and deeds, live on as forces for good or evil in 
the lives of others. Here she tacitly accepts Comte's 
Positivist Religion of Humanity.
The problem of personal immortality is more in­
sistently present to Thomas Hardy than to Greorge Eliot. 
Whereas Eliot accepts the finality of this life as an 
inevitable fact not altogether repellent, Hardy never 
ceases to berate the Cause for endowing man with a vain 
longing that can ne v jr be satisfied.. Sometimes Hardy 
imaginatively complains that man, by necessity mortal, 
shourd have been allowed to evolve so far into sentience 
as to picture and desire an immortality forever denied 
him. Hot that Hardy considers eternal life a boon. He
is not so well pleased with this life that he would have
existence long protracted. He lets the yew tree in the
cemetery speaii of che peacef ul dead beneath it :
17 "The xiifted Veil," Essays, 456.
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If the living could out hear 
What is heard by my roots as they creep 
Hound the restful flock, aud the things said there 
Ho one would weep.
”Uow set among the wise,”
They say: Enlarged in scope,
That ho lod trumpet us to rise 
We truly hope.”
3ut the worthlessness of a postulated eternal life in 
no wise excuses the Cause from His sin —  one of many -- 
in permitting man a longing that can never 'oe gratified, 
and that serves no demonstrable good. The indictment is 
not, then, that man must remain mortal, but that he 
should have been permitted to wake sufficiently from 
the Unconscious to desire eternal life. Uince he can 
find no provision made whereby man may attain to immor­
tality, Hardy refuses to appear to sanction the de­
ception. As a matter of intellectual honesty he would 
not have man deluded by a false hope of the unattainable. 
The pathos of this unsatisfiable desire he presents in 
the final parting of Tes^ and Angel Claire:
” ...Terll me now, Angel, do you think we shall meet 
again after we are dead? I want to know.”
He kissed her to avoid s reply at such a time.
”0 Angel -- I fear that means no!” said she, with 
a suppressed sob. "And I wanted so to see you again —
so much, so much! What -- not even you and I, Angel,
who love each other so well? 11
Hike a greater than himself, to the critical question 
at the critical time he did not answer; and they were 
again silent.
18 "While Urawing in a Churchyard,” Collected JQems, 504. 
11 Tess of the D'Urbervillec, 453.
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This tragedy of parting with no hope of reunion is also 
expressed in his poems.
That man would be better off without such an un­
founded belief in immortality, Hardy is quite certain.
He resorts that
... Once upon a time Ansel had been so unlucky as 
to say to his father, in a moment of irritation, that 
it might have resulted far better for mankind if Oreece 
had been the source of the relision of modern civilization, 
and not -Palestine. ^ u
Hardy’s super-sensitive humanitariunism makes him 
see the belief in immortality as a cruelty against the 
sufferer -- a belief far in advance socially of that 
expressed by Greorge Eliot. Hardy finds true kindness 
to inhere in absolute integrity rather than in avoiding 
the issue or in conscious deception of the victim. To 
schield man from unpleasant truth he considers a denial 
of m a n ’s dignity and courage. He also holds that the 
belief in immortality, instead of adding meaning to earthly 
life, really lessens its seriousness ctnd worth.by shifting 
to the remote future the goal of endeavor. In this, and 
in the belief that the hope of immortality makes for greater 
inhumanity, Hardy aggress with leorge Eliot. His thought 
is expressed in the feeling of hag el dlaire toward Tess:
less was no insignificant creature to toy with and. 
dismiss; out a woman living her precious life -- a life
20 Ibid, 175
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which to herself, who endured or enjoyed it , possessed as 
great a dimension as the life of the mightiest to himself.
Upon her sensations the whole world depended to Tess; 
through her existence all her fellow-creatures existed, to 
her. The universe itself only came into being for Tess 
on the particular day in the particular year in which she 
w^s b o m .
This consciousness upon which he had intruded was 
zha single opportunity of existence ever vouchsafed to 
Tess by an unsympathetic First Cause -- her all; her every 
and only chance. How then should he look upon her as of 
less consequence than himself? ^
The divergent attitudes of Hardy and Bliot towards 
the reader is significant. Bliot, while she does not 
actually postulate an immortality in her imaginative 
writings , really says nothing to encourage the inquiring 
reader to revis? his views. Hardy, on the other hand, re­
fuses to conciliate his reader by seeming to countenance 
an immortality that his reason Cannot accept. Uor does 
Hardy refrain, as does Bliot, from proclaiming his dis­
belief through his ©t cries and poems, iiather he courageously, 
if bitterly,pronounces his opinions on this and other 
theological matters.
Just as Hardy is more obsessed with the horror 
vacui than is leorge Bliot and shrinks more sensitively 
from a final nothingness, so he speaks more frequently 
of the rTimmorjality of influence'1 than does she. Possibly 
in this case immortality is not the scientific term to be 
used, although Hardy always employs it whether he means
Z1 Ibid, 174.
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a relative persistence in the consciousness of loved ones
or absolute immortality in the sense of a never dying
echo, A note of rather goomy hope is present in this
contemplation of death:
3y briefest meeting something sure is won;
It will have boan:
How 3od nor Demon can undo the done,
Unsight the seen, 
naake muted music be as unbegun.
Though things terrene 
droan in their bondage till oblivion supervene.
So, to the one long-sweeping symphony 
I'rom times remote 
Till now, of human tenderness, shall we 
Supply one note,
Small and untraced, yet that will ev-r be
• Somewhere aloat 2 2
Amid the spheres, a part of sick Life's antidote,
■uiore bitter is the modd in "his Immortality." Here he
shows immortality as conditioned by the rememorunce of the
living:
I saw a dead m anfs finer part 
Shining within each faithful heart 
Of those bereft. Then said 1: "This must be
His Immortality."
w • ♦ •
vastly I ask -- now old and chill -- 
If aught of him remain unperished still;
And find, in me d o n e ,  a feeble spark.
Dying amid the dark.
Similar is the thought in "Her Immortality;"
Hut grows iiy grief. 7/hen I surcease.
Through whom alone fives she,
Her spirit ends its living lease,
Hever again to beJ 24
22 "To meet, or Otherwise," Qollected loams, 292.
23 "His Immortality," Qolleoted ^oems, ISO.
24 "her Immortality," Collected Poems, 50.
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A yet deeper pathos lie wrote into his notebook ten
years after his sister’s death:
December 23 (1925}. Gary's birthday. 51ie Came 
into the world .. and went oat again .. and the world 
is .just the same ... not a ripple on the surface left. 25
This statement is not, of course, true to his belief that
the immortality of influence is coexistent with the
memory of those surviving It shows, rather, a gloomy
foreboding as to the ultimate ,Tto-be~forgottenness. 'T
Another phase of the immortality of influence is
shown in various stories and poems of heredity. The
most sustained expression is in the novel The Well-deloved,
in which Jocelyn Jierston is enamored of three successive
incarnations of his beloved Avice Caro —  grandmother,
mother, daughter. Elsewhere a biological immortality is
postulated in the family face, which lives on^
Projecting trait and trace 
Through time to times anon,
And leaping from place to place 
Over oblivion.
• t •
The eternal thing in man, g 
That heeds no call to die.
A third aspect of the subject appears in a poem 
dated dew Year's Eve, 1922. In this the Absolute explains 
that :
Your ,fdow" is just a gleam, a glide 
Across your gazing sense:
Aith me, "Past," "Aatur o ,,f ever abid^:
They come not, go not, whence 
They are never hence.
25 juater Yeprs, 245.
2 6 !,Heredity , " Collec ted logins , 407.
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Later the Absolute reveals to the poet:
The vista called the Past,
Wherein were seen, as fair as when
They seemed they couxd not last,
Small things and vast.
3ut the future remains veiled, for:
'Twould harrow you to see undraped 
The scenes in ripe array 
That wait your globe —  all worked and shaped;
And 1*11 not, as 1 say,
3are them today.
Lika a poetic rendering of Kant's Critique of the Pure
Heason, the Absolute concludes:
In fine, Time is a mock,—  yea, suchJ —
As he might well confess:
Yet hath he been believed in much,
Though lately, under stress 
Of science, less.
And hence, of her you askeu about 
At your first speaking: she 
Hath, I assure y/u, not passed out 
Of continuity,
3ut is in me.
bo thus doth 3eing's xength transcend 
Time’s ancient regal claim 
To see all lengths begin and end.
”The Pourth Dimension” fame 
3ruits as its name.
Likewise in ”bo, Time,”
The sound philosopher 
Dow s^ts him to aver 
Y ou are nought 




27 "The Absolute Explains,” Qollected Poems, 720. 
h8 'ho, Time,” Collected Poems, 723.
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Such assurance of immortality by virtue of philoso­
phising over the non-reality of time as a concept is 
not satisfying to the man craving eternal life* Hardy- 
wili not do violence to his conscience by suggesting a 
comfort that he is convinced is vain. Uor will he re­
frain, as does Eliot, from pronouncing truths that he knows 
to 0 9 harmful to his reputation. In reply to a criticism 
of the Dynasts which appeared in the Loudon Times, he 
wro te:
I suppose I have handicapped myself by expressing, 
both in this drama and previous verse philosophies and 
feelings as yet not well established or formally adopted 
into the general teaching; and by thus over-stepping the 
standard boundary set up for the thought of the age by 
the proctors of opinion, I have thrown bach my chance of 
acceptance in poetry b.y many years. £he very fact of my 
having tried to spread over art the latest illumination 
of the time has darkened counsel in respect of me.
What the reviewer really asserts is, not "This is an 
untrue and inartistic view of life,’’ but ’’This is not the 
view of life that we people who thrive on conventions can 
permit to be painted."
A last phase of immortality, that of the evil 
initiated or permitted by the first Cause, is suggestive 
of Hardy’s theory of the Immanent Aill. In "3y the 
Earth’s Corpse,f the ^ord is questioned by inquiring
' A
Time;
0 -uord, why grivist Ihou?-- 
Since -ife has ceased to be 
• • •
And humankind, end fowl, and fur 
Are gone eternally.
All is the same to Thee as ere 
Th ey knew m or t a 1 i ty.
3d xiutar Years, 104.
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Do Shis the Lord replies:
Written indelibly 
On my eternal mind 
Are all the wrongs endured 
3y Earth’s poor patient ^ind,
Which my too oft unconscious hand 
^et enter undesigned.
Ho god can cancel deeds foredone,
Or thy old coils unwind I
As when, in HoS's days,
I whelmed the 'lains with sea,
Jo at this last, when flesh 
And herb hut fossils he.
And, all extinct, their piteous dust 
devolves obliviously.
That I made Earth, und life, and man.
It still repenteth me I 30
Small consolation for the seeker after eternity!




The early life of George Eliot was one of deeply 
emotional religion -- a life in which the renunciation 
of so-called worldly concerns figured largely. In another 
chapter are sot forth the steps whereby her adsorbing 
Christianity gave way to the Positivism which was to 
dominater her intellectual life* and which was one of 
the bases of her religion. Here will b'- discussed the 
principal tenets of that religion, and the media through 
which Eliot felt that religion could best serve humanity.
A singular fact in the development of George Eliot’s 
thought is that the disillusionment through which she 
passed in discovering the weakness of the historical 
basis of Ohristianity was not succeeded by either bitter­
ness or indifference. Through her whole life she kept 
the enthusiasm of her early religious experience, in­
tensified rather than diminished by the fi.ilure of histor­
ical support. 3y a sort of reincarnation, the life prin­
ciples timt for orthodox religionists reside in the 
traditions of Christianity were reborn for Eliot in the 
virtues themselves.
In puace of the uivine fiats of scripture ^nd 
tradition, Eliot found justice, love, reverence, und 
renunciation as themselves authorities for the governance
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of conduct. liras, although she rebooted for herself all 
ecclesiastical doctrine and dogma, sh9 remained profoundly 
religious throughout her life. Nor did she, like Hardy, 
seek to weaken the faith of her readers in a theology that 
she found no longer tenable. Hardy’s integrity demanded 
intellectual honesty in his dealings with his readers. 
Bliot believed that high aspiration, faith, hope, charity 
are virtues of greater worth, at least to most man, than 
enlightenment with it^ frequent attendant dissatisfaction 
with life. Her position she writes to i^udame Hodichon;
Pr^y don’t ever ask mo again not to rob a man of his 
religious belief, as if you thought my mind tended to 
such robbery. I have too profound a conviction of the 
efficacy that lies in all sincere faith, and the spiritual 
blight that comes with no-faith, to have any negative 
propagandism in me. in fact, I have very little sympathy 
with freethinkers as a class, and have lost all interest 
in mere antagonism to religious doctrines. I care only 
to know, if possible, the lasting meaning that lies in all 
religious doctrine from the beginning till now. 1
An interesting commentary on Bliot's opinion of mere
negation of worship is the following from a description
of the thought of certain colliers;
... and in some of the ale-house corners the drink 
was flavored by a dingy mind of infidelity, something 
like rinsings of fom laine in uitchwater. 2
^rnple justification for the religious life Bliot 
finds in the emotional demands of human nature, without 
the necessity of any factual revelation whatever:
1 .Letter to ^adame bodichon, Jov. 26, 1862. dross II, 343.
2 ’’Amos .barton," Scones of Jlerical jjife, 23.
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The first condition of human goodness is something 
to love;. hi3 second, something to reverence. ^
Eliot seems to feel that average humanity must have some 
outside authority to holster a will liable to weakness, 
yian must look up to something outside himself, and, 
failing a god, he will consecrate for himself an ikon, 
as did the Children of Israel in the wilderness. This 
innate requirement of man Eliot perhaps illustrates hast 
in the Cc.se of Silas marner, who enshrines his hoarded 
guineas in the place of the god who has deserted him, 
and who later consecrates Eonie as his deity. That this 
outside power is itself only a figment of the mind does 
not invalidate its efficacy. So long as the worshiper 
does not see that his idol is of clay, he receives the 
whole subjective value of worship. The disillusioned, 
who is convinced that the source of his inflowing inspir­
ation is merely a prefect ion of his own consciousness and 
coexistent with it, may also satisfy his appetency to 
worship, even though h a feel that the object of his veneration 
is only as divine as he is himself. The following comment, 
spoken in somewhat idfferent connection, shows her views 
on this subject of edification through conscious illusion:
... V/elj., well, the illusions that began for us when 
we were less acquainted with evil have not lost their 
value when we discern them go be illusions. They feed 
the ideal better: and in living them still, we strengthen 
the precious habit of living something not visibly, 
tangioly existent, but a spiritual product of our visible, 
tangible selves. *
3 ,f Janet’s liepentance", Scenes of Clerical Idfe, 300.
4 ’’Looking Backward,” The ophraatua"Uuch , Essays, £78.
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Eliot seems able to divorce the idea of spiritual 
beauty from that of intellectual truth. V/hile she de­
clares that dod is inconceivable and immortality un­
thinkable . she nevertheless holds that the aesthetic 
values to oe got from religion are so precious that they 
should be secured to the race even at the sacrifice of a 
certain intellectual frankness. In a letter to J. W. 
dross, 'whom she later wedded, she writes:
All the great religions of the world, historically 
considered, are rightly the objects of deep reverence and 
sympathy -- they are the record of spiritual struggles, 
which are the types of our own. This is to me pre­
eminently true of Hebrewism and Christianity, on which my 
own youth was nourished. And in this sense I have no 
antagonism toward any religious belief, but a strong 
outflow of sympathy. Every community met to worship the 
highest Cood (which is understood to be expressed by Cod) 
carries me along in its main current; and if there were 
not reasons against my following such an inclination, I 
should go to church or chapel, constantly, for the sake of 
the delightful emotions of fellowship which come over me 
in religious assemblies —  the very nature of such assem­
blies being a binding belief or spiritual law, which is to 
lift us into willing obedience, and save us from the 
slavery of unregulated passion or impulse. And with r e ­
gard to other people, it seems to me that those who have 
no definite conviction which constitutes a protesting 
faith, may often more beneficially cherish the good within 
them and be better members of society by a conformity, 
based on ohe recognized good in the public belief, than 
by a non-conformity which has nothing but negatives to 
utter. Hot., of course, if the conformity w o u A  be accom­
panied by a consciousness ef hypocrisy. That is a question 
for the individual conscience to settle. 6
In the emotional need for religious excercise Eliot
agrees 'with Hardy. Hut Hardy is less tolerant of what
a setter of J. V/. dross, act. 10, 1873. dross 1^1, 21a.
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would seem to him a lack of integrity. 7/hi la ha would 
not deny folk the practlca of those religious rites that 
have won a plaoe in the life of the nation, he would 
have it understood by all that the rites are performed 
only for their antiauarian and reminiscent value —  not 
at all for any potency in themselves* In his stories 
and especially in his poems he is outspoken against the ke 3 
keeping up of a mummery unless it is plainly recognized 
as such* siiotfs attitude toward worship is more posi­
tive than Hardy's* She would have man reap what "benefit 
he can from religion, if possible forgetting for the time 
its slender basis in fact, Hardy's attitude is first of 
all negative. He would have man consciously and con­
stantly deny the supernatural, and treat his worship as 
symbo-lical, not of outside reality but of immanent 
aspiration toward the good, fhus he fails somewhat of
ro
the devotional attitude. He is resentful that no hypo­
thesis of Grod can be found that will satisfy his reason. 
While admitting the present necessity of emotional idealism, 
he never ceases to berate whatever holds responsibility for 
letting man develop to this pass in a world so devoid of 
resources for either intellectual or emotional satis­
factions. ne would have man freed from all illusion as 
a prerequisite to any honest religion. fhe contrast of 
his position and Eliot's on this point appears in an
6 See chapters on the immanent Will and Pessimism.
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excerpt from his journal:
May 9 (1381). After infinite t rying to reconcile a 
scientific view of life with the emotional and spiritual, 
so that they may not he interdestructive I come to the 
following;
Jeneral Principles, haw has produced in man a child 
who cannot hut constantly reproach its parent for doing 
much and yet not all, and constantly say to such parent 
that it would have been better never to have begun doing 
than to have overdone so indecisively; that is, than to 
have created so far beyond all apparent first intention 
(on the emotional side), without mending matters hy a 
second intent and execution, to eliminate the evils of 
the blunder of overdoing. Ihe emotions have no place in 
a world of defect, and it is a cruel injustice that they 
should have developed in it.
If Law itself had consciousness* how the aspect of 
its creatures would terrify it, fill it with remorse l  ^
Eliot also differs widely from Hardy in her con­
ception of the moral Quality of the Prime Source, which, 
she is convinced, is more nearly perfect in idealism than 
is man. Hardy, on the other hand, considers the Will 
non-moral in itself hut inimical to manfs good through 
its blindness. Although neither identifies this ex­
ternal power with any conception of a god concerned with 
man's petty affairs, and responsive to man's wishes,
Eliot's endowment of it with goodness makes her sanction 
of worship seem more aesthetically consistent than does 
Hardy's. Hhe believes that man may legitimately expect 
an inflow of inspiration as from Emerson's over soul, 
even though the object of worship be only a projection 
of the worshiper's imagination, or a bit of matter endowed 
with spirit by the worshiper. Hardy says: Let man perform
7 Early -uif e. 192.
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his worship for his own sake, constantly remembering 
that its only value is reflex; that if there is an outer 
being it is probably non-sentient and non-moral* at 
least not benevolent toward man. Hardy is intellectually 
consistent, although he seems not Quite aesthetically 
consistent in projecting worship towards a being which 
cannot be conoeived as worth:/ of reverence. Eliot says: 
Let man forget that his worship does not transcend his 
own consciousness. For there must be an outer being 
which is worthy of reverence, though it is impossible 
for man to come to an adeauate conception of it. Eliot 
explains somewhat this attitude toward the Infinite in 
a letter to biss Hennell, in which she recognizes the 
instinct to worship, but does not hold th^t this in- 
stict is a proof that she worship accomplishes anything 
objectively;
... iou observe in your note that some persons say 
she unsatisfied longing we feel in ourselves for some­
thing better than the greatest perfection to be found 
on earth is a proof that the true object of our desires 
lies beyond it. Assuredly this earth is not the home of 
the spirit - - i t  will rest only in the bosom of the 
Infinite. 3ut the non-satisfaction of the affections 
and intellect being inseparable from the unspeakable 
advantage of such a mind as that of men in connection 
with his corporal condition and terrene destiny, forms 
not at present an argument with me for the realisation 
of particular desires. ®
deorge Eliot's conception of the goodness of the universe 
she expresses in another letter to bliss Hennell:
3 better to ^iss Hennell, Jov. h, 1843. cross I, 116.
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• •• fhere is a sort oi blasphemy in that 'pro­
verbial phrase, "loo good to be true." fhe highest 
inspiration of the purest, noblest human soul, is the 
nearest expression of the truth. ... Shall we poor 
earthworms have sublimar thoughts than that universe, 
of which we are poor chips -- mere effluvia of mind —  
shall we have sublimer thoughts than that universe 
can furnish out into reality? 9
Ihis idea of an outside perfection to which the human 
mind can aspire is common in Eliot’s fiction. The 
philosophy spoken h j  airs. Vinthrop to Silas ilarner has 
many points of similarity to Eliot’s own:
... it comes into my head as Them above has got 
a deal tenderer heart nor what I fve got —  for  ̂ can't 
be anyways better nor Them as made me; and if anything 
looxs hard to me, it*s.because there's things I don’t 
know on; and for the matter o ’that. there may be plenty 
o'things I don't know on, for it ’s little as I know -~ 
that it is. ... And all as we've got to do is to trusten, 
Aaster earner - to do the right thing as fur as we know, 
and to trusten. For if us as knows so little can see 
a bit o ’good and rights, we may be sure as there’s a 
good and a rights bigger nor what we can know —  I feel 
it i' my own inside as it must oe so. And if you could 
but ha' gone on fcrlistening, master Warner, you wouldn’t 
lia’ run away from your fellow-creaturs and been so lone. 10
Gwendolyn found this outside Source through the help
of Daniel Deronaa. ^aggie lulliver in her "Valley of
Humiliation" found th t her old dream worlds would no
longer satisfy her needs.
She wanted some explanation of this hard, real 
life: ... she wanted some key that would enable her
to understand, and, in under standing, endure, the 
heavy weight that had fallen on her young heart. H
She found the needed support in the truth preached to
her by fhomus a Aempis. She discovered a new secret
9 Ibid, 194.
10 Silas earner, 363.
1 1  ^iilJT'on the- -loss, 304.
IjO
of life :
... It flashed through her like the suddenly appre­
hended solution of a problem, that all the miseries of 
her young life had come from fixing her heart on her own 
pleasure, as if that were the central necessity of the 
universe; and for the first time she saw the possibility 
of shifting the position from which she looked at the 
gratification of her own desires -- of taking her stand 
out of herself, ana looking at her own life as an insig­
nificant part of a divinely guided whoia. ... She had 
not perceived —  how could she until she had lived longer? -- 
the inmost truth of the old monx's outpourings, that re­
nunciation remains sorrow, though a sorrow' borne willingly, 
^aggie was still panting lor happiness, and w^s in ecstacy 
because she had found the key to it. She knew nothing of 
doctrines and systems -- of mysticism or quietism; 
but this voice out of the far-off middle ages was the 
direct communication of a human soul's belief and ex­
perience, and came to uiaggie as an unquestioned message. 12
Having asserted man's innate need of religion, and 
having justified the existence of religion on the basis 
of that need, Sliot goes much further than does Hardy in 
defining her religion and in formulating its uenets. 
briefly her religion is one of service to mankind and of 
development of the self through emotion, tradition, pain 
renunciation. It is a denial of injustice, hypocrisy, 
intolerance, commercialism, ’* save -your-own soulism".
Duty, service, aspiration, renunciation are shibboleths 
of that religion.
To Sliot the recognition of duty is that which most 
distinguishes i on from the brute creation. In "Janet’s 
Hepentance" she calls this id n  of duty
... that recognition of something to de xivea for 
beyond the mere satisfaction of self, which is to the
12 Ibid, 308.
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moral life what the addition of a great central ganglion 
is to animal life. 1^
The demands of duty hecome more absolute as man advances 
in the evolutionary process, and as certain other con­
cepts that formerly actuated him -- god, immortality, 
fear, and the lixe -- become less operative. 3ut duty 
must have an object. In 31iot the all-important object is 
not the glorification of Grod. or the betterment or 
salvation of the self, but the aiding of suffering and 
erring humanity. It is an exaltation of brotherhood:
I began to feel for other people's wants and sorrows 
a little more than I used to do. Heaven help us.' said 
the old religion; the new one, from its very lack of that 
faith, will teach us all the more to hal'p one another. 14
Throughout her imaginative writings and essays and in
many of her letters, Sliot emphasises the imperative
nature of this duty of or osherhood. A letter to mrs.
h. 3. btowe shows this idea of duty grounded on pity:
I believe Shat religion, too, has to be modified-- 
"developed", according to the dominant phrase -- and that 
a religion more perfect than any yet prevalent must 
express less care for personal consolation, and a more 
deeply awing sense of responsibility to man, springing 
from sympathy with that which of all things is most 
certainly-known to us, the difficulty of the human lot.
I do not find my temple in Pantheism, which, whatever 
might be its value speculatively, could not yield a 
practical religion* since it is an attempt to look at 
the universe from the outside of our relation to it 
(that univ ?r ̂ e) as human beings. .iS healthy, sane human 
beings, we must love ana hu^e, —  love what is good lor 
mankind, hate what is evil for manxind.
13 "Janet's hepen tance ," 5ce_ngs £f lieric^
14 setter to the ira^ a , Jun. 18o3. — t «-
la Letter to ^rs. H. 3. btowe, **ay 8, 1869. oross xrl. o.
Xu a long letter to the Hon* Mrs* Ponsonby she rebukes 
her correspondent for feeling no pity for nan, now that 
she believes him mortal and miserable. 31iot insists that 
this knowledge is the greater reason for trying to im­
prove m a n ’s present state. Part of the letter follows;
My books have for their main bearing a conclusion 
the opposite of that in which your studies seem to have 
painfully imprisoned you —  a conclusion without which I 
could not have cared to write any represent at ion of human 
life -~ namely, that the fellowship between man and man 
which huS been the principle of development, social and 
moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is not man; 
and that the idea of Grod, so far as it has been a high 
spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely 
human (i.e., an exaltation of the human). 16
As Aomola is fleeing from the unhappiness in Florence, 
she is met by Duty in the person of Savonarola. He 
challenges her to a beatitude more precious than es­
cape ;
X q u  are seeking your own will, my daughter. You 
are seeking some good other than the law you are bound 
to obey. 3ut how will you find good? It is not a thing 
of choree; it is ol river that flows from the foot of 
the Invisible Throne, and flows by the path of obedience.
I say again, man cannot choose his duties. You may choose 
to forsake your duties, and choose not to have the sorrow 
they bring. 3ut you vail go forth; and what will you 
find, my daughter? borrow without duty —  bitter herbs, 
and no bread with' them. 17
Romola's acceptance of the duty of the dross imposed 
upon her is in the spirit of disillusioned devotion:
... if everything else is doubtful, this suffering 
that I can help is ceruain; if the glory of the cross is 
an illusion, the sorrow is only the truer. While the 
strength is in my arm I will stretch it out to the
16 letter to the Hon. jars. Ponsonby, nec. 10, 1874. 
dross IXa., 34o.
17 Itomolu i, 37 8.
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fainting; while tlie light visits my ayes they shall 
seek the forsaken.
Eliot's whole enthusiasm is directed 'towards this un­
selfish service to man. Aeligion she measures only by 
its human Quotient, -kites and creeds are judged only by 
whether or not they u-lleviate man's sufferings and elevate 
him above sin and degradation. fhus it is not the Evan­
gelical teaching of -m*. fr^an or Dinah morris, or the High 
Church doctrine of nr. Irwine that enkindles Eliot's en- 
thusias.::. It is their love of humanity, altogether in­
dependent of creed or of Christianity. She lets Adam 
3ede voice a homely religion which in many points seems 
not unlike her own;
Hay, Seth, lad; I'm not for laughing at no man's 
religion, let'em follow their consciences, that's all.
Only I think ic 'nd be better if their consciences' 'ud 
let 'em stay quiet i' the church -- there's a deal to be 
learnt there. And there’s such a thing as being over-
spiritual; we mu^t have something besides Cospei i f this
worla. ... I know a man must have the love o T Cod in his 
soul, cm! the 3 ible's Cod's word. Jut wh«t does the 3ible
say? T/ĥ  , it says as Cod put his -perrit into the work-
man as built the tabernacle, to make him do all the 
carved wori and things as wanted a nice hand. And this 
is my way o' looming t it; there's the spaerit o' Cod 
in all things and all times -- week-day as well as Sunday — 
and i 1 the gr^at works anu inventions, and i' the figur­
ing and the mechanics. And Cod helps us with our head­
pieces and our hands as well as with our souls; and if 
a man does bits o' jobs out o ’ working hours -- builds 
a oven for's wife to t>nve h u  from going to the bake­
house, or scrats ot his bit o' gard m  and makes two 
potatoes grow istead o' one, h e ’s doing more aoou, and 
he's just as near to Cod, as if he was running after 
soma preacher and a-pra^ing and a-groaning. ^
18 Ibid,I I , 188. 
11 Adam Jade, 7.
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21iot hub no sympathy for the religion that must 
go to tha past for its inspiration or thou seeks its 
justification in uhe future of this ‘world or another. A 
religion must justify itself through service to present 
humanity, not through promise of a distant millennium. 
Hare she is in perfect accord with Hardy. In one of 
the essays of Theophrastus Such she writes:
... Wide-reaching motives, blest and glorious as 
they are, and of the highest sacramental virtue, have 
their dangers, like all else that touches the mixed life 
of the earth. They are arch-angels with av/ful brow and 
flaming sword, summoning and encouraging us to do the 
right and the divinely heroic, and we feel a beneficent 
tremor in their presence; 'out to learn what it is they 
thus summon us to do, we have to consider the mortals we
are elbowing, who are of our own stature and our own
appetites. ... On the whole, and in the vast majority of
instances, the action by which v̂ e can do the best for
future ages is of the oort which has a certain benefi­
cence and grace for contemporaries. ^0
' "lor Id li ness and Other-^orldliness’’ is a denunciation
of thus shifting the center of religious thought from
the immediate needs of humanity to o future world.
"Svangelical Teaching'’ opposes the doctrine that all
things should oa evaluated according to their service
to the glory of lod. 8 he finds that glory to lod, a s ’
popularly conceived, does not have as its correlary
kindness to man. Hor does it imply a moral exaltation
of the worshiper.
nut next to fiut noored of une enemies oi aod 
which is o'he principle of per sec ut ion , there perhaps has
HO ,rThe '.Yatoh-uog of .mowl ?uge ,ft Theophrastus Such, 
Hssa^ s, 3H5.
lob
baen no perversion more oosti’uctive of true moral develop­
ment than this substitution of a reference to the glory 
of Ood for the direct promptings of the sympathetic feel­
ings. benevolence and justice are strong only in p r o ­
portion as they are airectly and inevitably calleu into 
activity by their proper objects: pity is strong only
because we are strongly impressed by suffering; and only 
in proportion as it is compassion that speaks through the 
eyes when we soothe, and moves the arm when we succor, 
is a deed strictly benevolent. If the soothing or the 
succor be given because another being wishes or approves 
it, the deed ceases to be ^ne of benevolence, and b e ­
comes one of .,def erence, of obedience, of self-interest, 
or vanity.
These latter motive may inspire the doing of soma acts
beneficial to mankind, but their commercialism prevents
the doer from receiving the highest approbation. So
Eliot chooses as her only criterion direct human values. --
especially those involved in self-forgetting service. The
stanza opening ,fTha Lifted Veil" is a fitting invocation
for such a faith:
dive me no light , great Heaven, but such as turns 
To energy of huiun fellowship ; 
do powers beyond the growing heritage 
That makes completer manhood. 22
sarca pronounces to T'edcilma this creed of duty, begotten
of common orotherhood;
Oh, it is a faith 
Taught by no priest, but by their beating hearts, 
faith to each other: the fidelity
Of fellow-wanderers in a desert place 
7/ho share the same dire thirst, and therefore share 
The scanty water: one fidelity
man whose pulses leap with kindred fire,
7/ho in the flash of eyes, the clasp of hands,
The speech that even in lying tells the truth 
Of heritage inevitable as past deeda,
Jay, in the silent bodily presence feel
Thy mystic stirring of a common life
7/hi oh makes the many one: fidelity
To that deep consecrating. oath our sponsor fate
hi ,TEvungelical Teaching,” Es pay s , 106.
22 "The lifted Veil,” Essays, 4T6.
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Aade through our infant breath when we were born,
Ihe fellow-heirs of that small island, .uiie ,
j n e  re we must dig and cow and reap with jrotoers.
rear thou that oath, my daughter, -- nay, not fear,
3uo love it; for oha sanctity of oaths 
^ies not in lightning that avanges them,
Jut in the injury wrought by broken bonds
And in the garnered good of human trust.
And you have sworn,-- even with your infant oreath 
You too were pledged. ... ^
This idea of duty governs the whole direction of 
Eliot's religion. She accepts the debt that is laid on 
her by the fact of her having received life, but where­
as the orthouos OLristian conceives the debt as due a
heavenly father and payable in part, at least, in praise 
and paean, Eliot finds no god outside humanity to whom 
to pay any debt. Jut she does not default the debt.
Hat her she finds herself debtor to humanity. fhe bond 
is in no wise invalidated by being owed to mankind.
Daniel Deronda nid middlemaroh ^re notable developments 
of the idea of a debt owed by the enlightened to thos e 
in comparat iv e darkness•
Eliot often gives this duty a tragic signifi­
cance by suggesting that if the debtor fail of his 
obligation, not Jod himself can right the wrong. 3o
... If Dorothea, *fter her night's anguish, had 
not taken that walk to Eosamond -- why, she perhaps 
would have been a woman who gained a higher character 
for discretion, but it would certainly not have been 
as well for those three who were on one hearth in Lydgate’s 
house at half-past seven that evening.
23 The Spanish lypsy, 124.
24 middlemarch II, 392.
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btrauivarius is made to voice «a like sense of re­
sponsibility :
•.. -ui.7 \v ork is mine *
A n d , lier0sy or not, if my hand slacken 
I should rob Jod -- since He is fullest good -- 
Leaving: a blank instead of violins,
I say, not Pod Himself can make man's best 
Without best men to help Him. 2a
This debt of brotherhood is a constantly growing
obligation. It is modified by the countless interlocking
human relaoionsnips in which each being is involved.
Hear the end of her career ^aggie acknovlejges this debt,
which she had early recognized intellectually, that
nothing is good for her that is bad for others -- that
the *oust has made ties for her so that she is no longer
free to act as she chooses. In resisting the passionate
yearnings of her own haart and the pleadings of Stephen
duest, she says:
... rou feel, as a do, th^t the real tie lias in the 
feelings and expectations we have raised in other minds.' 
Slse all pledges might be broken, when there was 110 
outward penalty. fhere would be no such thing as faith­
fulness.
* •  •
Oh, it is difficult —  life is very difficult! It 
seems right to me sometimes that we should follow our 
strongest feeling;— out then, such feelings continually 
come across t h 3 ties that lav? made others dependent on 
us —— unu yvoulu cut 0 nem in 0 w o . .. .man,/ unm^-o are
difficult and dark to me; out I see one tiling quite 
clearly -- that 1 must not, cannot, seek my own happi­
ness Oy sacrificing other o. ^ove is natural; out surely 
pity and faithfulness and memory are natural too. And 
t ey would live in me sti..l, and punish rne if I did not 
obey them. I should be haunt eu. by the suffering I had 
caused.
So ’'otxvdivarius , ' Hoe ms, 4 Pi.
Hu I he hall on the floss, 479.
Iu8
.uater, whan Stephan and Maggie are on the w^ter together , 
it is this sense of obligation incurred towards others 
that gives -.aggie strength to resist Stephen's eloauence. 
She ssys;
. *• There are memories, and affections, and longings 
after perfect goodness,, that have such a strong hold on 
me; they would n e v jr quit me for ^ong; they would come 
back and he pain to me -- repentance,
» f  t
... 7/e can't choose happiness either for ourselves 
or for another: we can't tell where that will lie. We
can only choose whether we will indulge ourselves in the 
present moment, or whether we will renounce thot, lor 
the sake of obeying the divine voice within us -- for the 
sake of being true to all the motives that sanctify our 
lives. 27
Eliot recognises, of course, tint not all these debts 
are created oy the debtor. Many are inherited; others 
are forced upon him by the sins and errors of those 
about him and by the normal interaction of human beings.
Eliot does not give this idea of brotherhood the 
complete development it lias received from later writers, 
notably Joseph Conrad in She digger of the Uarcissus.
Eers is not a doctrine of the "solidarity of mankind" 
where aver^ deed has a reflex influence on the doer as 
a part of the whole. Yet the difference seems to be 
largely one of metaphor and of terminology. The corner 
stone of her religion is duty to mankind, prompted by 
sympathy for error and suffering. Usually, however, she
27 I b i d , o lQ .
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maintains the individuality of the sympathizer; his 
suffering is not oy virtue of a postulated identification 
of himself and of the primary sufferer as parts of an 
inuivisa'ole whole. Yet Dorothea, after a night of self- 
examination, realizes that she is not merely a benevolent 
onloomer or even a director of the affairs of mankind, out 
t hat
... She was a part of that involuntary, palpitating 
life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious 
shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish 
complaining. 28
Hardy comes very near the concept of an organic unity
of mankind in the Dynasts, where on various occasions
the scene assumes a preternatural transparency and
discloses the Will as a drain whose tissues &re com- 
P 9posed of men. 3?his fancy of mankind as one
organism was in H a r d y ’s mind when he wrote these notes,
evidently intended to be used in a future nove^.:
march 4 (1886). Hovel-writing as an art cannot 
go backward. Having reached the analytic stage itr 
must transcend it by going further in the same direction. 
Why not be rendering as visible essences, spectres, etc. 
the abstract thoughts of the analytic school?
fhe human race to be shown as one great network or 
tissue which quivers in every part when one point is 
shaken, like a spider’s web if touched. Abstract realisms 
to be in the form of Spirits, Soectral figures, etc.
fhe Realities to be the true realities of life, 
hitherto called abstract ions. fhe old material realities 
to be placed behind the former, as shadowy accessories.
58 uiiddlemaroh II, 578.
23 Dynasts, 36, 118, end elsewhere.
50 Re1 rlj -aile , 2 a 2 •
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If the first tenet of iliot's religion is service 
to others, the second is the development of o n e ’s own soul. 
Yet the culture of the soul is never an end in itself.
It is always a most valuable by-product of courses under­
taken for other ends judged worthy in themselves. To 
her readers she holds forth the Christian virtues of re­
nunciation and high aspiration, together with worship, 
which she considers necessary to the good life.
Throughout 31iot’s fiction unselfish renunciation 
is insisted upon as the sine qua non of moral excellence.
It is this which exalts fedalma ^nd makes her worthy of 
her high destiny when she gives up the life of a Spanish 
lady to save her father’s nincalas:
... I will bear 
The heavy trust of my inheritance.
See, ’twas my people's life that throbbed in me;
An unknown need stirred darkly in my soul,
An made me restless even in my bliss.
On, all my bliss was in our love; out now
I may not taste it; some deep„energy 
Compels me to choose hunger.
-more poignant still is 5’ed alma's refusal to let Silva
abandon his religion and station to follow her. This
ability to make the higher sacrifice is the one noble 
quality lacking in Silva’s character. Yet his acquies­
cence in the decision of ledalma that they must p^rt 
rehabilitates him somewhat in our eyes, and he leaves
31 Spanish lypsy, hhb.
161
us also a hero. Eor Eliot does not ,hold that renun­
ciation must be sought for its own sake to be of moral 
worth* do sought it would lose its ennobling value and 
become merely a commercial venture.
In Eliot renunciation is accompanied by the voluntary 
undertaking of the harder, nobler life indicated for us 
by circumstance. It never becomes mere passivity* Eor 
renunciation is not the eno. in itself, but the prerequisite 
oo purposeful endeavor. Waggle voices a philosophy which, 
if she could have followed it, would have saved her much 
misery:
I*v,e been a <?r^at deal happier ... since I have 
given up thinking about what is easy and pleasant, and 
being discontented because I couldnTt have my own will.
Our life is determined for us -- and it makes the mind 
very free when we give up wishing, and only think of 
bearing what is laid upon us, and doing what is given 
us w o do a
The theme of ^iddlemarch is the acceptance of a heroic 
self-abnegation and the courageous shouldering of a 
burden. That the burden is not worth the bearing does 
not invalidate the effort as a means of ennobling 
Jorothea’s character, Eliot Questions the rationality 
of such vain sacrifice, but she does not discount the 
spirituality of one who could entertain such idealism:
... it always seemed to me that the use I should 
like to make of my life would be to hope some one who ^ 
did great works-, so fch./fc hit burthen mi>iht be lighter*
3 2 m-ill o n the f l o s s , 3 2 0 .
3 3 ETddlemaroh I, £ 1 Q .
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Bach vain sacrifice as this of Borothea's Eliot dis- 
comiuananoas in the discussion of "Bouddha giving himself 
lio ohe famisned tigress to save her and her little ones
riAfrom starving.’*
In a previous chapter mention is made of Hardy’s 
doctrine of resignation. fhere it is stated that Hardy 
advocates the voluntary renunciation of what cannot be 
acquired or retained with certainty. But Hardy’s pur­
pose is not the refining of character through trial, of 
the rendering of the person capable of greater service.
It is merely the avoidance of bootless striving and 
eventual disappointment. fhus resignation seems often 
to be only an anaesthetic to relieve the symptoms of 
the irremediable disease of being. A contrary opinion 
is voiced by Philip Wakam, who seems to speak here for 
Eliot:
... Joy and peace are xiot resignation: resignation 
is the willing end or ance of a pain that is not allayed -- 
that you don't expect to be allayed. stupefaction is 
not resignation: and it is stupefaction to remain in 
ignorance--to shut up all the avenues by which the life 
of your fellow-men might become unown to you. I am not 
resigned: I am not sure that life is long enough to
learn t h a t  lesson. You are not resigned: you are only
trying to stupefy yourself. 35
Eliot shows renunciation as more than an avoidance of 
greater unnappineas; it is a uirect means of grace.
While she never causes her characters to court privation
34 Baniel Peronda XI. 72.
3o iuLli~"on the rloss. 348.
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as a zealot might, or to do purposeful penance, she 
constantly recognizes the soul-purifying efficacy of 
renunciation, her belief in renunciation, service, 
duty, is as positive as that in Grod and immortality 
is negative.
As a Positivist she evaluates the changes she has 
seen wrought in lives through the voluntary giving up 
of things desired. She acclaims unselfish deeds as their 
own reward, as not in need of any outward recognition. 
Hardy is too much a Hedonist to sanction such a system 
of worldly 'unfairness. Go he demands a poetic justice,
He lets Jude speak bitterly of his failure to achieve 
a recognized success:
... 3ut I don't admit that my failure proved my 
view to be a wrong one, or that my success would have 
made it a right one; though that's how we appraise such 
attempts nowadaws —  X mean, not by their essential 
soundness, but by their accidental outcomes.
We see diarty South made heroic by her noble unselfless­
ness, out we are not made to feel that her nobility is 
its own reward. We are made to recent the objective 
unfairness she suffers. In Ieli^ Holt we also resent 
unfairness, but we rejoice more in the edification of 
character that we see. Ihe difference is portly in 
point of view. Hardy is the onlooker demanding visible 
justice. Sliot identifies herself more with the sufferer
56 Jude the Obscure, 387.
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and attempts to utilize the injustice as a means of 
inner grace. Yet this does not mean tln-t Hardy's is the 
less sympathetic heart. He is possibly more militant in 
demanding rectification of wrongs. Sliot's is a more 
immediately practical critique. She sees lives miserable 
and degraded through their own faults and those of others. 
While she cannot hold out the hope of ideal justice, she 
does declare that lives may be made more blessed through 
service and self-sacrifice than through an insistance on 
their rights. Hers is much like Coe the’s doctrine of 
3nt sagen , developed by Car’lyle in 3 ar tor He cartas. ^7 
Sliot has a strong contempt for all commercialism 
in religion, especially "save-your-own-soal-isr” , fre­
quently a correlary to renunciation as taught by the 
Christian Church. one 'urges renunciation,not that one- 
may purge the dross from one’s soul as a condition of 
union with the infinite, out tnah one may uiie oetter 
serve humanity. Renunciation undertaken for a selfish 
ulterior purpose is not complete renunciation, but a 
commercial engagement. the soul undertaking it is lass 
free from self interest, less lit for spiritual union 
with the nig he st than the one uhct loses itself in 
living for others, even though it may have no theolo­
gical theories whatever. Her concept of virtue is
37 Quoted above in Chapter V.
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wholly apart from any consideration of wages. In fact, 
virtue ceases to ha virtue when its object is external 
advantage. The most patent exposition of this idea is in 
the struggle of hanker hulstroae to reconcile a sensitive 
conscience with a paternalistic attitude towards Hod's 
earthly kingdom.
... It was a principle with hr. 3ulstrode to gain 
as much power as possible, that he might use it for the 
glory of Hod. He went through a great deal of spiritual 
conflict and inward argument in order to adjust his 
motives, and make clear to himself what Hod's glory re­
quired. 38
Through much compromising with his troublesome conscience 
and many justifications of his questionable dealings,
3ulstrode develops his egoism until peril that threatens 
him seems a direct visitation from the lord. He argues in 
his prayers thu-t he is merely acting as the Lord’s steward, 
that he has sought nothing for his ovrn gratification:
... Those misdeeds even when committed -- had they 
not been half sanctified by the singleness of his desire 
to devote himself and all he possessed to the furtherence 
of the divine scheme? ^
Hulstrode is not a coarse hypocrite, such as might affect 
a belief merely go gull the world. He is of the self- 
deceived. His desires have been stronger than his be­
liefs, so that he has gradually explained the gratification 
of those desires into a satisfactory agreement with his 
cherished creed. How the carefully ratiocinated arrangement is
38 Hiddlemarch I, 161.
30 .uiddlemarch II, 104.
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in imminent; danger of collapse. 3o with Nemesis upon him, 
he attempts bribery of the unreasonable Omnipotent;
He had long poured out his utterances of repentance. 
3ut today a repentance had come which was of a bitterer 
flavor, and a threatening Providence urged him to a hind 
of propitiation which was not simply a doctrinal trans­
action. fne divine tribunal tad changed its aspect for 
him; self-prostration was no longer enough, and he must 
bring restitution in his hand. It was really before his 
lod that 3ulstrode was about to attempt such restitution 
as seemed possible. ... Night and day, while the resurgent 
threatening past was making a conscience within him, he 
was thinking bf what means he could recover peace and 
trust -- by v/hat sacrifice he could stay the rod. His 
belief in these moments of dread was, that if he s ,on- 
taneously diu something right, 3od would save him from 
jhe consequences of wrong-doing, for religion can only 
change when the emotions which fill it are changed; and 
the religion of personal fear remains nearly at the level 
of the savage.
dulstrode never ceases his attempts to corrupt the Almighty 
He cannot comprehend that Omniscience must know not only 
what is sooken in prayer ana what is consciously held as 
the thought sponsored by the will, but also the half-sub- 
znergea desire felt to be unworthy of acknowledgement. His 
prayers for this reason lack singleness of purpose. fhey 
have no efficacy in calming his terrors. They ure dis­
tracted Pj  aoology and cross-ourpose :
... If- it should turn out that he was freed from 
all danger of disgrace -- if he could breathe in perfect
l i b e r t y  his rile sho^j-u be more consecrateu than it
had ever been oefora. he mentally lifted up this vow 
as if it would urge the result he longed for -- he tried 
to believe in the potency of that prayerful resolution —  
its potency to determine death, he knew that he ought to
40 Ibid 11 , hJh.
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say, rfJ?hy will be done ; 11 and he said it often. 3at the 
intense desire remained that the will of Bod might be 
the death of that hated man. 41
M a i n  S^iot gives a vivid picture of the futility of urging 
the ideal right in the sane breath as self interest when 
she has ^atthew Jermyn ask urs. Iransome to reveal to her 
son his true parentage. lo uses, fransome's refusal deorge 
2 1 iot adds this comment:
... **9n do not become penitent and learn to abhor 
themselves by having their backs cut open with the lash; 
rather, they learn to abhor the lash. ... A man who had 
stolen the pyx, and got frightened when justice was at 
his heels, might feel the sort of penitence which would 
induce him to run back in the dark and lay the pyx where 
the sexton might find it; but if in doing so he whispered 
to the 31essed Virgin that he was moved by considering 
the sacredness of all property, and the peculiar sacred- 
ness of the pyx, it is not to be believed that she would 
like him the better for it. Indeed, one often seems to 
see why the saints should prefer candles to w o r d s s- 
pecially from penitents whose skin is in danger.
Yet Sliot is tolerant in the main of the unenlightened 
who hold fast to the rewards promised in the Beatitudes.
She does not expect folk to be entirely free from the 
idea of compensation, ducli ĉ re xir. Bryan’s flock at 
uiilby:
... Whatever might be the weaknesses of the ladies 
who pruned the luxuriance of their lace and ribbons, 
cut out garments for the poor, distributed tracts, auoted 
ocripture, and defined the true dospel, they had learned
this   that there Was a divine work to be done in life,
a rule of goodness higher than the opinion of their 
neighbors; and if the notion of a heaven in reserve for
41 ibid, II, 283.
42 tfelix Holt , 413.
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themselves was a little too prominent, yet the theory 
of fitness for that heaven consisted in purity of heart, 
in Christ-like compassion, in the subduing of selfish 
desires. Ihey might give the name of piety to much that 
was only puritanic egoism; they might call many things 
sing that were not sin; but they had at least the feel­
ing that sin was to be avoided and resisted, and color­
blindness, which may mistake drab for scarlet, is better 
than total blindness, which sees no distinction of color 
at all. 43
jar. Grilfil's sermons at bliepperton amounted
... indeed, to little more than an expansion of 
the concise thesis, that those who do wrong will find 
if the worse for them, and those who do well will find 
it the better for them; the nature of wrong-doing being 
exposed in special sermons against lying backbiting, 
anger, slothfulness. and thj like; and wall-doing being 
interpreted as honesty, truthfulness, charity, industry, 
and other common virtues, lying quite on the surface of 
life, and having very little to do with deep spiritual 
doctrine, airs. fatten understood that if she turned 
out ill-crushed cheeses, a Just retribution awaited 
her; though, i fear, she made no particular application 
of the sermon on backbiting.
Thus, though their motives may not be altogether 
altruistic, folk may lead jet ter lives than without 
ins b r ucti on.
Co-ordinate with the renunciation of selfish 
ambition in the culture of character, l£liot places 
moral integrity and high aspiration; for they all 
frequently coexist in the same personal nobility.
**orul integrity, the antithesis of commer­
cialism, hliot finds embodied in science. It is the
4b "Janet's uepentance ,'' Scenes of_ Cl erioal -pif e , 299. 
44 "ar. fillil's x,ove-story"/7 Scenes of Clerical -ife ,
92.
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oread of the Positivist;, superior to all propaganda. 
Physician .^ydgate speaks her opinion of the sincerity 
of science:
... science is properly more scrupulous than 
dogma. Bogma gives a charter to mistakes, hut the 
very oreath of science is a contest with mistake, and 
must keep the conscience alive, ^5
An intense study of moral integrity is the not alto­
gether successful struggle of Savonarola to exalt 
high idealism in Florence through means that he re­
cognizes as Questionable. When, near the end of his 
career, he is brought to the extreme of executing 
political enemies, he justifies his action to the 
more simple Pomola on the grounds of a divine ex­
pediency:
Be thankful, my daughter, if your own soul has 
been spared perplexity; ana judge not those to whom 
a harder lot has been given. You see one ground of 
action in this matter. I see many. I have to choose 
that which will further the work entrusted to me. The 
end i seek is one to which minor respects must be 
sacrificed. The death of five men —  were they less 
guilty than these -- is a light matter weighed against 
the withstanding of the vicious tyrannies which stifle 
che life of Italy, ana foster the corruption of the 
Jhurch; a light matter weighed against the furthering 
of lod1s kingdom upon earth, the end for which I live 
and mm willing myself to die.
... Tjjg cause of my party ijs the cause of dod1 s 
kingdom.
middlemarch II, 327. 
46 Porno ia~ ll.“116.
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This seams far from the singleness of criterion of 
the Christian ideal. 3ut his integrity has not, as 
in the case of 3ulstrode, been prostituted to a 
selfish commercialism. It has been sacrificed to 
his concept of the greater glory of doa. 31iot does 
not sanction the Jesuitical ethics to which he commits 
himself, but she does rehabilitate him as a hero and 
a martyr, humble and without cupidity, e v m  for the 
martyr’s crown:
Ihere is no jot of worthy evidence that from 
the time of his imprisonment to the supreme moment, 
Savonarola thought or spoke of himself as a martyr.
Ihe idea of martyrdom had been to him a passion 
dividing the dream of the future with the triumph 
of beholding his work achieved. And now, in place 
of both, had come a resignation which he called by 
no glorifying name.
3ut therefore he may t he mor e fitly be calle d 
a martyr by his fellow-men to all time. Tor power- 
rose against him "not because o f  "his sTns, but b e ­
cause of his greatness -- not because he sought to 
deceive the world, but because he sought to make it 
noble. And through t h  t greatness of his he endured 
a double agony; not only the reviling, and the 
torture, and the death-throe, but the agony of sink­
ing from the vision of glorious achievement into that 
deep shadow where he could only say, 'TI count as 
nothing; darkness encompasses me: yet the light
1 saw was the true light.'1 ^
The highest integrity is spoken oy ^euulma;
J-ou may divide the universe with dod,
keeping your will unbent, and hold a world
Ahere he is not supreme. 48
47 u o m o l a  II, £ 0 2 .
48 Soanish dypsy, loams, 145*
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An honesty supported by the will, which cannot be 
corrupted even by loyalty Do Deity, is Eliot's ideal.
High aspiration in Eliot never takes the form 
of secluded asceticism. Just as renunciation works a 
regeneration in the individual but is not undertaken 
for its own sake, so the vision of the seer always 
has its social objective. In fact, Eliot does not 
indicate that spiritual exaltation is possible ex­
cept when the heart is inspired by a desire to serve, 
or at least by benevolent thoughts towards man# that 
the seer himself is exalted is not the prime con­
sideration, although his life is necessarily hallowed 
beyond that of those served#
... the earth yields nothing more Divine 
Jhan high prophetic vision —  than the Seer 
\Tno fasting from man's meaner joy beholds 
The pathos of beauteous order, ana constructs 
A fairer type, to shame our low content. 4 9
The l e g e n d  of Jubal7' relates the coming of death 
into a happy world. fill then none in Jain's city 
but Jain himself anew of d aath. So, not aware that 
end could come to life, the people throve in un­
aspiring idleness. 3ut the accidental slaying of 
a boy brought a new dispensation:
4 9  ’'A «iinor Drophet," Poems, 389.
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And a new spirit from that hour came o'er 
The race of Jain: soft idlesse was no more,
Jut evan sunshine ha d a heart of care,
Smiling with hidden dread —
• • •
How glad Oontent by clutching Haste was torn,
And Work grew eager, and Device was horn.
It seemed the light was never loved before,
How each man said, " 'fwill go and come no more."
* • •
liras to Jain's race death was tear-watered seed 
Of various life and action-shaping need.
3ut chief the sons of iinmech felt the stings 
$f new ambitions, and the force that springs 
In passion beating on the shores of fate.
From this hard discovery of mortality sprang not
only sorrow and ambition and dissent ion, but also
pity and service and spiritual striving, from this
latter were born the arts, preeminently music, as
blessings to man. Stripped of direct utilitarian
enas, this exaltation of spirit appears most nobly
in a letter written near the end of Oeorge Eliot's
life :
1 try to delight in the sunshine that vd 1 1  be 
when 1 snail never see it any more. And I think it 
is possible for this sort of impersonal life to attain 
great intensity,-- possible for us to gain much more 
independence, than is usually believed, of the small 
bundle of facts that make our own personality.
A religion of duty, service, renunciation*
lofty aspiration and the like is not calculated to
win wide popularity cimong mankind. i ort the elect
few.who, like leorge Eliot, are by inheritance and
^0 "The Legend of Jubal," Poems, 2 Qo. 
al Letter oo the Hon. airs, xiobert xi,/11oil, cJtn oul.̂  , 
1870. dross III, 116.
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training fitted for the religious life, these appeals 
may be sufficient. 3ut Eliot realizes that man lives 
by emotion, habit, tradition much more than by intel­
lectual promptings unenforced by the feeling. the
vital element in her religion is feeling as manifested 
in mysticism, tradition, emotion.
3oth Eliot and Hardy are much interested in 
mysticism, <nud both introduce the supernatural into 
their poems and stories. Yet neither seems quite 
convinced of the existence of supernatural forces.
They are frankly agnostic but cirrious. Hardy is 
querulous that the human intellect cannot come by 
any explanation of seemingly authenticated mani­
festations of supernatural powers. Eliot is more 
resigned to ignorance. Her attitude here seems to 
be consistent with that towards other inexplicable 
phenomena, as suffering. ohe would induce man, if 
possible, to derive some benefit from what is alto­
gether beyond his control. If he cannot gain direct 
good from the mystical, he may be able to ennoble 
his heart through contemplation of what seems to 
be she supernatural. 3he maxes no attempt to ex­
plain oy natural Imws the strange iiisight by which
174
-uxor&eoai reads Daniel Deronda’s fitness to oe his 
successor. Dor does she explain awu^ Adam Dede's
strange visitation on the night of his father’s 
death. Her sympathy for sincere belief in the super­
natural is evident in her treatment of the devout 
faith of Dino in his mission and visions:
... Dor the Divine love had sought me, and 
penetrated me, and createu a great need in me. ... X 
felt that there was alife of perfect love anu purity 
for the soul; in which there woALd he no uneasy 
hunger after pleasure, no tormenting questions, no 
fear of suffering, before I .mew the history of the 
saints, X had a foreshadowing of their ecstasy, for 
the same truth had penetrated even into pagan philos­
ophy: that it is a bliss within the reach of man to
die to mortal needs, and live in the life of Ood 
as the Unseen Perfectness. ... It came over me in 
visions when my mind fell awa.y weary from the vain 
words which record the passions of dead men: it
came over me after I had he an tempted into sin and 
had turned away with loathing from the scent of the 
emptied cup. And in visions I saw the meaning of 
the Orucifix.
• # •
... Dor I have had that vision thrice. And 
through all the ^ears since first the Divine voice 
called me, while I was yet in the world , X have been 
taught and guided by visions, for in the painful 
linking together of our wahing thoughts we can never 
be sure that we have not mingled our own error with 
the light we have prated for; 'out in visions and 
areams we are passive, and our souls are as an in­
strument in the Divine hand.
Often the mystic does not have the qualities of 
uhe supernatural. It is a state somewhat analogous
oZ Daniel Peronda
0 6 i.xdam D 9 dq , 3o 0 u I , cncjp . i v *
u4  h o m o l a  X ,  1 6 7 .
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to catalepsy. Of Savonarolafs mystic religion she 
says:
... In moments of ecstatic contemplation, 
doubtless, the sense of self melted in the sense of 
the Unspeakable, and in that part of his experience 
lay the elements of genuine self-abasement; but in 
She presence of his fellow-men for whom he was to 
act, pre-eminence seemed a necessary condition of 
his life.
lo the ecstatic states of fra balvestro she gives 
a rational meaning, ah the same time indicating 
that the explanation of seeming mysteries by psychic 
laws doe s not invalidate the mysteries for the pur­
poses of religion:
... Ira balvestro had a peculiar liability to 
visions, dependent apparently on a constitution 
given to somnambulism. Savonarola believed in the 
supernatural character of these visions, while Ira 
Salvestro himself had originally resisted such an 
interpretation of them, and had even rebuked 
davonarola for his prophetic preaching: another 
proof, if one were wanted, that tlio relative great­
ness of men is no t be gauged by their tendency to 
disbelieve the superstitions of their age.
Eliot recognizes the organic demand of man for
the mysterious, the occult. fhis she finds as
biologically insistent as the need for something
to worship und for immortality. 3ut she cannot
postulate any critique of the mystic. 3.he holds
that man can xnow nothing beyond what io revealed
an homola II* sO-L.
56 homola I, 585.
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to him through hits senses. bo the effort to frame 
a supernatural world deductively must he in vain, 
io her the mystic is merely the subject of interesting 
speculation. let she recognizes that to some it has 
vital religious significance. xn "fhe lifted Veil," 
a study of preternatural vision, she shows the tragedy 
that would attend the ability to read clearly the 
occult:
... Jo matter how empty the adytum, so that the 
veil be thick enough. bo absolute is our soul's need 
of something hidden and uncertain for the maintenance 
of that doudt and hope and effort which are the breath 
of its life, that if the whole future were laid bare 
to us beyond to-day, the interest of all mankind would 
be bent on the hours that lie between; we should pant 
after the uncertainties of our one morning and our one 
afternoon. 57
liardy's treatment of the mysterious is that of 
an agnostic v/ho would like to be convinced. lie seems 
to regard the supernatural phenomena he presents in 
his stories and. notes as intellectual curiosities, 
fney must, as the tricks of a magician, be explicable 
by natural law. hard., enjoys them cS riddles defying 
his reason. He is very painstaking in oresenting 
the details of any inexplicable occurrence uti if 
challenging the reader to unravel the mystery. Thus, 
even when used as an essential element in an emotional
57 IT f h o  l i f t e d  V e i l , "  H s s a y s , 4 5 6 ,
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element in an emotional story, the mystic itself does 
not appeal to the reader’s emotion but to his intellect, 
fh emotion is stirred, rather, ay the straggle of the 
victim against a fate that assumes a baffling guise.
In "The 'dithered Arm” Hardy weaves an intellectual 
mystery whose details are supplied anu attested by not 
less than four persons. Hut the supernatural does not 
carry its own emotional appeal as it does in 31iot.
Ilie reader is induced to puzzle his wits for a solution 
whether or not his heart is touched by the spiritual 
struggles of uhoda. In itself the supernafural engages 
the intellect, although as a manifestation of a hostile 
fate it enters the omotional construction of the story 
as its gre^c obstacle. The mystery of one w if he red 
arm is never solved, and the story closes 011 the in­
tellectual plane:
... Here, sometimes, those who knew her ex­
periences would stand and observe her, and wonder what 
^ombre thoughts were beating inside that impassive, 
wrinkle-^ brow, to the rhythm of the alternating milk- 
streams.
Hinee he always sees the mystic as something de­
manding solution, Hardy never uses it as of blessed 
emotional significance, as does Hliot. To do so he 
would have to be resigned to the supernatural, or at
n3 "The Withered Arm,” 7/e ©sex Tales, 104.
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least be aole, as is Hliot , to acquiesce gracefully 
to the inevitably onsolvabla, and make the hest of 
it. Hardy remains mentally more militant, more in­
vestigative. ’JHir on gh out his life Hard^ retains a keen
interest in reported happenings of a psychic nature.
A most intiim.te instance , reported by A s .  Hardy, is 
the onaccountable behavior of Hardy1s dog Wessex:
About nine o ’clock on the evening of April 18 (1925), 
A r . Watkins called at Aax late. ... The dog, as was 
his wont, rushed into the hall and greeted his friend 
with vociferous barks. Suddenly these gave way to a 
piteous whine, and the change was so startling that 
Wessex’s mistress went to see what had happened.
nothing however seemed amiss, und the dog re­
turned into the room where Hardy was sitting and where 
he was joineu oy ^r. Hat kins. Jut even here Wessex 
seemed ill at ease, and from time to time went to the 
visitor and touched his coat solicitously with his 
paw, which he always withdrew giving a sharp cry of 
distress.
xur. Hat kins left a little after fen o ’clock, 
apparently in very good spirits. Harly the next 
morning there came a telephone message from his son 
to say that the father, Hardy’s guest of the night 
before, had died auite suddenly about an hour after 
his return to the hotel from aiax Grate. As a rule the 
dog barxeu furiously when he heard the telephone 
ring, but on this occasion he remained silent, his 
nose between his paws. °
Haray maxe^ use of a similar incident in Desperate 
60Hamad I 3 o : Jcavtered throughout his journals
reportings of mysterious happenings which Ii^rdy seems
59 hater Years, 241.
60 Desperat e Hemedies, 105.
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intellectually to doubt as manifestations of a super­
natural, but vdiich he plainly wishes he coufd believe.
In lieal Conversations William Archer testifies to 
Hardy's eager interest in the mystic:
Ar. hardy: Well, now, in this matter my position
is just the reverse of yours. I am most anxious to 
believe in whut, roughly speaking, we may call the 
supernatural —  but I find no evidence for it! People 
accuse me of scepticism, materialism, and so forth; 
but, if the accusation is just at all, it is quite 
against my will, for instance, I seriously assure 
you Chat I would give ten yeara of my life -- well, 
perhaps that offer is rather beyond my means —  but 
when I was a younger man, I would cheerfully have 
given ten years of my life to see a ghost - - a n  
authentic, indisputable spectre.
• • •
mother believed that she once saw an apparition,
etc. bl
One of the most profound effects of Sliot's 
study of evolution seems to be her conviction that 
each social institution, just as each organism, is 
Che .roduct of a long series of developments. She 
does not believe t h a t  a new order can come into being 
by a special creation. It must be built on the 
accumulated traditions of p^st ages. Phis belief 
keeps her from being so iconoclastic as is Hardy, and 
at the same time causes her go countenance moderat e 
views t h a t  seem inconsistent with her professed agnos­
ticism. In a letter of 1880 she writes:
61 Archer, V/m. , ueal Jonvor sat ions , 37.
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Remember , dear, the t the reason why societies 
change slowly is, because individual men and women 
cannot have their natures changed by doctrine and 
can only be wrought on by kittle and little. 62
she somewhat defends her position of tolerance of
irrational traditions as being the only tenable one
in the nineteenth century:
... As a necessary preliminary to a purely 
rational society, you must obtain purely rational 
men, free from the sweet and bitter prejudices of 
hereditary affection and antipathy; which is as easy 
as to get runningr streams without springs, or the 
leafy shade of the forest without one secular growth 
of trunh and branch. 63
She accepts traditional forms of worship, not as 
does Hardy for their antiquarian interest only, or 
because nothing better is at hand to beep some sort 
of church in operation, but because they seem to her 
to be parts of the foundation of modern society and 
to embrace the accumulated wisdom and aspiration of 
the race. Aany of the observances have been proved 
through long generations to be conducive to the highest 
ethical and emotional development. 2he cites, for
example, aneeling in prayer;
Slowly Homola fell to her anees, and in the 
very act a tremor came over h e r ; in the renunciation 
of her proud erectness, her mental attitude seemed 
changed, and she found herself in a new state of 
passiveness. 64
62 setter to Alma Otuart, l»ec. 11, 1380.
63 rTIhe Hatural History of Herman ^ife,,f 3 s say s , 180. 
6a uoi'flola 1, IV 0,
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Eliot does not answer uhe psychological question of 
whether kneeling gets its virtue through long associ­
ation with humility, or whether there is something 
biologically conducive to meekness in the physical atti­
tude of kneeling. bhe simply accepts the institution 
of uneeling as jending towards the desirable renun­
ciation. ilor does the fact that she can conceive of 
nothing absolute to which to kneel affect the efficacy 
of the uneeling. for the essential purpose is not 
to glorify another being, but to edify man. like­
wise for all the symbolisms of religion Eliot has 
reverence. To her they are the crystalization of the 
highest idealism and the most disinterested heroisms 
of the race. They are the imagery that has been 
hallowed through the loftiest aspirations of mankind. 
They are the net result, too, of former reasonings 
and experiments, and have become the guide of the 
race as an organism, just as habit, when once learned 
through feeling or through reason, becomes the mentor 
for the individual. The mutual guidance of man by 
tradition and reason Eliot describes in a speech of 
u ne Jew ane pard o «
... 1 t.o id e 
3y thot wise spirit of jListening reverence 
Which marks the boldest doctors of our ro.ce.
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For truth, to us, is like a living child 
3orn of two parents: if the parents part 
And will divide the child, how shall it live?
Or, I will rather say: Two angels guide 
The path of nan, doth aged and yet young,
As angels are, ripening through endless years*
On one he leans: some call her kemory,
And some, tradition; and her voice is sweet,
With deeo mysterious accords; the other,
Floating ahova, holds down a lamp which streams 
A light divine and searching on the earth, 
Compelling eyes and footsteps. memory yields,
Yet clings with loving check, and shines anew
Reflecting all the rays of that bright lamp
Our angel Reason holds. We had not walked
But for Tradition; we walk evermore
To higher p^ths, by brightening Reason's lamp. 61:
Elsewhere she pictures poetically the present hope
of man as the culmination of all the past, just as
the hope of the future will incorporate the best from
uhe present;
The faith that life on earth is being shaped 
To glorious ends, that order, justice, love,
Aeon man's completeness, mean effect as sure 
As roundness in the dew-drop —  that great faith 
Is but the rushing and expanding stream 
Of thought, of feeling, fed by all the past.
Our finest hope is finest memory.
In a review of Lacey's History of Rati onalism in
Earope she defends the role of tradition:
Our sentiments may oe callau. organized tra­
ditions; and a large Part of our actions gather all 
their justification, all their attraction and aroma, 
from the memory of uhe life lived, of the actions 
done, before we were born. In the absence of any 
profound research into psyci ologicul functions or iiito
6p The Spanish By psy, 171.
66 ''A Ainor Prophet , *T Poems, 389.
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the mysteries of inheritance, in the absence of 
any profound comprehensive view of i .  oil’s historical 
development and the dependence of one age on another, 
a mind at all rich in sensi oilit ieio must always have 
had an indefinite uneasiness in an undistinguishing 
attack on the coercive influence of tradition, 67
A letter to Aadame bodiehon gives us more intimate
knowledge of Eliot's conception of what should be
the attitude of the enlightened mind towards religious
traditi on:
... As for the forms and ceremonies, I feel no 
regret that any should turn to them for comfort if 
they can find comfort in them; sympathetically 1 enjoy 
them myslef. 3ut I have faith in the working out of 
higher possibilities than the Catholic or any other 
Church has presented; and those who have strength to 
wait and endure are bound to accept no formula which 
their whole souls —  their intellect as well as their 
emotions -- do not embrace with entire reverence.
The "highest calling and election" is t_o do without 
opium, and live through all your pain with conscious, 
clear-eyed endurance. 6°
Tradition in worship, then, like belief in immortality 
and other orthodox concepts, Eliot values for its poetic 
and utilitarian virtue s. lor the non-rationalizing 
mind tradition must be the criterion, lor the seer, 
tradition has a different significance. It is re­
spected ci.s the mother of the best in life, but it 
is also subject to improvement by the best intelli­
gence of the race, and its dictates must always 
be oubjact to the veto of the enlightened intellect;
67 "The Influence of Aati onc-li sm ," Essays fllal«
68 jj611 er to ijiudam bodicnon, rec. 2 o , 1860 Cross II, 28a.
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There is not a more pernicious fallacy afloat in common parlance than the wide distinction made 
between intellect and morality. Amiable impulses 
without intellect man m^y have in common with dogs 
and horses; but morality, which is specifically 
human, is dependent on the regulation of feeling 
by intellect. All human beings who can be said to 
be in any degree moral have their impulses guided, 
not indeed always by their own intellect, but by the 
intellect of human beings who have gone before them, 
and created traditions andqassociations which have 
taken the rank of laws.
finally, Eliot places a much higher value on 
religious tradition than does hardy, who would hold 
EliotTs position not quite intellectually honest in 
himself, and who would not be convinced that what 
tradition can conserve is altogether worth con­
serving.
In Eliot’s philosophy the true life of an organism 
is the life of feeling. This idea is in line with her 
concept of evolution. She sees the intellectual faculty 
in man as a late development, an outgrowth, an ordering 
of the emotions. It has been made necessary only because 
of the greater complexity of the higher organism and 
the conflicts incident to interaction of different or­
ganisms. Though the intellect has come to oe a guide 
and moderator of man's emotional life, the emotions 
still remain the basic part of liis nature. Often they
o'J ’’Evangelical Teaching,’’ Ess a y s , 112.
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are to 00 trusted rather than the inure lately de- 
velopeu intellect, lor onl̂ y through the emotions cun 
one enter s„mputhetically into the life of one's fellow- 
men and 'understand their hopes and fears, in other words, 
it is not intellectual knowledge of the objective needs 
of the world that gives motive power to service, that 
inspires the feelingo of duty and of self sacrifice.
It is the subjective feeling for the sufferings of others. 
77e see the conflict between the spirit and the letter, 
between beauty and truth. ISliot expresses the contrast 
in the defense she has Maggie make against her righteous 
but unimugin. t ive brother:
... nut yet, sometimes whan I have dona wrong, 
it has bean because I have feelingc that you would 
be the better for, if you had them. If #ou were in 
fault ever —  if you had done anything very wrong,
1 should not want punishment to be heaped on you.
... You have no pity; you have no sense of your own 
imperfection and ^Qur own sins. ...You are nothing 
but a Yharisee.
So her purpose in writing is not to combat unscientific 
beliefs or to encourage rutionalistic t h o u g h t  in her 
readers. It sens to make but little difference what 
people think if only their feelings are right, for it 
is the feelings that produce the all important service
73 î-ll on the x loss . 36Q.
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to humanity* She declares that
•«. it is possible , thank heaven.1 to have very 
erroneous theories and very sublime feelings. ?1
Eliot lets Adam 3ede speak this critiaue of feeling
as the incentive of good deeds:
Jut I've seen _ratty clear, ever since I was a 
young un, as religion1s omethin else besideo notions. 
It isn't notions-Bets people doing the right thing—  it'a feelings. 72
Elsewhere is quoted Eliot's dictum that to her the 
idea of dod is inconceivable. Yet she advocates
the holding to the concept of dod, not, as does Hardy, 
for its historical and poetic value alone, but as a 
"conscious illusion" for the ennoblement of man's 
sent iment s:
fiie idea of dod is really moral in its influence- 
it really cherishes all that is best and lovliest 
in man —  only when dod is contemplated as sympa­
thizing with the pure elements of human feeling, 
as possessing infinitely all those attributes which 
we recognize to o? moral in humanity. In this light, 
the idea of dod and the sense of his presence in­
tensify all noble feeling, and encourage all noble 
efforts, on the same principle that human sympathy 
is found a source of strength: fhe brave man feels
braver when he .mows that another stout heart is 
beating time with his; the devoted woman who is 
wearing out her years in patient effort to alleviate 
suffering or.save vice from the last stages of 
degradation, finds aid in the pressure of a friendly 
hand which tells her timt there is one who under­
stands her deeds, and in her place would do the lime, 
fhe idea ô  a dod who not only sympathizes with all 
we feel and endure for our fellow-men, but who will 
pour new life into our too languid love, and give
71 Adam Aede , 3872 Ibid, 186.
72 *«yers, krederic A. Ii. : "deorge Eliot," Century 
mgazine , dov. 1881. Quoted in Ohao.”Yi.
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firmness to our vasciflating purpose, is an at­
tention and a multiplication of the effects pro­
duced by human sympathy; and it has been intensi­
fied for the better spirits who have been under the influence of orthodox Christianity by the con- „.
tomplation of Jesus as ’Cod manifest in the flesh.”
From this it is apparent that the concept of Cod
is not one of litteral truth. leather, He is an
objectification of loftiest and most unselfish
feeling. Her purpose as the sponsor of such a god
is that this god may so appeal to the sensibilities
of man as to purge him of much of his selfishness
and inspire him with more idealist! c sympathy. Her
creed as a writer she gives in a letter to Charles
3 ray:
... I have had heart-cutting experience that 
opinions are a poor cement between human souls: 
and the only effect I ardently long to produce by 
my writings is, that those who read them should 
be batt?r able to imagine and to feel the pains 
and the joys of those who differ from themselves 
in everything but the broad fact of being struggling, 
erring, human creatures.
This glorification of the ennobling feeling, 
seemingly at the expense of insistence on scientific 
accuracyt is easily accounted for from the manner 
of Eliot’s conversion to Jositivism. A letter of 
tint period shows her as already committed to two 
standards -- the intellectual one of scientific truth
74 ’Evangelical leaching” Essays, 136.73 .letter to Charles 3ray, ath July, 1839. Cross II, 118.
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for her private thinking, and the emotional one of 
spiritual truth, love, service, for her life of feel­
ing and for others, in commenting on the religious 
experiences of a certain miss I), she says:
When the soul is just liberated from the 
wretched giants' bed of dogmas on which it has 
been racked and stretched ever since it began to 
think, there is a feeling of exultation and strong 
hope. ... ’Ye believe that we shall soon obtain 
something positive which will not only more than 
compensate us for what we have renounced, but will 
be so well worth offering to others, that we may 
venture so- proselytise as fast as our zeal for truth 
may prompt us. 3ut a year or two of reflection, and 
the experience of our own miserable weakness, which 
will ill afford to part even with the crutch of super­
stition, must, I think, effect a change. Speculative 
truth begins to appear but a shadow of individual 
minds* Agreement between intellects seems unattain­
able, and we turn to the truth of feeling as the only- 
universal bond of union. Ye find thd the intellectual 
errors which we once fancied were a mere incrustation 
have grown into the living body, and that we cannot 
in the majority of cases wrench them away without 
dBStroying vitality. Ye begin to find that with 
individuals, as with nations, the only safe revolution 
is one arising out of the wants which their own progress
has generated. It is the auaokery of infidelity to
suppose that it has a nostrum for all mankind.
Of the two standards, the intellectual and the emotional,
she nelu. the latter oo oo paramount.
Again the intellect is considered as ancillary to 
emotional well being. It is not justified in itself,
but only it serves the affections, which have given
rise to it:
76 Letter to bara hennell, Oct. 1 J , 1845. cross I, 182.
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After all has bean said that can be said 
about She widening influence of ideas, it remains true 
that they would hardly be such strong agents unless 
they were taken in a solvent of feeling. I he great 
world-struggle of developing thought is continually 
foreshadowed in the struggle of the affections, 
seeking a justification for love and hope. 77
Her advice to thinking man is that he keep emotion
and sentiment intact and operative even in the face
of reflection that threatens to reduce life to
barren law. Jo this and she justifies, as Hardy
would not, the entertaining of conscious illusion:
... Our sweet illusions are half of them 
conscious illusions, like effects of color that 
we know to be made up of tinsel, broken glass, 
and r&gs, 78
77 Aomola 11, 67.78 "The lifted Veil," Essays, 407.
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